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SPARE THE ROD, EMBRACE OUR HUMANITY:
TOWARD A NEW LEGAL REGIME PROHIBITING
CORPORAL PUNISHMENT OF CHILDREN
Susan H. Bitensky*
This article proceeds from the simple premise that hitting children
hurts them-even when the hitting does not rise to the level of child
abuse as traditionally conceived. There is convincing evidence that
corporal punishment is a hidden cruelty in child rearing that has se-
rious adverse consequences for its victims and society at large. Yet
forty-nine states permit parental corporal punishment of children
and approximately half of the states permit such punishment in ele-
mentary and secondary schools The main purpose of this Article is to
question the advisability of continuing the legalized status of corpo-
ral punishment of children in the United States, especially when the
punishment is administered by parents or guardians The Article
presents a new framework for analysis by surveying the laws of those
countries and the one state that have prohibited all corporal pun-
ishment of children and by examining international human rights
instruments that may be interpreted to support such laws. The Article
also explores the psychological, sociological, and ethical considera-
tions warranting prohibition and presents a new proposal for law
reform on the subject.
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INTRODUCTION
"Childhood"-the word readily conjures up sunlit pictures of
little souls boisterously bounding in play or quietly absorbed in
whimsical imaginings. But childhood also moves in dark shad-
ows that loom large with fear and pain. These are the shadows
cast by an adult world that wields the power and legal preroga-
tive to subject its young to "reasonable" corporal punishment in
the name of discipline and guidance. Blows, no matter what
their purpose, bring pain and dread of pain even if they are
administered with moderation; and these are blows against
which there is no recourse, regardless of how often they are
repeated. This is the somber side of childhood, overhanging
days of play and whimsy with a helpless distress that operates
at the level of normalcy.
It may be that the more charming images of childhood come
to mind first or exclusively not only because childhood is in-
deed a time of bustling activity and idle reverie but also
because it is too uncomfortable to summon up sensations of
pain and attendant feelings of fear, sorrow, and anger. Such
summoning can make unbearable demands on us both as pre-
sent parents and as former children. For, if the reader has
spanked his or her own child, the summoning is apt to produce
unease at having administered a spanking that may have
caused these sensations and feelings in another;' and, if the
reader was spanked as a child, unpleasant memories of it may
require an acknowledgment that a beloved parent had short-
comings and caused one's own suffering.2
This reflexive resistance to a critical contemplation of
corporal punishment of children is compounded by the fact
that spanking is common in the United States. Most American
1. See NANCY SAMALIN, LOVING YOUR CHILD IS NOT ENOUGH: POSITIVE DIs-
CIPLINE THAT WORKS 73 (1987); WILLIAM SEARS & MARTHA SEARS, THE DISCIPLINE
BOOK EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW TO HAVE A BETrER-BEHAVED CHILD-FROM
BIRTH TO AGE TEN 148 (1995).
2. See MURRAY A. STRAUS, BEATING THE DEVIL OUT OF THEM: CORPORAL
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN FAMILIES 163 (1994); Dean M. Herman, A Statutory Pro-
posal to Prohibit the Infliction of Violence upon Children, 19 FAM. L. Q. 1, 18-21
(1985); see also ALICE MILLER, THOU SHALT NOT BE AWARE: SOCIETY'S BETRAYAL OF
THE CHILD 161, 209-10, 299 (1984) (describing generally the way children react to
trauma caused by their parents).
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children have been hit by an adult in one venue or another.'
Indeed, corporal punishment of children in the schools is, as of
this writing, legal in about half the states.4 "Reasonable"
3. See STRAUS, supra note 2, at 3 ("[Mlore than 90 percent of American parents
hit toddlers and most continue to hit their children for years. In short, almost all
American children have been hit by their parents-usually for many years."). A 1989
Harris poll showed that 86% of the respondents representing "a random, representa-
tive sample of 1,250 Americans" supported parental spanking. See IRWIN A. HYMAN,
READING, WRITING, AND THE HICKORY STICK: THE APPALLING STORY OF PHYSICAL AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL ABUSE IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS 56 (1990) [hereinafter HYMAN,
READING, WRITING, AND THE HICKORY STICK]. An even more recent assessment is that
four out of five Americans who were spanked as children approve of spanking. See
Interview by Katie Couric with Heidi Murkoff, author of child care books, on Today
(NBC television broadcast, Nov. 19, 1996). Indeed, "[e]ven in their late teens (ages 15
to 17), about a quarter of American children still experience some sort of corporal
punishment." STRAUS, supra note 2, at 32. But see Larry Reibstein & Susan Miller,
The Debate over Discipline, NEWSWEEK Special Edition, Spring/Summer 1997, at 64
(reporting that "[flor this generation of educated middle-class parents, spanking is as
politically incorrect as smoking," and that a Newsweek poll shows that only 31 percent
of parents spank their children sometimes or often).
With respect to corporal punishment of children in public elementary and secon-
dary schools, see infra note 13 and accompanying text. "[Situdies of corporal
punishment in schools indicate that it is not used as a 'last resort.' It is too often the
first punishment for nonviolent and minor misbehaviors." Irwin A. Hyman, Corporal
Punishment, Psychological Maltreatment, Violence, and Punitiveness in America: Re-
search, Advocacy, and Public Policy, 4 APPLIED & PREVENTIVE PSYCHOL. 113, 117
(1995) (citations omitted) [hereinafter Hyman, Corporal Punishment] (summarizing
the findings of studies of corporal punishment in schools). In addition, "[m]ost of the
corporal punishment in America occurs in states in the South and Southwest-
Florida, Texas, Arkansas, and Alabama have consistently been among the leaders in
the frequency of hitting school children." Id. at 17 (citations omitted).
4. Some statutes, either expressly or by inference, prohibit the use of corporal
punishment on students in elementary and secondary schools. Some of these statutes
also contain language stating that force may be used for other specified purposes
besides punishment. See, e.g., ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, § 07.010(c) (1996) (stating
an express prohibition); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49001 (West 1993) (stating an express
prohibition with the caveat that force may be used for the specified purpose other
than punishment); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-18(6) (West 1994) (implying a
prohibition by permitting the use of force for specified purposes other than punitive
ones); HAW. REV. STAT. § 298-16 (1993) and HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 703-309(2)
(Michie 1994) (expressly prohibiting the use of force for punishment, but allowing its
use for other specified purposes such as the maintenance of school discipline); 105 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/24-24 (West 1996) (stating an express prohibition with the caveat that
force may be used for specified purposes other than punishment); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 280.21 (West 1996) (stating an express prohibition with the caveat that force may be
used for specified purposes other than punishment); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-306
(1996) (stating an express prohibition); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 71, § 37G (Law. Co-op.
1991) (stating an express prohibition with the caveat that force may be used for
specified purposes other than punishment); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.1312 (West
1997) (stating an express prohibition with the caveat that force may be used for
specified purposes other than punishment); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 127.45 (West 1996)
(stating an express prohibition); MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-4-302 (1997) (stating an
express prohibition with the caveat that force may be used for specified purposes such
as "maintain[ing] the orderly conduct of a pupil"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-295 (1996)
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corporal punishment of children by their parents or guardians
is legal in every state except Minnesota;5 even so, recently
(stating an express prohibition); NEV. REV. STAT. § 392.465 (1995) (stating an express
prohibition with the caveat that force may be used for specified purposes other than
punishment); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-1 (West 1989) (stating an express prohibition
with the caveat that force may be used for specified purposes other than punishment);
N.Y COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 19.5 (1995) (stating an express prohibition with
the caveat that force may be used for specified purposes other than punishment); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 15-47-47 (1993) (stating an express prohibition with the caveat that
force may be used for specified purposes such as "quell[ing] a verbal disturbance" or
"preserv[ing] order"); OR. REV. STAT. § 339.250(2),(11) (1995) (stating an express
prohibition with the caveat that force may be used for the specified purpose of
maintaining order); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-802 (1997) (stating an express
prohibition unless the child's parent or guardian has given written permission for
corporal punishment to be administered and otherwise allowing use of force for
specified purposes besides punishment); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1161a (1989) (stating
an express prohibition with the caveat that force may be used for specified purposes
other than punishment); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-279.1 (Michie 1997) (stating an express
prohibition with the caveat that force may be used for specified purposes such as
"maintain[ing] order and control'); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.150.300 (West 1997)
(stating an express prohibition); W. VA. CODE § 18A-5-1 (Supp. 1997) (stating an
express prohibition); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.31 (West 1991 & Supp. 1997) (stating an
express prohibition with the caveat that force may be used for specified purposes such
as maintaining order and control). Rhode Island does not expressly forbid corporal
punishment in its schools, but all school districts are directed to devise a discipline
policy and no districts have permitted the use of corporal punishment on students. See
Jerry R. Parkinson, Federal Court Treatment of Corporal Punishment in Public
Schools: Jurisprudence that is Literally Shocking to the Conscience, 39 S.D. L. REV.
276, 279 n.30 (1994) (citing Telephone Interview with Mr. Vila, Legal Office, Rhode
Island Department of Education (Mar. 23, 1994)). According to the Legal Counsel for
the Commissioner of Rhode Island's Department of Education,
There's no policy manual provision in the State of Rhode Island which author-
izes the use of corporal punishment in the schools. School districts can only do
what is authorized in the state policy manual. Corporal punishment is looked
down upon and a law authorizing its use would never pass the state legislature.
Telephone Interview by Christine Greig with Thomas Vila, Legal Counsel for the
Commissioner of Rhode Island's Department of Education (Jan. 6, 1997).
Also, "[clorporal punishment is no longer practiced in most Catholic schools ...
Karen W. Arenson, Parochial School Mystique, N.Y TIMES, Sept. 22, 1996, § 4 (Week in
Review), at 14.
5. For commentators referring to the fact that all states permit parents or
guardians to administer "reasonable" corporal punishment upon children, see Leonard
P. Edwards, Corporal Punishment and the Legal System, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 983,
984-85 (1996); Mary Kate Kearney, Substantive Due Process and Parental Corporal
Punishment: Democracy and the Excluded Child, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 22 & n.125,
29 (1995). Cf Franklin E. Zimring, Legal Perspectives on Family Violence, 75 CAL. L.
REV. 521, 526 (1987) (stating that "the physical discipline of children is typically in-
sulated from legal review if it does not represent a gross threat to the child').
Some states have enacted statutory language specifically authorizing corporal
punishment of children by their parents or guardians. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-
24(1) (1993); ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.430(a)(1) (Michie 1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
403(1) (West 1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-605(1) (Michie 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-
1-703(1)(a) (1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-18 (West 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
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there was an unsuccessful attempt in Congress to enact
legislation that would have given parents an express federal
right to mete out such punishment.6
11, § 468 (1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-15-1(3)(A) (Supp. 1997); HAW. REV. STAT. § 703-
309(1) (1993); IDAHO CODE § 16-2002 (1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-34-1-15 (West Supp.
1997); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.110(1) (Michie 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:18(4)
(West 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 106(1) (West 1983); MD. CODE ANN.,
FAM. LAW § 4-501(b)(2) (Supp. 1997); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.136b (West 1991);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-105 (Supp. 1997); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.110(1) (1994); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:6(I) (1996); N.Y PENAL LAW § 35.10(1) (McKinney 1998); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-05(1) (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.03.1(B) (Anderson
Supp. 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 844 (West 1983); OR. REV. STAT., § 161.205(1)
(1995); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 509(1) (West Supp. 1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-
490(3)(a) (West Supp. 1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAwS § 22-18-5 (Michie Supp. 1997); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.001(1)(C) (West 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-401(3) (1995);
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.015 (1996); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.45 (West 1996 & Supp.
1997).
Some states have also indicated acceptance of "reasonable" parental corporal pun-
ishment by judicial decision. See, e.g., State v. Arnold, 543 N.W2d 600, 602-03 (Iowa
1996) ("[Plarents have a right to inflict corporal punishment on their child, but that
right is restricted by moderation and reasonableness."); Carpenter v. Commonwealth,
44 S.E.2d 419, 423 (Va. 1947) ("Courts are agreed that a parent has the right to ad-
minister such reasonable and timely punishment as may be necessary to correct
faults in his growing children.").
Minnesota also appears to have a statute allowing parental corporal punishment of
children. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.06, subd. 1(6) (West Supp. 1998) (allowing rea-
sonable force "when used by a parent, guardian, teacher or other lawful custodian of a
child or pupil, in the exercise of lawful authority, to restrain or correct such child or
pupil"); see also MANN. STAT. ANN. § 609.379 (West 1987) (same). For this reason,
commentators often incorrectly include Minnesota among the states authorizing such
punishment. See Letter from Victor I. Vieth, Senior Attorney, National Center for
Prosecution of Child Abuse, to Nadine Block, Director, Center for Effective Discipline
(Oct. 29, 1997) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). How-
ever, Minnesota precludes the use of reasonable force, including corporal punishment,
as a defense to assault charges. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.379 (West 1987 & Supp.
1998) (allowing for the use of reasonable force as a defense for certain criminal of-
fenses, not including assault); see also Victor I. Vieth, Corporal Punishment in the
United States: A Call for a New Approach to the Prosecution of Disciplinarians, 15 J.
JUV. L. 22, 41-45 (1994) [hereinafter Vieth, Corporal Punishment] (detailing Minne-
sota's statutory scheme vis-A-vis corporal punishment of children); infra Part I.H. The
result is that "it is a crime to employ physical discipline in Minnesota." Vieth, Corpo-
ral Punishment, supra, at 42 n. 160.
It is interesting to note that in 1991, a bill was introduced in the Wisconsin legisla-
ture which, had it been enacted, would have prohibited any person responsible for a
child's welfare from subjecting the child to corporal punishment. See H.R. 799, 1991-
92 Leg. (Wis. 1991).
6. See Parental Rights and Responsibilities Act of 1995, S. 984, 104th Cong. § 3
(1995) (providing for parents' right to direct the upbringing of their children and sub-
suming therein a parental right of "disciplining the child, including reasonable
corporal discipline"). The bill died in the Senate Judiciary Committee. See Telephone
Interview with Bryce Sandler, Finance Director for Congressman Joseph Knollenberg
(Sept. 18, 1997).
Over the past two and one-half years, a movement has also been under way to per-
suade 28 state legislatures to adopt a parental rights amendment that would give
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Because parentally administered corporal punishment is a
long-standing and pervasive practice, it, in particular, is as-
sumed to be sacrosanct. Until recently, it did not even occur to
many Americans that a practice so ingrained and common-
place could be misguided.7 Indeed, while most psychologists,
pediatricians, social workers, and other experts in child devel-
opment have questioned the wisdom of corporal punishment of
children,' the legal community has tended to string with the
lay mainstream and has remained virtually impervious to the
debate insofar as it involves punishment in the family. Legal
scholarship in particular has been, with a few exceptions, re-
markably silent.9 This Article is intended to throw down the
intellectual gauntlet, not just to recruit converts to this
author's point of view, but also, more humbly, to nudge the
academy into giving the subject fuller and more objective scru-
tiny.
Reassessment of corporal punishment of children is
politically sensitive and evocative of related controversial issues,
circumstances which make it easy to ascribe an unintended
breadth to the topic undertaken here. Before proceeding further,
parents a seemingly absolute right to raise and educate their children without state
governmental interference. See Mark Frankel & Larry Reibstein, Family: Who's
Hands-On, Who's Hands-Off? The Parental Rights Amendment, NEWSWEEK, July 8,
1996, at 58. Adding such a right to state constitutions would, no doubt, further
strengthen parents' prerogative to physically punish their offspring. However, as of
July, 1996, the parental rights amendments had not yet been adopted in any state and
had been defeated in Kansas, North Dakota, and Virginia. See id. It was also more
recently defeated in Colorado. See Robert Kowalski, Voters Reject Parental-Rights
Measure, DENV. POST, Nov. 6, 1996, at Al.
7. See STRAUS, supra note 2, at 11 ("Corporal punishment is so commonly ac-
cepted that it is taken for granted, an unremarkable and almost imperceptible part of
the lives of parents and children."); see also Herman, supra note 2, at 2 (describing
Americans as desensitized to the use of corporal punishment on children). But see
STRAUS, supra note 2, at 33 (discussing surveys showing some decline in the frequency
and severity of such punishment from 1975 to 1985).
8. See infra notes 347-48 and accompanying text.
9. Credit is due to Dean M. Herman who wrote a ground breaking law review
article in 1985 critiquing the legality of parental corporal punishment of children.
Herman, supra note 2. The Herman piece was ahead of its time and represents a ma-
jor contribution. There are very few other American law review articles dealing
primarily with the legal status of parental corporal punishment of children from the
perspective of law professionals. See Edwards, supra note 5; Kearney, supra note 5;
Vieth, Corporal Punishment, supra note 5; Scott A. Davidson, Note, When Is Parental
Discipline Child Abuse?-The Vagueness of Child Abuse Laws, 34 U. LOUISVILLE J.
FAM. L. 403, 405-19 (1996); Dennis Alan Olson, Comment, The Swedish Ban of Corpo-
ral Punishment, 1984 BYU L. REV. 447 passim (1984); cf Murray A. Straus & Carrie
L. Yodanis, Corporal Punishment by Parents: Implications for Primary Prevention of
Assaults on Spouses and Children, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 35 (1995)
(discussing parental corporal punishment from the sociologist's point of view).
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therefore, it is essential to avoid any misunderstanding by
distinguishing what this Article does and does not profess to do.
First, this Article does not presume to attribute all of the ills of
childhood or of society at large to corporal punishment of
children. The world is too complex to assign any one cause as
the sole source of adversity. Instead, the approach here is to
treat such punishment as a highly significant and frequently
unacknowledged factor contributing to humanity's more
destructive characteristics and tendencies."°
Second, this is not an article advocating permissiveness in
raising or educating children. Like many experts on child psy-
chology, this author accepts the notion that adults must set
limits for children and that children should be taught to ad-
here to those limits." The intent here is to examine policy and
law reform with respect to only one form of discipline-
physical chastisement.
Third, this is not an article about child abuse as that term is
traditionally conceived. My concern instead is with subabuse
corporal punishment. "Subabuse," as used here, is not meant
to imply that there is nothing abusive about "reasonable"
spanks or smacks; Part III of this Article, in fact, demonstrates
the contrary. Rather, "subabuse corporal punishment" is used
to signify attacks on the body of the child, in the name of dis-
cipline or guidance, that are not extreme enough to be
prosecutable under child abuse or child cruelty statutes. The
term "subabuse corporal punishment," which will be employed
interchangeably with "corporal punishment," may thus be de-
fined for purposes of this Article as follows: the currently
nonprosecutable (in the United States) use of physical force
with the intention of causing a child to experience bodily pain
so as to correct, control, or punish the child's behavior.2
Fourth, the primary focus of this Article will be on corporal
punishment administered by parents or other custodians of
the child in the family context. One reason for this emphasis is
that the legality of corporal punishment in the schools has
10. See infra notes 391-405 and accompanying text.
11. See PENELOPE LEACH, YOUR GROWING CHILD: FROM BABYHOOD THROUGH
ADOLESCENCE 205-08, 211-13, 217 (1996) (defining the proper nature and role of dis-
cipline as affected by the variable of a child's age); SEARS & SEARS, supra note 1, at
158-59; BENJAMIN SPOCK, DR. SPOCK ON PARENTING 145-53 (1988) (denying that lack
of corporal punishment amounts to permissive parenting); ALICE MILLER, FOR YOUR
OWN GOOD: HIDDEN CRUELTY IN CHILD-REARING AND THE ROOTS OF VIOLENCE 177
(1990) (rejecting permissiveness in child rearing).
12. This formulation is derived in large measure from Professor Murray A.
Straus' definition of corporal punishment. See STRAUS, supra note 2, at 4.
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already received substantial attention from American legal
scholars.13 The other reason for this delimitation is that
banning corporal punishment of children by parents or
guardians raises constitutional concerns that are unique to the
family and that still await analytical study. However, this
emphasis should not be taken to signal the acceptability, from
a policy standpoint, of subabuse corporal punishment of
children in the schools or in any other milieu. Most of the
policy reasons elaborated in Part III of this Article for
prohibiting corporal punishment of children in the family
apply equally well to corporal punishment of children
elsewhere. Indeed, this author advocates the abolition of all
corporal punishment of children and proposes a model statute
to that end.
The main purpose of this Article, then, is to question the
advisability of continuing the legalized status of subabuse
corporal punishment of children in the United States,
especially when that punishment is administered by parents
or guardians. It is an undertaking that necessarily entails
discussion of the relevant psychological, sociological, and
ethical considerations as well as a proposal for legal reform,
matters that have been covered in less depth in other law
reviews. Perhaps more significantly, this Article also presents
a new framework for analysis by providing a survey of how the
13. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Alexander & Paul Horton, Ingraham v. Wright- A
Primer for Cruel and Unusual Jurisprudence, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1305, 1326-49, 1382-
93, 1399-1403 (1979); Gerard J. Clark, Ingraham v. Wright and the Decline of Due
Process, 12 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1151 (1978); Cynthia Price Cohen, Beating Children Is
as American as Apple Pie, HUM. RTS., May, 1978, at 24; Cynthia Price Cohen, Freedom
from Corporal Punishment: One of the Human Rights of Children, N.Y.L. SCH. HUM.
RTS. ANN. 95, 101-11 (1984) [hereinafter Cohen, Corporal Punishment]; John Dayton,
Corporal Punishment in Public Schools: The Legal and Political Battle Continues, 89
EDUC. L. REP. 729 (1994); Cecelia M. Espenoza, Good Kids, Bad Kids: A Revelation
About the Due Process Rights of Children, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 407, 425-27
(1996); Donald H. Henderson, Constitutional Implications Involving the Use of Corpo-
ral Punishment in the Public Schools: A Comprehensive Review, 15 J. L. & EDUC. 255
(1986); Joan L. Neisser, School Officials: Parents or Protectors? The Contribution of a
Feminist Perspective, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1507, 1522-25, 1530, 1542, 1546-47 (1993);
Parkinson, supra note 4; Cary W. Purcell, Limiting the Use of Corporal Punishment in
American Schools: A Call for More Specific Legal Guidelines, 13 J. L. & EDUC. 183
(1984); Irene Merker Rosenberg, A Study in Irrationality: Refusal to Grant Substan-
tive Due Process Protection Against Excessive Corporal Punishment in the Public
Schools, 27 Hous. L. REv. 399 (1990); Irene Merker Rosenberg, Ingraham v. Wright-
The Supreme Court's Whipping Boy, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 75 (1978); Jacqueline A.
Stefkovich, Students' Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights After Tinker: A Half
Full Glass?, 69 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 481, 507-08 (1995); Michael Wells & Thomas A.
Eaton, Substantive Due Process and the Scope of Constitutional Torts, 18 GA. L. REv.
201,216, 219-21, 252-57 (1984).
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international community has addressed the issue and an
examination of whether criminalizing corporal punishment of
children would pass muster under the U.S. Constitution.
The Article is divided into four parts that elaborate and de-
velop these themes. Part I surveys statutes enacted in Sweden,
Denmark, Norway, Finland, Austria, and Cyprus, as well as a
judicial decision by Italy's highest court, expressly prohibiting
subabuse corporal punishment of children by their parents or
other caretakers. 4 Part I also provides a discussion of Minne-
sota statutes precluding corporal punishment as a defense to
assault charges. 5 Part II reviews various international human
rights instruments that may be interpreted to support the
prohibition of corporal punishment of children as a matter of
international law. Part III describes the psychological, socio-
logical, and ethical reasons that make prohibition an advisable
policy change. Part III includes a proposed statute criminaliz-
ing all use of corporal punishment on children and a
discussion as to why criminal law measures, in tandem with
prosecutorial restraint, posttrial or postplea diversion, and a
society-wide education campaign, are likely to be the most effi-
cacious means of diminishing the use of such punishment.
Finally, Part IV identifies and responds to objections that are
likely to be raised under the U.S. Constitution against the pro-
posed statutory criminalization of corporal punishment of
children in the family setting.
I. LAWS IN OTHER COUNTRIES AND IN MINNESOTA
PROHIBITING CORPORAL PUNISHMENT OF CHILDREN
Of the six countries that have enacted statutes prohibiting
all corporal punishment of children, four countries have lived
with these laws for ten years or more."6 Sweden's statute has
been on the books for over seventeen years. 7 The circum-
stances surrounding this longevity are cause for reassurance
14. Judge Leonard Edwards has included Poland as among the countries that
have legislatively prohibited all corporal punishment of children. See Edwards, supra
note 5, at 1018. As of this writing, however, Poland has not yet taken such a step. See
Letter from Professor Adam Lopatka, The Institute of Law Studies of the Polish
Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, Poland (Mar. 8, 1996) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
15. See infra notes 155-70 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 19, 51, 63-64, & 77 and accompanying text.
17. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
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that such legal reform need not be viewed with trepidation.
During these years, none of the enacting countries has re-
pealed its statute or experienced a backlash, even though the
prohibition has governed tens of millions of parents and chil-
dren. Indeed, family life, parental authority, and the rule of
law have continued to undergird the.social and political struc-
tures of these countries much as they do elsewhere in the
absence of war or natural catastrophe.
A. Sweden
Sweden became the first country in the world to ban all cor-
poral punishment of children 8 by enacting a statutory
prohibition in 1979 that extended to parents and guardians,
among others. 9 The statute, as amended in 1983, provides as
follows: "Children are entitled to care, security and a good up-
bringing. They shall be treated with respect for their person
and their distinctive character and may not be subject to cor-
poral punishment or any other humiliating treatment."20
School personnel also are forbidden by Swedish law from using
corporal punishment on students.2'
Prior to the 1979 legislation, Sweden had a long tradition of
corporal punishment in the family context.2 Although the
Swedish Parliament had made steady progress toward
restricting this tradition by legal reform during the 1950s and
18. See PETER NEWELL, CHILDREN ARE PEOPLE TOO: THE CASE AGAINST
PHYSICAL PUNISHMENT 67 (1989); Dennis A. Olson, Comment, The Swedish Ban of
Corporal Punishment, 1984 BYU L. REV. 447,447.
19. 6 kap. 1§ para. 2 fdrildrabalken (Swed.) [Swedish Children and Parents Code
ch. 6, § 1, 2] (Swedish Ministry of Justice trans.) (stating that "[tihe parent or
guardian shall exercise necessary supervision in accordance with the child's age and
other circumstances" and that "[tihe child may not be subjected to physical punish-
ment or other injurious or humiliating treatment"), quoted in NEWELL, supra note 18,
at 73.
20. 6 kap. 1§ fdrildrabalken [Swedish Children and Parents Code ch. 6, § 11
(Swedish Ministry of Justice trans.).
21. See Letter from Goran HAkansson, Permanent Undersecretary, Swedish
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, to the author (May 6, 1997) (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Letter from Katja Levdn, attorney
with the law firm of Lagerlof & Leman, Stockholm, Sweden, to Nicholas J. Stasevich 6
(May 30, 1996) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform)
[hereinafter Levdn Letter].
22. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 70-73; Olson, supra note 9, at 447-52; Adri-
enne Ahlgren Haeuser, Swedish Parents Don't Spank, 63 MOTHERING 42, 42, 44
(1992).
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1960s, including repeal of a statutory provision allowing
reprimands, the perception continued among a substantial
number of Swedes that their laws condoned such punishment."
In 1977, the Swedish Parliament established the Commission
on Children's Rights comprised of lawyers, psychologists,
psychiatrists, politicians, and others, that undertook to study
the feasibility of adopting an express prohibition of all corporal
punishment of children so as to clarify the law.2' The Com-
mission found subabuse corporal punishment to be deleterious
to children's well-being and recommended an explicit ban. 5
When the bill which ultimately became the 1979 law was
submitted to the Parliament, it was supported by all political
parties and passed by a vote of 259 to six.
26
The ban on corporal punishment of children by parents and
others acting on the parents' behalf does not, on its face, provide
for any legal sanctions in case of violation. It appears that the
Swedish Parliament enacted the law without express reference
to sanctions because the lawmakers conceived of the prohibition
as having its primary effect by influencing societal attitudes
rather than by more immediately deterring individuals with the
threat of penalties or liability.27 Literature distributed to the
public by the Swedish government emphasizes that "while the
purpose of the new legislation is indeed to make it quite clear
that spanking and beating are no longer allowed, it does not
aim at having more parents punished than hitherto."28
23. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 71; Olson, supra note 9, at 448-51. For a fuller
history of the legal status of corporal punishment of children in Sweden before the 1979
reform, see NEWELL, supra note 18, at 70-73; SIMONE EK, RADDA BARNEN [SWEDISH SAVE
THE CHILDREN], THE FIRST ANTI-SPANKING LAW IN THE WORLD 1-5 (1994) (presented as a
paper before the U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child on Oct. 10, 1994 in Geneva,
Switzerland); Klaus A. Ziegert, The Swedish Prohibition of Corporal Punishment: A Pre-
liminary Report, 45 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 917, 919 (1983); Adrienne A. Haeuser, Reducing
Violence Towards U.S. Children: Transferring Positive Innovations from Sweden 16-17
(1988) (unpublished report of study visit to Sweden May 14 through June 16, 1988 in
fulfillment of a grant award from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services)
(on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
24. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 71; Olson, supra note 9, at 451; Ziegert, supra
note 23, at 919.
25. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 71-73; Olson, supra note 9, at 451; Ziegert, supra
note 23, at 919.
26. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 73.
27. See id. at 74-75, 80; SWEDISH MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, CAN You BRING UP
CHILDREN SUCCESSFULLY WITHOUT SMACKING AND SPANKING? (1979) (example of an
attempt to influence social attitudes towards corporal punishment); Haeuser, supra note
22, at 44; Olson, supra note 9, at 453-54; Ziegert, supra note 23, at 920.
28. SWEDISH MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 27.
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Nevertheless, the possibility exists that violators of the ban
on corporal punishment may be prosecuted under the provi-
sion of Sweden's penal code criminalizing assaults.29 This is
true even if the corporal punishment is not severe-even if it
is a solitary smack-provided that the punishment results in
some bodily injury, illness, or bodily pain for the child.30
Moreover, if a parent is prosecuted for assaulting the child, it
is conceivable that the child could state a viable claim for
damages under the penal code if injury accompanies breach of
the child's bodily integrity.3' It should be emphasized, however,
that although prosecuting parents or other caretakers for cor-
porally punishing children under the assault statute is a real
option in Sweden, prosecutors almost invariably exercise re-
straint by electing not to prosecute.2
29. The assault provision of Sweden's criminal code provides:
A person who inflicts bodily injury, illness or pain upon another or renders him
unconscious or otherwise similarly [sic] helplessness, shall be sentenced for as-
sault to imprisonment for at most two years or, if the crime was petty, to pay a
fine or to imprisonment for at most six months.
3 kap. 5 § brottsbalken (Swed.) [Chapter 3 Sec. 5 of the Swedish Penal Code] (Nat'l
Swedish Council for Crime Prevention & Katja Levdn trans.) (quoted in Lev~n Letter,
supra note 21); see also Herman, supra note 2, at 16-17 (stating that if a parent in-
ficts pain of more than a "very minor and temporary nature" on a child through
corporal punishment, "the parent is subject to prosecution under Sweden's criminal
assault statute").
30. See Telephone Interview with Goran HAkansson, Permanent Undersecretary,
Swedish Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (July 19, 1996); Herman, supra note 2,
at 16-17; cf. NEWELL, supra note 18, at 81 (describing Swedish authorities' assault
prosecution of a father for spanking his son); Ziegert, supra note 23, at 920 (noting
that the threat of prosecution hangs over parents who would spank in Sweden). Some
writers have had the evident misconception that parents in Sweden may not be prose-
cuted for inflicting subabuse corporal punishment on their children because the ban
on corporal punishment mentions no possibility of criminal penalties. See Haeuser,
supra note 23, at 18; Olson, supra note 9, at 453-55; Straus & Yodanis, supra note 9,
at 65.
31. See Interview with G6ran Hfikansson, Permanent Undersecretary, Swedish
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, in Dublin, Ireland (Aug. 21, 1996). The relevant
section of the Swedish Penal Code states: "Aside from sanction, and in accordance
with appropriate statutory provisions, a crime may incur forfeiture of property, a com-
pany fine or some other special consequence defined by law and may also incur
liability for the payment of damages." 1 kap. 8§ brottsbalken (Swedish Penal Code ch.
1, § 8] (Nat'l Swedish Council of Crime Prevention trans.). Indeed, Mr. Hdkansson
raised the possibility that in the future Swedish law may be construed to allow the
child monetary recovery under Swedish Penal Code ch. 1, § 8 for breach of bodily in-
tegrity where there has been no injury. See Interview with Gdran HAkansson, supra.
32. See Elizabeth Ann Gibbons, Note, Surveying Massachusetts' Child Abuse
Laws: The Best Protection for Children?, 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 107, 144 (1992)
(mentioning that prosecution of parents for corporally punishing their children is
rare in Sweden); Interview with Goran HAkansson, supra note 31; Levdn Letter,
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The legal repercussions for a parent who violates the ban on
corporal punishment are not necessarily limited to prosecution
for assault. An offending parent also could run the risk of los-
ing custody of the child in a divorce case if the parent's use of
corporal punishment entails a lasting danger to the child's
health or development. 3 A parent would not be denied custody
solely on the basis that the parent corporally punished his or
her child, but the fact that a parent used such punishment
would be a serious consideration in awarding custody.'
supra note 21 (reporting that her research turned up only one prosecution of a par-
ent for mild corporal punishment of a child).
33. The pertinent language of the Swedish Child and Parent Code provides in
relation to the custody of the child:
If, when exercising custody of a child, a parent is guilty of abuse or neglect or is
otherwise wanting in his or her care of the child in a manner which entails an
enduring risk to the child's health or development, the court shall make a deci-
sion changing the custody position.
Questions concerning a change of custody position as provided in this section
shall be considered on the application of the social welfare committee or, of the
court's own motion, in a divorce case between the parents or some other case
referred to in Section 5 or 6.
6 kap. 7§ irdldrabalken [Swedish Children and Parents Code ch. 6, § 7] (Swedish
Ministry of Justice trans.).
The Swedish Social Welfare Committee, referred to in the above quoted statutory
provision, is obliged to act so as to ensure that children are brought up in a safe and
good environment, as follows:
The social welfare committee shall endeavor to ensure that children and young
persons grow up in good and secure conditions, act in close co-operation with
families to promote the comprehensive personal development and the favour-
able physical and social development of the children and young persons, and
ensure that children and young persons in danger of developing in an undesir-
able direction receive the protection and support they need and, if their best
interests so demand, are cared for and brought up away from their own homes.
12§ socialtjainstlagen [The Social Services Act § 12, Swedish Code of Statutes] (Int'l
Secretariat of the Swedish Ministry of Health and Social Affairs & Katja Lev6n trans.)
[hereinafter Swedish Social Services Act].
Accordingly, the Committee is empowered to initiate judicial proceedings to arrange
for the care of a child whose health or development is jeopardized by physical pun-
ishment. Swedish statutory law states that, "A care order is to be made if, due to
physical abuse, exploitation, deficiencies of care or some other circumstance in the
home, there is a palpable risk of the young person's health or development being im-
paired." 2§ lagen med sirskilda bestrmrmelser om vArd av unga [Swedish Care of the
Young Persons Act (Special Provisions) § 2] (Int'l Secretariat of the Swedish Ministry
of Health and Social Affairs trans.).
34. See Telephone Interview with Gbran Hfkansson (July 19, 1996), supra note 30.
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The Swedish experience with the legal prohibition of
corporal punishment of children is more interesting and
perhaps more significant than that of any other country
because the prohibition has been law for so long-for over
seventeen years. Contrary to some expectations, Swedish
prosecutors have not hauled hordes of parents into court at the
behest of children alleging illegal corporal punishment. As
mentioned above, the Swedish policy in relation to such
parental conduct is one of prosecutorial restraint. It appears
that during the entire period since 1979 less than a handful of
prosecutions have involved situations where the corporal
punishment was not severe, i.e., not what would normally be
considered child abuse in the United States. 5 In keeping with
the apparent legislative intent, the Swedish government has
primarily relied upon the pedagogic effect of the legal
prohibition of corporal punishment, enhancing the law's
effectiveness with a massive education campaign 36 and with
extensive support services designed to minimize family stress
and conflict 7
Data is available tracking the effect of the prohibition and
education campaign on the incidence of corporal punishment
of children. Statistics Sweden, on contract with the Swedish
Department of Social Welfare, conducted one survey in the
spring of 1994, and another during the spring of 1995, on
adults' and middle school-age children's opinions, knowledge,
and experience of corporal punishment in the familial
context.38 Taken together, the surveys show that 70% of middle
school-age children and 56% of adults oppose all forms of
physical punishment of children.39 Another 22% of adults
oppose all forms of physical punishment in principle but admit
to using such punishment if they are overwrought.40 Thus, 78%
35. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 81; Haeuser, supra note 22, at 44. For exam-
ple, among the few isolated prosecutions one 1986 case involved a father charged with
punishing his son by whipping him with a bundle of twigs. The whipping caused some
redness on the boy's hips and buttocks. The father was found guilty of assault, but,
because the court considered the crime to be petty, the father was fined rather than
imprisoned. See RH 1986:163 (Swedish Court of Appeal), cited in Lev~n letter, supra
note 21, at 3.
36. See EK, supra note 23, at 1; NEWELL, supra note 18, at 73-77; Haeuser, supra
note 23, at 18-19; Ziegert, supra note 23, at 922-23.
37. See Haeuser, supra note 23, at 26, 28-29.
38. See STATISTICS SWEDEN, DEMOGRAPHY, THE FAMILY AND CHILDREN, SPANKING
AND OTHER FORMS OF PHYSICAL PUNISHMENT: A STUDY OF ADULTS' AND MIDDLE
SCHOOL STUDENTS' OPINIONS, EXPERIENCE, AND KNOWLEDGE (1996).
39. See id. at 7, 8.
40. See id. at 8.
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of all Swedish adults have become convinced that corporal
punishment of children is unacceptable. The policy against
corporal punishment appears to have been most persuasive
with those proportionally longest under its sway, since the
surveys show that more young adults (between the ages of 18
and 34) are against spanking than older adults (between the
ages of 55 and 74).1 In keeping with this attitudinal shift, the
surveys found overall "a strong decrease in the use of physical
punishment" in Sweden.42 Specifically, the surveys found that
roughly 30% of middle school-age students reported having
been exposed to parental corporal punishment before they
became teenagers.43 In contrast, a 1979 survey shows that
about half of all Swedish parents surveyed spanked their
children."
What makes these findings particularly intriguing is that
the decreasing use of corporal punishment has occurred even
as Swedes have rejected the permissive child rearing with
which they apparently experimented from the late 1940s to
the early 1980s. 45 It appears that at least since 1988, Swedish
parents have shown a greater predilection for disciplining
their children, but mainly by methods other than corporal
punishment. 46 For example, Swedish parents are encouraged to
control their children by talking and reasoning.47 Other
favored techniques include sending a child to his or her room
or depriving the child of privileges. 4 The 1994/1995 surveys
found that most people think that deprivation of privileges,
such as a weekly allowance, is the preferable form of
punishment.49 For preverbal infants and toddlers, Swedes do not
generally believe in punishment and avoid the need for
restraints by "childproofing" the home into a safe environment. °
41. See id. at 7.
42. See id. at 15.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See Haeuser, supra note 23, at 22-24.
46. See id. at 24; STATISTICS SWEDEN, supra note 38, at 12.
47. See Haeuser, supra note 23, at 31-33.
48. See id. at 32.
49. See STATISTICS SWEDEN, supra note 38, at 13.
50. See Haeuser, supra note 23, at 33.
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B. Finland
The prohibition of corporal punishment of children in the
family was enacted in 1983 as part of a general overhaul of
Finnish law governing children.5' The prohibition states: "A
child shall be brought up with understanding, security and
gentleness. He shall not be subdued, corporally punished or
otherwise humiliated. The growth of a child towards inde-
pendence, responsibility and adulthood shall be supported and
encouraged." 2 The ban was adopted unanimously and almost
without debate, and went into effect on January 1, 1984.5' It
should be noted that corporal punishment of children in the
schools had long been outlawed when the 1983 law was passed
and continues to be impermissible under modern Finnish laws
governing education.'
Matti Savolainen, a member of the Finnish Ministry of Jus-
tice who was responsible for drafting the 1983 prohibition, has
made clear that three strategies for stopping corporal punish-
ment are contemplated by virtue of the prohibition, including
criminal penalties:
Firstly the Act attempts to establish certain "positive"
guidelines for the upbringing of the child. Secondly the
Act makes it absolutely clear that all violations against
the child's integrity (whether "physical" or "spiritual")
which would constitute a criminal offence if committed by
a third person (e.g. assault, unlawful imprisonment, libel,
51. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 87.
52. Laki lapsen huollosta ja tapaamisoikeudesta, 1 luku, 1§, 3 mom. [Finnish
Child Custody and Right of Access Act, ch. 1, § 1, subsec. 3] (Finnish Dep't of Legisla-
tion, Ministry of Justice trans.).
53. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 86-87 (stating that the lack of controversy
may have been due to the fact that the new prohibition was part of a comprehensive
overhaul of children's law and that public attention was diverted by other controver-
sial measures in the proposed reform legislation).
54. The legal prohibition of corporal punishment in Finnish schools dates back to
the nineteenth century. See id. at 87. In the twentieth century, the prohibition was
again made law in 1914. See NAdig Forordning hvarigenom anvandandet af kroppslig
bestraffning vid laroverken firbjudes, 6 juni 1914/24. [Finnish Gracious Ordinance,
whereby the use of corporal punishment in the schools is banned, June 6, 1914/241
(replaced by Kansakoululaki, 1.7.1957/247 [Finnish Act on Primary Schools, July 1,
1957/247] (Isabella Riska trans.), which continued the ban). In the 1980s, Finland
reenacted the school ban, stating that [c]orporal punishment in comprehensive
schools is forbidden." See Peruskoululaki, 5 luku, 42§. [Finnish Act on Comprehensive
Schools ch. 5, § 42] (Isabella Riska trans.).
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slander, etc.) are equally punishable even when commit-
ted by a parent with the intent to discipline the child. And
under the Criminal Code even a petty assault committed
against a child under 15 is subject to public prosecution
when committed by a parent at home. Thirdly the Act ex-
plicitly forbids also any degrading treatment ... even
where such an act would not constitute a criminal offence
and even if there are no other direct legal remedies avail-
able.55
In accordance with this intent, it is understood that if par-
ents violate the ban they may be prosecuted for assault under
Finland's penal code."6 For example, in one case, Finland's Su-
preme Court found a guardian to be guilty of petty assault
because the guardian corporally punished a child by pulling
his hair and slapping his fingers. 7 The Court stated that
[Tihe purpose of the provision [the prohibition of corporal
punishment of children] was to confirm that the guardian
has no longer a right to corporally punish his child and
that the provision on petty assault in the Penal Code,
Chapter 21, Section 7, shall be applied when parents or
55. NEWELL, supra note 18, at 87 (quoting Matti Savolainen of the Ministry of
Justice in Helsinki, Finland).
56. See id. at 89. Parents or guardians who corporally punish their children also
violate the following provisions of Finland's penal code:
A person who employs physical violence on another or, without such violence,
damages the health of another, causes pain to another or renders another un-
conscious or to a comparable condition, shall be sentenced for assault to a fine
or to imprisonment for at most two years.
An attempt shall be punished.
Rikoslaki, 21 luku, 5§ [Finnish Penal Code ch. 21, § 5] (Finnish Ministry of Justice
trans.).
Even petty assaults by parents upon the child in the name of childrearing will con-
travene the Penal Code, which states: "If the assault, when assessed as a whole and
with due consideration to the minor character of the violence, the violation of physical
integrity, the damage to health or other relevant circumstances, is of minor character,
the offender shall be sentenced for petty assault to a fine." See Finnish Penal Code ch.
21, § 7 (Finnish Ministry of Justice trans.). In this regard, the Penal Code also pro-
vides that '[tihe Public Prosecutor shall not bring charges for petty assault, if the
victim has attained the age of fifteen years, nor for negligent injury, unless the com-
plainant reports the offence for the bringing of charges." See id. ch. 21, § 16.
57. See Memorandum from Isabella Riska, Attorney, Roschier-Holmberg &
Waselius, Helsinki, Finland, to Nicholas J. Stasevich 4 (June 25, 1996) (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (describing Korkeimman oikeuden
ratkaisuja [Decision of the Highest Court of Finland] 1993:151, Helsinki 1994, at 685).
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guardians employ physical violence on their child, even if
they consider it a means of upbringing.58
Parents who violate the prohibition of corporal punishment
may also be sued for damages either in conjunction with an
assault prosecution or in an independent action when the par-
ent is not the subject of criminal charges.'59 In addition, it is
possible under Finnish law that parental use of corporal pun-
ishment on children may be a factor that influences judicial
awards of custody."
The Finnish government has not been content to rely only
upon the law to effectuate reform. The government has also
conducted a nationwide campaign to educate adults about
better ways to correct children than by using corporal
punishment. 1 For example, Finnish authorities have utilized
television spots to urge parents to use reasoned discussion as a
substitute for physical chastisement."
58. See id.
59. A child who has suffered corporal punishment at a parent's hands may, in
conjunction with pressing criminal charges, bring a civil suit for damages against the
parent under the following statutory provisions. First, "[a] civil law claim based on an
offence may be presented in the same connection where punishment or a confiscatory
sanction is demanded on the basis of the offence. If such a civil law claim is presented
in a separate action, the provisions on proceedings in civil law shall apply"
Oikeudenkaymiskaari 1734/4, 14 luku, 8§ [Finnish Code of Judicial Procedure ch. 14
§ 8] (Finnish Ministry of Justice trans.). Second,
If it becomes evident in the investigation of a criminal case that the act referred
to in the charges is not an offence, or if for another reason no punishment is
imposed for the act, a civil law claim presented in the case may nonetheless be
considered or the consideration of the claim be continued in the manner stipu-
lated for the consideration of civil cases.
Id. § 11.
Conceivably a child subjected to corporal punishment by a parent could also have
monetary redress alone under a statutory provision that states: "Any person who,
either wittingly or through negligence, causes prejudice to any other person shall pay
compensation for the prejudice so caused, save as otherwise provided in this Act." See
Vahingonkorvauslaki, 2 luku, 1§, 1 mom. [Finnish Compensation for Damages Act ch.
2, § 1, subsec. 1] (English translation obtained from Legislative Series 1974 of the
Finnish Int'l Labour Office).
60. See Letter from Isabella Riska, Attorney, Roschier-Holmberg & Waselius,
Helsinki, Finland, to the author 3 (July 26, 1996) (on file with the University of Michi-
gan Journal of Law Reform).
61. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 87-89.
62. See id. at 88-89.
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C. Denmark
In 1985, Denmark became the third Scandinavian country
to enact a law directed against corporal punishment of chil-
dren in the family context. 63 The law, which became effective
on January 1, 1986,64 provided that "Parental custody implies
the obligation to protect the child against physical and psy-
chological violence and against other harmful treatment."65 On
May 28, 1997, the law was amended to delete that language
and substitute the following: "The child has the right to care
and security. It shall be treated with respect for its personality
and may not be subjected to corporal punishment or any other
offensive treatment."6 Denmark has also banned corporal
punishment in the schools. 7
Unlike its Swedish and Finnish counterparts, the earlier
Danish statute dealing with parental corporal punishment
was generally understood to be precatory.' It did not totally
abolish parents' right to inflict corporal punishment as a child
63. The measure against corporal punishment of children in the family was
originally contained in an amendment to the Danish Majority Act. See Myndighed-
sloven nr. 443 af. 3 Sept. 1985, jf. § 7, stk. 2 [Danish Majority Act no. 443, § 7, subsec. 2
(Sept. 3, 1985)] (Kromann & Munter trans.); NEWELL, supra note 18, at 91.
64. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 91.
65. Lov nr. 387 af 14. juni 1995 om foraeldremyndighed og samvaer, jf. § 2, stk. 2
[Danish Act on Parental Custody and Conviviality no. 387, § 2, subsec. 2 (June 14,
1995)] (revision of 1985 law) (Kromann & MUnter trans.), quoted in NEWELL, supra
note 18, at 91.
66. Lov nr. 416 om aendring af lov om foraeldremyndighed og samvaer § 1
[Danish Act to Amend the Act on Parental Custody and Conviviality no. 416 § 1]
(Kromann & Minter trans.).
67. See Bekendtgorelse nr. 276 af 14. juni 1967, om fremme af god orden i skol-
erne, jf. § 8 [Danish Order No. 276 Concerning the Promotion of Order in the Schools
§ 8 (June 14, 1967)]. The current ban provides:
Subsection 1. Corporal punishment may not be used. Subsection 2. To avoid
that students lay violent hands on others or destroy or damage gods [sic], it is
permitted to use force to such an extent as the circumstances may require.
Bekendtgorelse nr. 27 om foranstaltninger til fremme af god orden i folkeskolerne, jf.
§ 8, stk 1 og 2 [Danish Order No. 27 Concerning Measures for the Promotion of Order
in the Public Schools § 8] (Kromann & Muinter trans.).
68. "In principle, the meaning of the statute is 'only' to signalize [sic] to the pub-
lic, that parents ought rather to refrain from corporally punishing their kids." Letter
from Jorn Vestergaard, Assoc. Professor, Inst. of Criminology and Criminal Law, Uni-
versity of Copenhagen to author 2 (July 1996) (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform).
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rearing technique." Indeed, the defense of "lovig revselse-
legally inflicted punishment-was still available in Danish
courts to parents and other custodians of the child for adult
conduct which might otherwise have come within penal code
provisions on assault.7" Nor was this simply a matter of judi-
cial interpretation since the explanatory remarks to the 1985
bill manifest a legislative intent to refrain from intruding on
the parental right to inflict "minor" or "light" corporal punish-
ment.7'
This equivocality engendered a continuing debate among
Danish politicians and academics as to whether their country
should strengthen the 1986 law.72 The result is the 1997
amendment, which is regarded by its authors and other
experts as completely prohibiting all corporal punishment of
children.73 Similar to the situations in Sweden and Finland,
violators of the law may be prosecuted under the Danish
Criminal Code for assault and battery or other related
crimes.74  Nevertheless, "[t]here will be no intensified or
69. See id. passim.
70. See id. at 1.
71. See id. Professor Vestergaard notes that a minority in the Danish Parliament
sought abolition of the parental right to use corporal punishment on children; he
characterizes the parliamentary debate as "rather confused." See id. at 2.
72. See id.; see also Telephone Interview with Giran Hikansson, supra note 30.
73. The legislators who introduced the bill which became the 1997 amendment
indicate, in the accompanying explanatory remarks submitted to the Danish Parlia-
ment, that the amendment is intended to have a prohibitory effect. See Margrethe
Auken, Anne Baastrup, Steen Gade & Villy Sovndal, Explanatory Notes to Bill No.
213 passim (Apr. 2, 1997) (Kromann & Miinter trans.); see also Letter from Jorn
Vestergaard, Assoc. Professor, Inst. of Criminology and Criminal Law, University of
Copenhagen, to author 1 (July 3, 1997) (on file with the University of Michigan Jour-
nal of Law Reform) [hereinafter Vestergaard Letter 7/3/971 (interpreting the new
provision as forbidding parents from "smacking" their children).
74. Parents may be prosecuted under the following provisions:
Sec. 213. Any person who, by neglect or degrading treatment, insults his
spouse, his child or any of his dependants under the age of 18 or any person to
whom he is related by blood or marriage in lineal descent, or who by deliber-
ately evading his duties to maintain or contribute to the maintenance of any
such persons, exposes them to distress shall be liable to imprisonment for any
term not exceeding 2 years or, in mitigating circumstances, to simple detention.
Sec. 244. Any person who commits violence against, or otherwise attack[s] the
person of others shall be liable to a fine, simple detention or imprisonment not
exceeding 1 year and 6 month[s].
Sec. 245. Subsec. 1. Any person who commits assault or battery which is excep-
tionally brutal, cruel or dangerous or are [sic] guilty of maltreatment is liable to
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excessive action taken by law enforcement or social welfare
authorities to monitor ordinary families['] private lives."7"
Apparently, the Danes expect that the 1997 revision will be
used primarily for its educational impact in gradually
persuading parents to relinquish corporal punishment as a
disciplinary technique.76
D. Norway
Joining the other Scandinavian countries in the effort to end
corporal punishment of children, in 1987 Norway passed a
statute providing that "[tihe child shall not be exposed to
physical violence or to treatment which can threaten his
physical or mental health."7" This more general measure is
complemented by a statute forbidding corporal punishment of
students in Norwegian schools.
7
The 1987 law is prohibitory rather than precatory,79 al-
though it also appears to be subject to certain limited
imprisonment not exceeding 4 years. Subsec. 2. The same applies for any per-
son who outside subsection 1 injures the body or health of others.
Sec. 246. Where the act of violence covered by Section 245 has been of such se-
rious character or has entailed [such] serious consequences that there are
particularly aggravating circumstances the penalty may be increased to impris-
onment for 8 years.
Straffelov nr. 886, §§ 213, 244, 245, 246 [Danish Criminal Code no. 886, §§ 213, 244,
245, 2461 (Kromann & Munter trans.); see also Letter from Jorn Vestergaard, Associ-
ate Professor, Institute of Criminology and Criminal Law, University of Copenhagen,
to author 1 (July 22, 1997) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform) (agreeing that "corporal punishment is now criminalized as an assault and
battery, according to exactly the same criteria as if the victim were somebody else
than the child").
75. Vestergaard Letter 7/3/97, supra note 73, at 1.
76. See id.
77. Endring i 1987 av barnelovens § 30, 3. ledd (Lov av 6.februar 1987 nr 11 om
endring i barneloven § 30) [Norwegian Parent and Child Act art. 30, § 3, as amended
by the Amending Act no. 11, Feb. 6, 19871 (Finn Erik Engzelius trans.).
78. Lov om grunnskolen nr. 24, § 16, 4. ledd [Norwegian School Act no. 24, art.
16, § 4].
79. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 95; Telephone Interview with MAlfrid Grude
Flekkoy, Interim Director, Division of Families and Global Change, Institute for Fami-
lies in Society, University of South Carolina (July 9, 1996). But cf Letter from Johan
Felix Lous, Executive Officer, Norwegian Royal Ministry of Children and Family Af-
fairs, to author 4 (Oct. 30, 1995) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform) ("The provision does not authorise sanctions. Beyond defining a mini-
mum norm for parental responsibility, the rule can therefore hardly be said to have
any direct judicial significance."). It should be noted that Mflfrid Grude Flekkoy was
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exceptions."s The prohibition is conceived primarily as peda-
gogical in operation-as achieving its objective by shaping
Norwegian norms on the subject."' That conception is reflected
in the language of the act which does not prescribe any penal-
ties or liability for those who might violate its terms.
It is understood, though, that until parental attitudes and
behavior conform to the ban, children may have recourse to
legal remedies under certain of Norway's other laws. For ex-
ample, parents who corporally punish their children may be
prosecuted for assault and related crimes under Norway's
Criminal Act if the punishment results in bodily manifesta-
tions such as bruises. 2 The Norwegian government may
additionally prosecute such parents under a statutory prohibi-
tion against neglect or maltreatment (mental or physical) of
persons belonging to the parents' household, including chil-
dren.' A basis also exists in Norwegian law for a tort action to
be brought on behalf of a child against his or her parent for
serious bodily injuries, if any, or for pain and suffering in con-
nection with an injury caused by parentally administered
the Norwegian Ombudsperson for Children from 1981 to 1989, the period during
which Norway's statute prohibiting parental corporal punishment of children was
debated among Norway's legislators and ultimately enacted. See Telephone Interview
with MAlfrid Grude Flekkoy, supra. She was a key figure in lobbying the Norwegian
Parliament to adopt the statute. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 94-95.
80. The various sources which I consulted were at some variance concerning
whether there are any exceptions to Norway's ban on corporal punishment of chil-
dren. Compare NEWELL, supra note 18, at 95 (intimating that the ban is absolute) and
Telephone Interview with Mflfrid Grude Flekkoy, supra note 79 (advising that the
only exception is that parents are allowed to physically restrain children from harm-
ing themselves or others) with Letter from Finn Erik Engzelius, of the law firm of
Thommessen Krefting Greve Lund, Oslo, Norway, to Nicholas Stasevich 4 (May 21,
1996) [hereinafter Engzelius Letter 5/21/96] (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform) (suggesting that the ban does not preclude a parent from
giving "light slaps" or from physically restraining children to prevent harm to them-
selves or others).
81. See Telephone Interview with Mflfrid Grude Flekkoy, supra note 79; Letter
from Johan Felix Lous, supra note 79, at 4.
82. The provision on assault states that "[alny person who commits violence
against the person of another or otherwise assails him bodily, or is [an] accessory
thereto, is guilty of assault and shall be liable [for] fines or imprisonment for a term
not exceeding six months." See Straffeloven av 22.mai 1902 nr. 10, § 228 [Norwegian
Criminal Act art. 228, § 11 (Finn Erik Engzelius trans.). A related provision states:
"Any person who injures another in body or health or reduces any person to helpless-
ness, unconsciousness or any similar state, or who is [an] accessory thereto, is guilty
of occasioning bodily harm and shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceed-
ing three years ... ." Straffeloven av 22.mai 1909 nr. 10, § 229 [Norwegian Criminal
Act art. 229] (Finn Erik Engzelius trans.); see also Interview with MAlfrid Grude
Flekkoy, Chief Psychologist, Nic Waals Institute for Child and Adolescent Psychiatry,
Oslo, Norway, in New Orleans, La. (Feb. 15, 1997).
83. See Letter from Johan Felix Lous to author, supra note 79, at 2-3.
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corporal punishment."4 As of spring, 1996, this possibility has
been of only academic interest; no tort cases have actually
been brought in Norwegian courts on behalf of children
against their parents to recover damages for parental corporal
punishment. 5 Finally, parental use of corporal punishment,




In 1989, the Austrian Parliament, by unanimous vote, 7 en-
acted a law which provides that "[tihe minor child must follow
the parents' orders. In their orders and in the implementation
thereof, parents must consider the age, development and per-
sonality of the child; the use of force and infliction of physical
or psychological harm are not permitted."8 Although the law
itself provides no legal remedies for the physically punished
child, 9 the intent behind the enactment is to bar all corporal
84. The language of Norway's tort laws makes it possible that children could sue
their parents to recover damages for corporal punishment under certain circum-
stances. See Engzelius Letter 5/21/96, supra note 80, at 3; Letter from Finn Erik
Engzelius, of the law firm of Thommessen Krefting Greve Lund, Oslo, Norway, to
author 3 (June 6, 1996) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Re-
form) [hereinafter Engzelius Letter 6/6/96]. A pertinent statute provides:
Whoever, acting willfully or by gross negligence has (a) caused injury to a per-
son ... may be sentenced to pay the offended party such a lump sum that the
court will hold to represent a just compensation ... for the pain and suffering
and other aggrievances or harm of non-economic nature that was inflicted upon
him ....
Lov om skadeserstatning av 13. juni 1969 nr. 26, § 3-5 [Norwegian Tort Act no. 26,
arts. 3-5] (Finn Erik Engzelius trans.). For example, if in administering physical disci-
pline the parent willfully or by gross negligence were to cause injury to the child, it is
conceivable that a tort suit would lie against the parent.
85. See Engzelius Letter 5/21/96, supra note 80, at 3; Letter from Johan Felix
Lous to author, supra note 79, at 1.
86. See Letter from Finn Erik Engzelius, of the law firm of Thommessen Krefting
Greve Lund, Oslo, Norway, to author 1-2 (July 24, 1996) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
87. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 68.
88. § 146a ABGB [Austrian Civil Code § 146a] (Berlitz Translation Services
trans.).
89. See Interview with Dr. Werner Schuitz, Executive Public Prosecutor and Sec-
tion Head of the Section on Int'l Family Law, Austrian Ministry of Justice, in Vienna,
Austria (June 24, 1996); Interview with Dr. Michael Stormann, Executive Public
Prosecutor and Section Head of the Section on Nat'l Family Law, Austrian Ministry of
Justice, in Vienna, Austria (June 24, 1996).
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punishment of children by parents or guardians." As in the
Scandinavian countries, Austria also has legislation prohibit-
ing corporal punishment of students in the schools.9
To a large extent, the 1989 law represents a logical progres-
sion rather than a sudden departure from statutory precedents.
In 1977, Austria repealed an explicit authorization of parents
to corporally punish their children. Austrian civil law experts
believed that this repeal meant that all parental corporal
punishment of children had been forbidden except to restrain
a child in an emergency situation.92 However, other experts
disagreed that the repeal had had such an effect, and the 1989
express prohibition was, in part, a response to this confusion;93
it was hoped that the 1989 reform would produce consistency
in judicial decisions on this issue.' There have, however, been
no reported decisions applying the 1989 law except a decision
by the Supreme Court of Austria which interpreted the prohi-
bition to deny continuation of custody to a divorced parent who
had been using corporal punishment that caused no bodily in-
jury as a child rearing method.95 Interestingly, in that case the
father who lost custody was found to have been involved with
his children and otherwise to have attended to their needs.96
However, he "believes in strict discipline, expects respect and
absolute obedience from his sons and demands that they not
engage in self-pity, but bear pain like men. He... struck them
on several occasions when they 'made trouble.'"" The court
found that this repeated striking of the children, combined
with an authoritarian and exacting approach to child rearing,
90. See Interview with Dr. Werner Schuitz, supra note 89; Interview with Dr. Mi-
chael Stormann, supra note 89.
91. See § 47/3 Schulunterrichtsgesetz [Austrian Teaching Act § 47/3] (Berlitz
Translation Services, trans.) (declaring that "[c]orporal punishment ... [is] forbid-
den"); see also Interview with Dr. Michael Stormann, supra note 89 (stating that the
Teaching Act is good law).
92. See Interview with Dr. Michael Stormann, supra note 89.
93. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 68; Interview with Dr. Michael Stormann, su-
pra note 89.
94. See Interview with Dr. Michael Stormann, supra note 89.
95. OGH 6/24/1992, 1 Ob 573/92 (Berlitz Translation Services trans.); see also
Erwin Bernat, Austria: Legislation for Assisted Reproduction and Interpreting the Ban
on Corporal Punishment, 32 U. LOUIsVILLE J. FAM. L. 247, 252-53 (1993-94)
(describing this decision). Some jurists are of the opinion that the high court did not
apply the 1989 law correctly in this case. See Interview with Dr. Michael Stormann,
supra note 89.
The Austrian legal system does not require that other Austrian courts follow deci-
sions by the Austrian Supreme Court. See id.
96. See OGH 6/24/1992, 1 Ob 573/92.
97. Id.
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violated Austria's ban on corporal punishment and, therefore,
warranted awarding custody to the mother.9"
Despite the dearth of reported cases, there is still the possi-
bility that a parent who violates the 1989 prohibition may be
subject to prosecution under a number of provisions of the
Austrian penal code for the equivalent of assault and battery
and related crimes." This is more of a possibility than a reality
for Austrian parents because, like many of the Scandinavian
countries, Austria enacted the prohibition mainly for its edu-
cational effect.' °° In any event, prosecution will not be initiated
unless the corporal punishment is serious and produces some
evidence on the child's body of perpetration.'' There is also a
98. See id.
99. See DIVISION FOR CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, AUSTRIAN FED. MINISTRY FOR YOUTH
AND FAMILY AFFAIRS, INITIAL REPORT OF AUSTRIA IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 44 OF
THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 66, 68-70 (1996) (on
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); see also Interview with
Dr. Michael Stormann, supra note 89; Letter from Dr. Kurt Heller, of the law firm of
Heller, Lbber, Bahn & Partners, Vienna, Austria, to Nicholas J. Stasevich 2-3 (May 28,
1996) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter
Heller Letter 5/28/96].
For example, a parent violating the 1989 law could be prosecuted under a penal
code provision which states:
1. Any person who physically injures another or harms his [or her]
health shall be sentenced to a prison term of up to six months or a
fine of up to 360 days pay.
2. Any person who physically abuses another and negligently injures
him as a result or harms his health shall also be sentenced.
§ 83 Abs 1-2 StGB [Austrian Penal Code § 83 parts 1-2] (Berlitz Translation Services
trans.).
Such a parent could also face possible prosecution under another penal code provi-
sion, which states in pertinent part:
1. Any person who inflicts physical or psychological suffering on an-
other, who is under his care or custody and who has not yet
completed his 18th year or who is defenseless because of infirmity,
illness or mental deficiency, shall be sentenced to a prison term of
up to three years.
2. Any person who grossly neglects his duty of custody or care for
such a person and as a result, even when also only negligent, con-
siderably harms his health or his physical or mental development
shall also be sentenced.
§ 92 Abs 1-2 StGB [Austrian Penal Code § 92 parts 1-2] (Berlitz Translation Services
trans.).
100. See Interview with Dr. Michael Stormann, supra note 89.
101. DIVISION FOR CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, supra note 99, at 66; Interview with Dr.
Werner Schfitz, Executive Public Prosecutor and Section Head of Section on Int'l
Family Law, Austrian Ministry of Justice, in New Orleans, La. (Feb. 15, 1997).
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statutory basis for bringing a civil suit against offending par-
ents for causing physical injury or mental anguish.'02
Austrian policy against corporal punishment of children re-
lies heavily upon social services and education as well as upon
the law. In order to assist parents who have difficulty refrain-
ing from corporal punishment or otherwise properly meeting
their child rearing obligations, the government has instigated
the establishment, among other support services, of child rear-
ing counseling in Youth Welfare Departments, child protection
centers, a "child helpline," and a children's ombudsman. 10 3 Both
children and adults may contact the ombudsman "to make
suggestions and lodge complaints" about mistreatment of chil-
dren, including the use of corporal punishment."° While the
emphasis is on the prevention of any violence against chil-
dren, 10 5 steps also have been taken to ensure that children who
are exposed to violence receive medical and psychological care."~
Since the enactment of the prohibition on corporal punish-
ment of children "there has been no rush of children reporting
their parents to the police for smacking them. State interven-
tion in family life has certainly not increased as a result of the
new law .... "" Instead, the 1989 ban on corporal punishment
and concomitant social services network appear to be under-
mining the social acceptability of such punishment without
prosecutorial intervention. A study commissioned by the Aus-
trian Federal Ministry of the Environment, Youth and the
Family indicates that as of the early 1990s, "67.5% of mothers
and 68.8% of fathers categorically reject serious corporal pun-
ishment (beatings) as a means of education."'08
102. The action would be brought under a statute providing that "[a]nyone in-
jured is entitled to demand reparations from the injuring party for damage that the
latter is guilty of having inflicted." § 1295 Abs 1 ABGB [Austrian Civil Code § 1295/1]
(Inter-Lingua trans.); see DwiSIoN FOR CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, supra note 99, at 70; see
also Heller Letter 5/28/96, supra note 99, at 2. The word "injured" is used in the stat-
ute to mean physical injury and/or mental anguish. See Letter from Dr. Kurt Heller, of
the law firm of Heller, L6ber, Balm & Partners, Vienna, Austria, to author 1-2 (July
11, 1996) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
103. DIVISION FOR CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, supra note 99, at 67-69.
104. See id. at 68.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 70.
107. Dr. Werner SchUtz, Lecture at the Conference to End Physical Punishment of
Children (EPOCH) Worldwide (Mar. 30, 1992) (transcript on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
108. DvISION FOR CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, supra note 99, at 67.
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F Cyprus
Cyprus is the sixth nation to have outlawed corporal pun-
ishment of children in the home. In June, 1994, the Cypriots
passed a bill entitled, "Prevention of Violence in the Family
and Protection of Victims Law."' 5 The Cypriot law not only
prohibits parental use of any force against children but also
makes it an offense for violent behavior to take place in the
presence of minor members of the family:
3.(1) For the purposes of this Law violence means any
unlawful act or controlling behavior which results in di-
rect actual physical, sexual or psychological injury to any
member of the family and includes violence used for pur-
poses of sexual intercourse without the consent of the
victim as well as for [the] purpose of restricting its liberty.
(3) Any act or behavior constituting violence within the
meaning of subsections (1) and (2) above or constituting
an offense under sections 174, 175 and 177 of the Crimi-
nal Code, if it takes place in the presence of minor
members of the family shall be considered as violence ex-
ercised against the said minor members of the family
likely to cause them psychological injury and such act or
behavior constitutes an offense punishable under subsec-
tion (4) of this section. "'
The 1994 law makes clear that parents or other family
members who engage in the proscribed conduct may be prose-
cuted and, if convicted, may be sentenced to fines and/or
incarceration."'
109. Act of June 17, 1994, Law 147(1), OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE REPUBLIC OF
CYPRus No. 2886 (Leonidas Markides, Embassy of the Republic of Cyprus trans.).
110. Id. at § 3(1), (3).
111. See id. § 4(1) ("When violence is used by one member of the family against
another, [it] shall be considered for purposes of this Law as particularly aggravated,
and the Court... may impose increased penalties....").
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G. Italy
On May 16, 1996, Italy's highest court, the Supreme Court
of Cassation, issued a decision prohibiting all parental use of
corporal punishment on children as a child rearing tech-
nique." In this decision the court announced as a new
juridical principle. that "the use of violence for educational
purposes can no longer be considered lawful."""
The case arose when Natalino Cambria took to repeatedly
subjecting his ten-year-old daughter, Danila, to heavy beat-
ings, purportedly to correct her behavior."5 He would hit or
kick the girl for lying, for getting bad grades, or for almost any.
failure to live up to her father's standards."6 Cambria's prose-
cution was heard in the first instance by the Magistrate of
Como-Menaggio who found the accused guilty of the crime of
abuse of the means of correction-"abuso dei mezzi di correzi-
one"-under article 571 of the Italian Penal Code." 7 On
112. Cambria, Cass., sez. VI, 18 marzo 1996, [Supreme Court of Cassation, 6th
Penal Section, Mar. 18, 1996], Foro It. II 1996, 407 (Italy) (Translation by Triangle
Translations on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Susan
H. Bitensky, Final Straw: To Spank or Not to Spank?, CHI. TRIB., July 25, 1996, § 1, at
25; Italian Court: Don't Hit Kids, DET. FREE PRESS, May 20, 1996, at 4A [hereinafter
Italian Court].
113. Judge Francesco Ippolito, who wrote the opinion for the court in this case,
explained that the principle that parents or other custodians of the child may not use
corporal punishment is a juridical principle having the force of law; putting the point
in American legal terminology, the court's statement of principle is not merely dictum.
See Interview with Judge Francesco Ippolito, Judge of the Corte Suprema di Cassazi-
one, Republica Italiana, in Rome, Italy (June 11, 1996).
114. Cambria, Foro It. II 1996 at 411, Translation at 4; see also Bitensky, supra
note 112, at 25.
115. See Cambria, Foro It. II 1996 at 409, Translation, at 2-3; see also Interview
with Judge Francesco Ippolito, supra note 113; Bitensky, supra note 112, at 25; Italian
Court, supra note 112.
116. See Cambria, Foro It. II 1996 at 409, Translation at 2; see also Interview with
Judge Francesco Ippolito, supra note 113; Bitensky, supra note 112, at 25.
117. See Cambria, Foro It. II 1996 at 408, Translation, at 1, 1 1. Article 571 states
as follows:
Whoever misuses means of correction or discipline to harm a person subject to
his authority, or entrusted to him for purposes of education, instruction, treat-
ment, supervision or custody, or by reason of his practice of a profession or
craft, shall be punished, if the act results in the risk of physical or mental ill-
ness, by imprisonment for up to six months.
If the act results in personal injury, the punishments prescribed in Articles 582
and 583 shall be applied, reduced by one-third; if it results in death, imprison-
ment for from between three and eight years shall be imposed.
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November 23, 1995, the Milan Court of Appeals convicted
Cambria for ill-treatment---"maltrattamenti in famiglia o
verso fanciulli"-of his daughter under article 572 of the Ital-
ian Penal Code 18 rather than for abuse of the means of
correction.119
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Italy, Cambria argued,
among other things, that since the beatings did not cause "the
danger of a physical or mental illness" as required for a convic-
tion under article 571, he should not have been found guilty of
abuse of the means of correction at the first judicial level;120 he
further argued that the appeals court should not have con-
victed him of ill-treatment because he lacked the requisite
intent to mistreat a child, having administered the beatings
only with the purpose of correcting Danila's wayward behav-
ior.121 Indeed, Cambria accused the Milan Court of Appeals of
"'rampant permissiveness.' 122
The Supreme Court of Italy rejected Cambria's defenses and
upheld his conviction for ill-treatment towards a child under
article 572 of the Italian Penal Code. 12' The Court explained
that article 571 of the Italian Penal Code could not apply to
Cambria's case because that provision is triggered only when a
legitimate means of correction is used abusively. The Court
CODICE PENALE [C.P.] art. 571 (Italy), translated in THE ITALIAN PENAL CODE 190-91
(Edward M. Wise & Allen Maitlan trans., 1978).
118. The provision making ill-treatment a crime states as follows:
Whoever, apart from the cases specified in the preceding Article, maltreats a
member of his family or a person under the age of fourteen years, or a person
subject to his authority, or entrusted to him for purposes of education, instruc-
tion, treatment, or supervision or custody, or by reason of his practice of a
profession or trade, shall be punished by imprisonment for from one to five
years.
If the act results in serious personal injury, imprisonment for from four to eight
years shall be imposed; if it results in very serious injury, imprisonment for
from seven to fifteen years; if it results in death, imprisonment for from twelve
to twenty years.
C.P. art. 572.
119. See Cambria, Foro It. II 1996 at 408, Translation at 1; see also Interview with
Judge Francesco Ippolito, supra note 113.
120. See Cambria, Foro It. II 1996 at 409, Translation, at 2; see also Interview
with Judge Francesco Ippolito, supra note 113.
121. See sources cited supra note 120.
122. Cambria, Foro It. II 1996 at 409, Translation at 2.
123. See id. at 409, 412, Translation at 3, 6.
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reasoned that corporal punishment, regardless of how it is
used, cannot be a legitimate means of correction.'
24
"The Cambria case involved the systematic use of serious
violence against a child.""2 However, the court's ruling was by
no means confined to those facts. According to Judge Ippolito,
who wrote the opinion on behalf of the Italian Supreme Court,
the judges "considered the case as an opportunity to establish
the legal principle that parents in Italy are absolutely forbid-
den from using any violence or corporal punishment to correct
their children's conduct." '26 That is why, in addition to affirm-
ing Cambria's conviction for ill-treatment, the Court laid down
as a juridical principle, effective throughout Italy, that violence
may never be used on children for educational purposes.' 27 The
ruling is most significant as it relates to familial corporal
punishment since even before the Cambria case Italy had
outlawed corporal punishment in the schools. 28
What considerations prompted the Court to take this dra-
matic step? Judge Ippolito explained that the Cambria case
represents the culmination of ongoing legal reforms and politi-
cal and cultural changes since the end of Benito Mussolini's
fascist dictatorship over Italy in 1945.129 Judge Ippolito ob-
served that in the 1930s and early 1940s, Italian courts, as a
matter of course, interpreted the country's penal code based on
the authoritarian and hierarchical structure of the family that
124. See id. at 411, Translation at 4 ("[The crime committed cannot be said to be
the one described in article 571 because the means of correction used were unlawful
both in terms of their nature and in terms of the potential damage they could in-
flict."); see also Interview with Judge Francesco Ippolito, supra note 113 (noting that
the Supreme Court wanted to make the point that physical punishment absolutely
cannot be used to correct or educate a child).
125. Bitensky, supra note 112; see Interview with Judge Francesco Ippolito, supra
note 113.
126. See Bitensky, supra note 112 (quoting from Interview with Judge Francesco
Ippolito, supra note 113); see also Italian Court, supra note 112.
127. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. Judge Ippolito explained that
lower courts in Italy are theoretically free to ignore the Supreme Court's enunciation
of the new juridical principle forbidding all corporal punishment of children. (The
Italian judiciary does not formally observe stare decisis.) However, the judge empha-
sized that as a practical matter the new principle is considered the law throughout
Italy because the other Italian courts adhere to the rulings of the Supreme Court
unless the lower courts can give very strong reasons for distinguishing the cases be-
fore them. See Interview with Judge Francesco Ippolito, supra note 113.
128. See Interview with Judge Francesco Ippolito, supra note 113.
129. See id. Benito Mussolini's dictatorship brought fascism to Italy during the
period from 1922 to 1945 and made Italy a member of the Axis in World War II. See
David I. Kertzer, Italy, in 10 THE WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA 496, 517 (1993)
[hereinafter WORLD BOOK); R. John Rath, Mussolini, Benito, in 13 WORLD BOOK,
supra, 967, 967.
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prevailed at that time.130 During this period, the father was the
head of the family and almost completely dominated his wife
and children. 131 In keeping with this model of family relations,
the courts interpreted article 571 of the Penal Code as allow-
ing the father to use virtually any means of "correcting" his
wife and children.
32
Judge Ippolito noted that as Italy moved away from fascism,
it also moved away from the concept of the authoritarian
father.13 3 This movement was reflected in legal innovations
such as the inclusion in Italy's 1948 Constitution of various
provisions protecting the dignity of the individual as an
inalienable right.'3 ' Likewise, the Constitution also contains
provisions assuring equal protection, 3 including provisions
specifically recognizing that marriage must be "based on the
moral and legal equality of husband and wife."36 Judge
Ippolito stated that the Justices in the Cambria case
understood these legal and historical trends also in light of the
fact that the Italian Constitution repudiates war or the use of
violence to settle international disputes.1
31
In the 1950s, Italy's Supreme Court decided that the Consti-
tution's provisions on equality in the marital relationship
barred the use by husbands of any means of correction, physi-
cal or otherwise, against their wives.13  In 1975, Italy's
Parliament enacted measures to conform the nation's family
laws to the provisions of the Constitution protecting each per-
son's dignity, equality, and right to be free of violence.'39 In
addition, between 1975 and 1995, the Supreme Court of Italy




134. See, e.g., COST. (Constitution] arts. 2, 3, 32, 36, 41 (Italy), translated in Gis-
berth H. Flanz, Italy, in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P.
Blaustein & Gisberth H. Flanz eds., 1987) [hereinafter COST.]; Interview with Judge
Francesco Ippolito, supra note 113 (discussing constitutional provisions).
135. See, e.g., COST. arts. 3, 37; Interview with Judge Francesco Ippolito, supra
note 113 (discussing constitutional provisions).
136. COST. art. 29. See also Interview with Judge Francesco Ippolito, supra note
113 (discussing constitutional provisions).
137. See COST. art. 11; Interview with Judge Francesco Ippolito, supra note 113
(discussing constitutional provisions).
138. See Interview with Judge Francesco Ippolito, supra note 113.
139. See, e.g., CODICE CIVILE [C.c.] art. 147 (Italy), translated in 1 THE ITALIAN
CIVIL CODE AND COMPLEMENTARY LEGISLATION 44 (Mario Beltramo et al. trans., 1991)
(defining the duties of parents to their children, including the duty to "maintain,
educate and instruct the children ... taking into account their ability, natural
inclinations and aspirations").
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issued a series of decisions that had the effect of further limiting
the use of force against children in institutional settings. 140
These domestic reforms were paralleled by developments in
the international law that governs Italy. In Italy, the constitu-
tional court has long recognized treaties as superior to the
Italian Constitution and other Italian laws.'41 Thus, the judges
who decided the Cambria case were influenced not only by the
Italian Constitution and the evolution of Italian family law,
but also by human rights treaties-especially the U.N. Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child 142 to which Italy is a party.
143
Judge Ippolito reported that, in interpreting Italy's penal code,
he and the other judges of the Supreme Court were especially
swayed by the preamble and articles 2, 3, 18 and 19 of the
Convention.'" Specifically, the court's opinion relies upon the
preamble's recognition of children's need to develop "full[y]
and harmonious[ly]" and to be brought up "in the spirit ... of
peace, dignity, tolerance, freedom, equality, and solidarity";
14
upon article 2's nondiscrimination principle; 146 upon article 3's
140. See Interview with Judge Francesco Ippolito, supra note 113.
141. See id.
142. U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, G.A. Res. 44/25,
U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (1989) [hereinafter Convention of
the Child].
143. See Interview with Judge Francesco Ippolito, supra note 113. Italy entered
into the Convention of the Child on September 5, 1991. See Status of U.N. Convention
on the Rights of the Child, 30 I.L.M. 1780 (1991).
144. See Interview with Judge Francesco Ippolito, supra note 113. Indeed, the
Court's opinion specifically names article 2, article 3(1) and article 18(1), quotes from
the preamble, and paraphrases article 2, article 3(1), article 18(1) and article 19(1) of
the Convention of the Child. See Cambria, Foro It. II 1996 at 410, Translation at 3-4.
145. Cambria, Foro It. II 1996 at 410, Translation at 3 (omissions in original). The
full language of the relevant portions of the preamble to the Convention of the Child
are as follows:
The States Parties to the present Convention
Recognizing that the child, for the full and harmonious development of his or
her personality, should grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of
happiness, love and understanding,
Considering that the child should be fully prepared to live an individual life in
society, and brought up in the spirit of the ideals proclaimed in the Charter of
the United Nations, and in particular in the spirit of peace, dignity, tolerance,
freedom, equality and solidarity....
Convention of the Child, supra note 142, pmbl., at 3.
146. Cambria, Foro It. II 1996 at 410, Translation at 4. The full language of this
portion of the Convention of the Child is as follows:
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and article 18's insistence on the primacy of the best interests
of the child; 47 and upon article 19's prohibition on the use of
violence against children.'48
Judge Ippolito stated that the Court in the Cambria case
looked to all of these sources-the Italian Constitution, Italian
civil law, and the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child-
to interpret Italy's penal code in a way that would undo the
basis of violence against children.49 In the judges' view, all of
these sources as well as modern Italian values made it clear to
the Court that in order finally to address the problem in a
meaningful way it would be necessary to forbid any violence
against children as a method of instruction or child rearing."'
Judge Ippolito admitted that, in spite of the Court's ruling
in the Cambria case, enforcement could prove difficult because
Italian children do not presently have the right of "denouncing"
to authorities so as to initiate prosecution; rather, an adult
States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Con-
vention to each child within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any
kind, irrespective of the child's or his or her parent's or legal guardian's race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or so-
cial origin, property, disability, birth or other status.
Convention of the Child, supra note 142, art. 2(1), at 5.
147. Cambria, Foro It. II 1996 at 410, Translation at 3-4. The full language of the
article 3, paragraph 1 of the Convention of the Child is as follows: "In all actions con-
cerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions,
courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the
child shall be a primary consideration." Convention of the Child, supra note 142, art.
3(1), at 5. The full language of article 18, paragraph 1 of the Convention of the Child is
as follows:
States Parties shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the principle
that both parents have common responsibilities for the upbringing and devel-
opment of the child. Parents or, as the case may be, legal guardians, have the
primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child. The
best interests of the child will be their basic concern.
Convention of the Child, supra note 142, art. 18(1), at 9.
148. Cambria, Foro It. II 1996 at 410, Translation at 3. The full language of this
portion of the Convention is as follows:
States Parties shall take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and
educational measures to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental
violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or ex-
ploitation including sexual abuse, while in the care of parent(s), legal
guardian(s) or any other person who has the care of the child.
Convention of the Child, supra note 142, art. 19(1), at 10.
149. See Interview with Judge Francesco Ippolito, supra note 113.
150. See id.
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must denounce for the child as the child's legal representa-
tive.151 However, the judge was optimistic about the overall
effect of the Cambria decision insofar as it will influence fu-
ture judgments by lower courts in prosecutions that are
brought in connection with parental corporal punishment of
children and insofar as the Supreme Court has set an example
for Italian jurists.15 2 The judge predicted that the new juridical
principle would "filter into society"15 as a new norm and create
an atmosphere in which physical chastisement of children is
not socially acceptable.15
H. Minnesota
Minnesota does not have a single statute that explicitly pro-
hibits parental corporal punishment of children. Rather, the
state's ban on such punishment must be teased out of four
statutory provisions read together.
Section 609.06, subdivision 1(6) of the Minnesota statutes,
when considered by itself, actually appears to authorize paren-
tal corporal punishment of children:
Except as otherwise provided in subdivision 2, reasonable
force may be used upon or toward the person of another
without the other's consent when the following circum-
stances exist or the actor reasonably believes them to
exist:
(6) when used by a parent, guardian, teacher or other law-
ful custodian of a child or pupil, in the exercise of lawful
authority, to restrain or correct such child or pupil. 155
However, this provision must be understood in conjunction
with section 609.379 of the Minnesota statutes, the statute
governing reasonable force as a defense. 56 Section 609.379,
subdivision 1(a), in its essential elements, tracks the language





155. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.06, subd. 1(6) (West Supp. 1997).
156. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.379 (West 1978 & Supp. 1997).
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to the same "reasonable force."'57 Section 609.379, subdivision
2 further lists the crimes to which reasonable force may be as-
serted as a defense.'58 Subdivision 2 does not include assault
among those crimes.' 59 Therefore, in Minnesota, reasonable
force is not a defense to assault.6
This analysis still leaves the question of whether
"reasonable" corporal punishment of children is an assault
under Minnesota law. Section 609.224, subdivision 1(1)(2) of
the Minnesota statutes defmes assault as an act committed
"with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm
or death"6' or the actual infliction of bodily harm. 2 Section
609.02, subdivision 7 of the Minnesota statutes defines bodily
harm as "physical pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of
physical condition."1 3  As one expert on the foregoing
Minnesota statutes observed, "[a] pplying these statutes to acts
of corporal punishment, it is clear that such discipline
constitutes an assault. This is because physical punishment, at
a minimum, involves the infliction of pain or placing the child
in fear of pain."'
157. The language of Section 609.06, subdivision 1(6) should be compared to that
of section 609.379, subdivision 1(a). The latter section provides as follows:
Subdivision 1. Reasonable force. Reasonable force may be used upon or toward
the person of a child without the child's consent when the following circum-
stance exists or the actor reasonably believes it to exist:
(a) when used by a parent, legal guardian, teacher, or other caretaker of a
child or pupil, in the exercise of lawful authority, to restrain or correct the child
or pupil ....
Id. § 609.379, subd. 1(a).
158. The text of section 609.379, subdivision 2, provides: "Subd. 2. Applicability.
This section applies to sections 260.315, 609.255, 609.376, 609.378, and 626.556."
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.379, subd. 2 (West Supp. 1997).
159. Indeed, section 260.315 concerns contributing to the need for protection or
services or to the delinquency of a child, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.315 (West 1987);
section 609.255 deals with false imprisonment, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.255 (West
1987 & Supp. 1997); section 609.376 defines the terms child, caretaker, and complain-
ant, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.376 (West 1987); section 609.378 covers neglect or
endangerment of a child, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.378 (West Supp. 1997); and section
626.556 addresses the reporting of maltreatment of minors, MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 626.556 (West Supp. 1997). See also Vieth, Corporal Punishment, supra note 5, at 42
& n.160 (stating that subdivision 2 of section 609.379 does not list the crime of as-
sault).
160. See Vieth, Corporal Punishment, supra note 5, at 42 & n.160.
161. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.224, subd. 1(1) (West 1987).
162. See id. § 609.224, subd. 1(2).
163. Id. § 609.02, subd. 7.
164. Vieth, Corporal Punishment, supra note 5, at 44.
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Thus, the reasonable force defense provided in section
609.06, subdivision 1(6) and 609.379, subdivision 1(a) is made
inoperative by subdivision 2 of section 609.379 when parents
are charged with assault for corporally punishing their chil-
dren. That is, if parents use "reasonable force" on a child as a
disciplinary tactic, they may be prosecuted by Minnesota for
assault and may not hide behind the excuse that they were
just using "reasonable" corporal punishment. "[C]orporal pun-
ishment is considered a crime to the same extent as any
assault" in Minnesota.
165
Although Minnesota has lived with this prohibition on cor-
poral punishment of children for many years," there are no
reported cases of a parent being prosecuted for administering
mild corporal punishment to children.6 7 As in the European
countries that have banned corporal punishment of children,
Minnesota has exercised prosecutorial restraint in relation to
"minor" instances of corporal punishment."
Minnesota's law on corporal punishment of children is not
widely known either by commentators, practitioners, or the
general public. 69 This is probably due to the relative complex-
ity and obtuseness of the prohibition's provisions. 71
II. LEGAL STATUS OF CORPORAL PUNISHMENT
OF CHILDREN UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
There is a traditional view that international human rights
instruments should be interpreted according to a pub-
lic/private distinction. 71 Under this view, such instruments
apply to human rights deprivations by governments and their
agents against individuals but not to deprivations by private




169. See Telephone Interview with Victor I. Vieth, Senior Attorney, National Cen-
ter for Prosecution of Child Abuse (Dec. 11, 1997).
170. See id.
171. See ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE 91-94 (1993)
(discussing the traditional view of the public/private distinction in interpreting inter-
national human rights instruments); see also Celina Romany, Women as Aliens: A
Feminist Critique of the Public/Private Distinction in International Human Rights
Law, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 87, 97-106 (1993) (describing and critiquing the pub-
lic/private distinction in human rights law from a feminist perspective).
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individuals against other individuals. 7 2 For example, the tradi-
tional view would interpret language lending itself to a
prohibition on corporal punishment as only reaching judicially
imposed or public school corporal punishment but not paren-
tally administered corporal punishment.
The traditional view, however, has lost much of its credibil-
ity and influence by virtue of the inclusive language of many
post-World War II international human rights instruments. 173
The phenomenon is perhaps most strikingly manifested in the
U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child (Convention of the
Child) which uses language throughout the document ex-
pressly indicative of an intent to impose human rights
obligations protective of children on both states parties and
private actors. 174 The other human rights treaties and declara-
tions discussed in Part II.B of this Article also employ
language that, either explicitly or implicitly, obligates both the
public and private sectors to observe human rights-an inter-
pretation reflected in the comments of the respective official
bodies monitoring treaty compliance7 and in the scholarly lit-
erature.17 The only arguable exception is the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (Torture Convention), 77 but, as will
172. See CLAPHAM, supra note 171, at 91 nn.10-11 (citations omitted).
173. See id. at 95-104 (discussing the evolution of international human rights in-
struments from the 1946 Charter of the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg to the U.N. conventions on discrimination of the 1990s); MYRES S.
McDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 350-57 (1980); Jordan
J. Paust, The Other Side of Right: Private Duties Under Human Rights Law, 5 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 51 passim (1992).
174. See, e.g., Convention of the Child, supra note 142, arts. 3(1) (best interests of
the child), 18(1) (best interests of the child), 19(1) at 5, 9 (protection from abuse); see
also CLAPHAM, supra note 171, at 101 (referring to articles 3(1) and 16 of the Conven-
tion of the Child as examples of human rights obligations imposed on the private
sector).
175. See infra Part II.B; see also CLAPHAM, supra note 171, at 107-11 (surveying
the positions announced by the Human Rights Committee with respect to the applica-
tion of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to human rights
duties of private actors).
176. See CLAPHAM, supra note 171, at 93-133; LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A POLICY-ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE
76-78 (1989); McDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 173, at 350-57; Louis Henkin, Interna-
tional Human Rights and Rights in the United States, in 1 HUMAN RIGHTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 25, 36 (Theodor Meron ed., 1984);
Paust, supra note 173, passim; Romany, supra note 171, at 97-121.
177. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20 (1988), 1465
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Torture Convention] (entered into force for the United States
Nov. 20, 1994).
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be shown, even that convention is being interpreted in some
circles as extending to private individuals' transgressions.
178
In light of the broadly inclusive language of the provisions
under discussion here and of the fact that there is scholarly and
other authoritative support for repudiating the public/private
distinction with respect to these provisions, this Article
proceeds upon the assumption that each instrument applies to
corporal punishment of children by parents and other private
actors as well as to state inflicted corporal punishment.
Indeed, a contrary reading would do violence to the very
language and essence of these instruments.
A. UN. Convention on the Rights of the Child
Of the numerous international human rights instruments
that may be understood to prohibit corporal punishment of
children, the Convention of the Child presents the strongest
case for such an interpretation. The Convention of the Child
was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations
on November 20, 1989."79 To date, 191 countries have become
parties."8 The President of the United States signed the Con-
vention of the Child on February 16, 1995,81 but, to date,
Congress has not ratified it; thus, the United States is pres-
ently not a party to the Convention of the Child. 2
It should be pointed out that lack of ratification is not
necessarily dispositive as to whether the Convention of the
Child should govern the United States. Even treaties to which
a country is not a party or particular principles set forth in
those treaties may, under certain circumstances, constitute
evidence of binding customary international law."s Factors
178. See infra notes 263-69 and accompanying text.
179. See UNITED NATIONS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL: STATUS AS AT 31 DECEMBER 1995, at 198 (1996).
180. Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, United Nations,
N.Y. ST/LEG/SER. E. (visited July 24, 1997) <http://www.un.org/Depts/Treaty/final/ts2/
newfilespartboo/ivboo/iv_ll.html> [hereinafter Multilateral Treaties] (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
181. UNITED NATIONS, supra note 179, at 199.
182. See id. at 199; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (granting the U.S. Presi-
dent power "to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur").
183. See McDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 173, at 266-72; Louis Sohn, "Generally Ac-
cepted" International Rules, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1073, 1073-74, 1077-79 (1986); Sarah
Ramsey & Daan Braveman, "Let Them Starve": Government's Obligation to Children
in Poverty, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1607, 1639-42 (1995).
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serving to signify that a treaty manifests customary
international law include "virtually universal participation of
states in the preparation and adoption of international
agreements recognizing human rights principles generally, or
particular rights... .""1 The Convention of the Child has
arguably become customary international law,'85 applicable
even to non-parties such as the United States,'86 because it was
adopted by consensus of the U.N. General Assembly. 7 and has
been ratified by an overwhelming majority of nations.
8 8
However, even if the Convention of the Child does not gov-
ern the United States as either treaty law or customary
international law, discussion of corporal punishment of chil-
dren would be incomplete without an analysis of highly
pertinent provisions of the Convention. Because the Conven-
tion of the Child is regarded as applicable international law
for most countries and is an authoritative expression of world
opinion, it is a resource that should serve to enrich and em-
bolden consideration of the issue in the United States.
The Convention established the Committee on the Rights of
the Child for the purpose of monitoring compliance by the
Customary international law is considered binding federal common law. See The
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); Richard B. Lillich, The Constitution and
International Human Rights, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 851, 856-58 (1989); Karen Parker &
Lyn B. Neylon, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights, 12 HASTINGS INT'L
& COMP. L. REV. 411, 417 (1989). But see Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional
Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and International Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071,
1072 (1985) (contending that although customary international law is, as a theoretical
matter, the law of the land, domestic courts have held that Congress has authority to
disregard such law).
184. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 701 rep. note 2 (1987).
185. See Ramsey & Braveman, supra note 183, at 1641; see also Elizabeth M. Cal-
ciano, United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: Will It Help Children in
the United States?, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 515, 531 (1992) (suggesting
that while many of the rights set forth in the Convention of the Child will not be con-
sidered customary international law, some of the rights contained therein could be
elevated to that status when considered in combination with other evidence that those
rights constitute customary international law).
186. See Ramsey & Braveman, supra note 183, at 1641.
187. See GERALDINE VAN BUEREN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE RIGHTS OF
THE CHILD 15 (International Studies in Human Rights Vol. 35, 1995).
188. See Multilateral Treaties, supra note 180; (asserting that by mid-1997, 191
countries had become parties to the Convention of the Child); see also Ramsey &
Braveman, supra note 183, at 1641 (characterizing the number of nations that have
ratified the Convention of the Child as "a large majority"). Only the United States and
Somalia have yet to ratify the Convention of the Child. See Multilateral Treaties,
supra note 180.
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treaty's parties.189 The Committee is considered the "authori-
tative source" with respect to interpretation of the Convention
of the Child,90 and the Committee's understanding of the Con-
vention's meaning is, therefore, decisive. The Committee has
expressly taken the position that the Convention as a whole is
inconsistent with corporal punishment of children. In an offi-
cial report issued in November, 1994, the Committee declared:
In the framework of its mandate, the Committee has paid
particular attention to the child's right to physical integ-
rity. In the same spirit, it has stressed that corporal
punishment of children is incompatible with the Conven-
tion and has often proposed the revision of existing
legislation, as well as the development of awareness and
education campaigns, to prevent child abuse and the
physical punishment of children.'91
The Committee has had occasion to articulate and elaborate
upon this position during 1994-97 in its concluding observa-
tions following examination of progress reports submitted by
various countries to the Committee.9 The Committee, invok-
ing a variety of the Convention's provisions or sometimes none
in particular, has stated repeatedly in these observations that
banning corporal punishment of children in families is essential
in order for reporting countries to achieve treaty compliance.'
189. See Convention of the Child, supra note 142, arts. 43(1), 44-45, at 20-22;
Marta Santos Pais, Address at the International Seminar on Worldwide Strategies
and Progress Towards Ending All Physical Punishment of Children (Dublin, Ireland,
Aug. 22, 1996) (transcript on file with University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
Marta Santos Pais was one of the ten experts who served as a member of the Commit-
tee on the Rights of the Child and was also the Committee's rapporteur.
190. See Cynthia Price Cohen, A Guide to Linguistic Interpretation of the Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child: Articles 1, 4, 41 and 45, in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS IN
AMERICA: U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD COMPARED WITH UNITED
STATES LAW 33, 33 (Cynthia Price Cohen & Howard A. Davidson eds., 1990).
191. U.N. Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, Report on the Seventh Session, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/34, Annex IV, at 63 (Nov. 1994).
192. See Convention of the Child, supra note 142, art. 44, at 21-22 (requiring
states parties to submit progress reports on their compliance with the treaty's terms).
193. See, e.g., Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the
Child: Ethiopia, 14th Sess., 27, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.67 (1997) (recommending
that Ethiopian legislation allowing "light bodily punishment" of children within the
family should be abrogated "as a matter of priority"); Concluding Observations of the
Committee on the Rights of the Child: Nepal, 12th Sess., 19, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/15/Add.57 (1996) [hereinafter Concluding Observations on Nepal] (voicing
concern that Nepal had not yet taken measures to prevent corporal punishment of
children within the family); Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights
of the Child. Zimbabwe, 12th Sess., 18, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.55 (1996)
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With respect to the specific provisions of the Convention of
the Child, article 19, paragraph 1 most readily lends itself to
[hereinafter Concluding Observations on Zimbabwe] (expressing dismay that Zim-
babwe's law tolerates corporal punishment of children in the family); Concluding
Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Republic of Korea, l1th
Sess., 1 15, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15 Add.51 (1996) (articulating concern that in the Re-
public of Korea corporal punishment is still widely regarded by parents as an
educational measure); Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the
Child: Germany, 10th Sess., 30, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.43 (1995) (proposing that
Germany consider adding an absolute ban on corporal punishment to its civil code);
Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Portugal, 10th
Sess., 15, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.45 (1995) (recommending that Portugal should
take measure to prevent corporal punishment of children, especially in the family);
Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Senegal, 10th
Sess., 24, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.44 (1995) [hereinafter Concluding Observations
on Senegal] (stating that Senegal's domestic law should include a specific provision
outlawing "any form of corporal punishment within the family"); Concluding Observa-
tions of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Ukraine, 10th Sess., 29, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/15/Add.42 (1995) (suggesting that the Ukraine should enact a ban on corporal
punishment in the family); Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of
the Child: Tunisia, 9th Sess., 1 17, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.31 (1995) (proposing that
Tunisia should employ measures against corporal punishment in the family); Con-
cluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Belgium, 9th Sess.,
15, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15 Add.38 (1995) (encouraging Belgium to consider legislative
reforms ensuring the prohibition of corporal punishment within the family); Conclud-
ing Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Canada, 9th Sess.,
1 14, 25, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.37 (1995) (recommending that Canada prohibit
physical punishment in the family); Concluding Observations of the Committee on the
Rights of the Child: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 8th Sess.,
31, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15 Add.34 (1995) [hereinafter Concluding Observations on the
United Kingdom] (recommending that the United Kingdom should prohibit physical
punishment of children in families); Concluding Observations of the Committee on the
Rights of the Child: Poland, 8th Sess., 1 30, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.31 (1995)
(suggesting that Polish legislation should be reformed to reflect a prohibition on cor-
poral punishment in the family); Concluding Observations of the Committee on the
Rights of the Child: Honduras, 7th Sess., 1 27, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.24 (1994)
(advising Honduras to improve family education on child rearing, "including the im-
portance of avoiding the physical punishment of children").
The Committee on the Rights of the Child has also made statements in its con-
cluding observations that generally condemn corporal punishment of children, but
without any special reference to the family context. See, e.g., Concluding Observations
of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Sri Lanka, 9th Sess., 15, 32, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/15/Add.40 (1995); [hereinafter Concluding Observations on Sri Lanka] Con-
cluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Jamaica, 8th Sess.,
7, UN. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.32 (1995); Concluding Observations of the Committee on
the Rights of the Child: France, 6th Sess., 24, UN. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.20 (1994).
Some concluding observations also criticize continued allowance of corporal punish-
ment in the schools or commend its disallowance in educational institutions, as the
case may be. See, e.g., Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the
Child: Guatemala, 12th Sess., 133, UN. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.58 (1996); Concluding
Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Lebanon, 12th Sess., 37,
UN. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.54 (1996); Concluding Observations on Zimbabwe, supra, at
18; Concluding Observations on Sri Lanka, supra, at 1 15, 32.
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interpretation as prohibiting corporal punishment of children.
Article 19, paragraph 1 provides:
States Parties shall take all appropriate legislative, ad-
ministrative, social and educational measures to protect
the child from all forms of physical or mental violence,
injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, mal-
treatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in
the care of parent(s), legal guardian(s) or any other per-
son who has the care of the child.'9
That article 19, paragraph 1 prohibits parental corporal
punishment of children would seem evident as a semantic
matter since the provision requires nations to protect children
against "all forms of physical ... violence." 95 If one adult hits
another-even once and not so as to cause any significant in-
jury-the slap would be considered a form of violence. For, a
"violent" action may be defined as one "marked by extreme
force or sudden intense activity.""9 If the slap is administered
by a parent to his or her child, pure logic would seem to re-
quire that the inherent nature of the act does not change from
violent to nonviolent simply because the victim is smaller, less
powerful, and the aggressor's own flesh and blood.' Why else
would article 19, paragraph 1 refer to "all forms of physical...
violence" in addition to "injury or abuse" unless the former
phraseology was meant to include violent conduct that does
not necessarily cause injury or rise to the level of conventional
conceptions of abuse?
While such an interpretation seems to be the plain meaning
of the provision's text, it is not necessary to rely on dictionary
definitions and logic to interpret article 19, paragraph 1 as
194. Convention of the Child, supra note 142, art. 19(1), at 10.
195. Id.; see Parkinson, supra note 4, at 278-79; Kerri A. Law, Note, Hope for the
Future: Overcoming Jurisdictional Concerns to Achieve United States Ratification of
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 62 FORDHAm L. REV. 1851, 1858 (1994).
196. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1316 (9th ed. 1988). The
concept of violence also is capable of other connotations. The term may also be defined
as "exertion of physical force so as to injure or abuse" or "injury by or as if by distor-
tion, infringement, or profanation." Id. As used in article 19, paragraph 1 of the
Convention of the Child, however, definitions of violence that require an injury appear
less appropriate because they make the article's reference to "forms of... injury" a
redundancy. See Convention of the Child, supra note 142, art. 19(1), at 10; see also
Peter Newell, Respecting Children's Right to Physical Integrity, in THE HANDBOOK OF
CHILDREN'S RIGHTs: COMPARATIVE POLICY AND PRACTICE 215, 222 (Bob Franklin ed.,
1995) (stating that article 19(1) protects children from all forms of violence).
197. See Newell, supra note 196, at 222.
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prohibiting all corporal punishment of children. The periodic
reports which states parties are required to submit to the
Committee on the Rights of the Child are supposed to conform
to the Committee's General Guidelines Regarding the Form
and Content of Periodic Reports.'98 The guidelines, drawing
upon the language of article 19, provide:
Reports should indicate, in particular:
whether legislation (criminal and/or family law) includes
a prohibition of all forms of physical and mental violence,
including corporal punishment, deliberate humiliation,
injury, abuse, neglect or exploitation, inter alia within the
family, in foster and other forms of care, and in public or
private institutions, such as penal institutions and
schools...."'
In addition, some of the Committee's concluding observations
single out article 19 in particular as a basis for admonishing
countries to take measures against corporal punishment of
children."°
198. See General Guidelines Regarding the Form and Contents of Periodic Reports
to Be Submitted by States Parties Under Article 44, Paragraph 1(b), of the Convention,
U.N. GAOR, Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 343d mtg., U.N. Doc. CRC/C/58 (1996).
199. Id. at 88.
200. See, e.g., Concluding Observations on Zimbabwe, supra note 193, at 18;
Concluding Observations on Sri Lanka, supra note 193, at 32; Concluding Observa-
tions on Canada, supra note 193, at 1 25; Concluding Observations on the United
Kingdom, supra note 193, at 1 31.
It may be predicted that proponents of corporal punishment of children will argue
that article 5 of the Convention of the Child justifies reasonable physical chastise-
ment. Article 5 provides:
States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights, and duties of parents or,
where applicable, the members of the extended family or community as pro-
vided for by local custom, legal guardians or other persons legally responsible
for the child, to provide, in a manner consistent with the evoiving capacities of
the child, appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of the
rights recognized in the present Convention.
Convention of the Child, supra note 142, art. 5, at 6.
When the United Kingdom raised this argument with the Committee on the Rights
of the Child, a Committee member stated:
It must be borne in mind, however, that article 19 of the Convention required
all appropriate measures, including legislative measures, to be taken to protect
the child against, inter alia, physical violence. A way should thus be found of
striking the balance between the responsibilities of the parents and the rights and
evolving capacities of the child that was implied in article 5 of the Convention.
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Although such authoritative interpretations of article 19,
paragraph 1 by the Committee make that provision the most
obvious and justifiable home for an international law banning
parental corporal punishment of children, the Committee has
found that other discrete provisions of the Convention of the
Child serve this purpose as well. In a lecture on the subject in
August, 1996, Marta Santos Pais, one of the ten members of
the Committee on the Rights of the Child at that time and the
Committee's then rapporteur, detailed the relevance of several
of these provisions.'O Her explanations are offered as a
glimpse into the legal reasoning of the Committee and as a re-
flection of the purposiveness with which the Committee has
proceeded on the issue of corporal punishment.
The Committee has repeatedly relied on articles 28 and 37
of the Convention of the Child as a basis for criticizing
countries that have not repudiated corporal punishment of
children.2" According to Ms. Santos Pais, articles 19, 28 and 37
make "a clear statement against the use of any form of
violence" in the treatment of children.0 3 Article 37, paragraph
(a) provides, in pertinent part, that "States Parties shall
ensure that no child shall be subjected to torture or other
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."21 Ms.
Santos Pais explained that while nations commonly identify
torture with "extremely serious and massive cases," this is too
narrow a reading of the term as it is used in the Convention of
the Child.20 5 Rather, "torture may cover a wide degree of
situations," even those which cause "unperceivable mental
suffering" or those involving "a disciplinary measure which may
be degrading or inhuman."2' What is more, this prohibition
There was no place for corporal punishment within the margin of discretion ac-
corded in article 5 to parents in the exercise of their responsibilities.
Summary Record of the 205th Meeting, U.N. GAOR, Comm. on the Rts. of the Child,
8th Sess., 205th mtg. at 17, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/SR.205 (1995).
Thus, there is a basis for the view that, due to the operation of article 19, article 5
should not be read to allow parental corporal punishment of children.
201. Santos Pas, supra note 189.
202. See, e.g., Concluding Observations on Zimbabwe, supra note 193, at 1 18;
Concluding Observations on Canada, supra note 193, at 1 25; Concluding Observa-
tions on the United Kingdom, supra note 193, at 31.
203. See Santos Pals, supra note 189; see also Law, supra note 195, at 1858.
204. Convention of the Child, supra note 142, art. 37(a), at 17.
205. See Santos Pals, supra note 189.
206. Id.
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applies in "all circumstances of the life of a child, including in
family life or in the school system. 0 7
Article 28, paragraph 2 of the Convention of the Child states
that "States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to
ensure that school discipline is administered in a manner
consistent with the child's human dignity and in conformity
with the present Convention."2' The Committee on the Rights
of the Child and the commentators have understood article 28,
paragraph 2 as requiring states parties to take measures
proscribing corporal punishment in the schools,2  an under-
standing reiterated by Ms. Santos Pais.21° Indeed, such an
interpretation is all but inescapable when it is considered that
if school discipline is to be administered "in conformity with
the present Convention," the discipline must conform to the
authoritative interpretation discussed above that the Con-
vention as a whole and certain of its individual provisions
forbid corporal punishment of children.21" '
Article 28, paragraph 2's prohibition of corporal punishment
in the schools is significant not only in itself but also because
of its bearing on other provisions of the Convention of the
Child. That is, while article 28, paragraph 2 states that school
discipline must be "administered in a manner consistent with
the child's human dignity," there are also numerous other ref-
erences to preserving the child's dignity throughout the
Convention of the Child.212 For example, the preamble to the
Convention of the Child refers to "the inherent dignity ... of
all members of the human family,"213 the "dignity ... of the
human person, "2"' and the need for children to be brought up
207. Id.
208. Convention of the Child, supra note 142, art. 28(2), at 14.
209. See Concluding Observations on Zimbabwe, supra note 193, at 1 18; Conclud-
ing Observations on Canada, supra note 193, at 1 25; Concluding Observations on the
United Kingdom, supra note 193, at 1 31; VAN BUEREN, supra note 187, at 249; Susan
H. Bitensky, Educating the Child for a Productive Life: Articles 28 and 29, in
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS IN AMERICA: U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
COMPARED WITH UNITED STATES LAW 167, 174 (Cynthia Price Cohen & Howard A.
Davidson eds., 1990); Law, supra note 195, at 1858; Telephone Interview with Cynthia
Price Cohen, former member of the Ad Hoc Nongovernmental Group on the Drafting
of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Aug. 13, 1996).
210. See Santos Pais, supra note 189.
211. See supra notes 193-210 and accompanying text; infra notes 219-30 and ac-
companying text.
212. See, e.g., Convention of the Child, supra note 142, pmbl., at 3; id. arts. 37(c),
39, 40(1), at 17-18.
213. Id. pmbl., at 3.
214. Id.
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"in the spirit of... dignity."215 Similarly, article 39 directs that
states parties shall take all appropriate measures to promote
the physical and psychological recovery of children who have
been the victims of any form of cruel or degrading treatment
such that "recovery ... shall take place in an environment
which fosters the ... dignity of the child."216 As a matter of
logic and linguistics, these provisions, when read in light of the
received meaning of article 28, paragraph 2, support the notion
that the spirit of the Convention of the Child in protecting the
child's dignity is inconsistent with allowing parental or other
corporal punishment of children.217 As Marta Santos Pais put
it, "the right not to be subject to any form of physical punish-
ment ... flows as a consequence of the consideration [in the
Convention of the Child] of the child as a person whose human
dignity should be respected."21 8
In addition to finding the right in the Convention's
provisions on dignity, the Committee on the Rights of the Child
and its former rapporteur have advised that at least three
other principles of the Convention of the Child may also imply
a child's right to be free of corporal punishment. First, the
right is protected by the Convention's nondiscrimination
principle.219 This principle is set forth in article 2, paragraph 1
which states that, "States Parties shall respect and ensure the
rights set forth in the present Convention to each child ...
without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child's
... status."220 Ms. Santos Pais elaborated that the principle of
nondiscrimination "means that no child should be ...
punished... on the ground of his or her... status."22' The idea
215. Id.
216. Id. art. 39, at 18.
217. Cf VAN BUEREN, supra note 187, at 249 (noting that international human
rights instruments predating the Convention of the Child use the phrase "human
dignity" in a way that implies repudiation of corporal punishment). In fact, when the
Italian Supreme Court ruled in May 1996 that no corporal punishment may be used
on children in Italy, the Court's opinion relied heavily on the fact that both the Italian
Constitution and the Convention of the Child mandate respect for human dignity. See
Cambria, Cass., sez. VI, 18 marzo 1996, Foro It. II 1996, 407, 410, Translation, supra
note 112, at 3-4; Interview with Judge Francesco Ippolito, supra note 113. See supra
notes 112-37, 142-54 and accompanying text for a full discussion and analysis of the
Italian decision. As one commentator has observed, "[a] child cannot grow up in
'dignity' if it is not guaranteed bodily integrity." Cohen, Corporal Punishment, supra
note 13, at 130.
218. Santos Pais, supra note 189.
219. See Concluding Observations on Nepal, supra note 193, at 1 10 (1996); Con-
cluding Observations on Senegal, supra note 193, at J 24; Santos Pais, supra note 189.
220. Convention of the Child, supra note 142, art. 2(1), at 5.
221. Santos Pais, supra note 189.
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is that article 2 forbids justifying corporal punishment of
children simply because they are children. Second, the
Committee has taken the position that the legality of corporal
punishment is affected by the Convention of the Child's
insistence on the primacy of the best interests of the child.
Article 3, paragraph 1 states that, "[uin all actions concerning
children, whether undertaken by public or private social
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities
or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a
primary consideration."" Ms. Santos Pais elucidated that the
Committee on the Rights of the Child has considered article 3,
paragraph 1 as setting a framework that is incompatible with
corporal punishment of children.2  Third, the Committee has
also found the child's right to be free from violence in the
assurance of article 12, paragraph 1 that the child should be
allowed to participate in all matters affecting his or her life.2"
Ms. Santos Pais explained that "[p]articipation implies
dialogue, mutual respect and tolerance. It facilitates the
negotiation of solutions and promotes the growing respon-
sibility of children. Similarly, participation in family life is a
form of dialogue which leads to the ability for negotiation and
peaceful conflict resolution."225  The inference is that if
participation leads to peaceful conflict resolution it should
necessarily exclude the violent conflict resolution of which
corporal punishment is a form.
While the above analysis of the Convention of the Child as
prohibiting all corporal punishment of children is based on
222. Convention of the Child, supra note 142, art. 3(1), at 5. The Convention of the
Child invokes the standard of the best interests of the child in several provisions. See,
e.g., id. art. 9(1), at 6 ("States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated
from his or her parents against their will, except when competent authorities subject
to judicial review determine ... that such separation is necessary for the best inter-
ests of the child."); id. art. 18(1), at 9 ("Parents or, as the case may be, legal guardians,
have the primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child. The
best interests of the child will be their basic concern."); id. art. 21, at 10 ("States Par-
ties that recognize and/or permit the system of adoption shall ensure that the best
interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration .... ").
223. See Santos Pais, supra note 189; see also Concluding Observations on Sene-
gal, supra note 193, at 1 24; Concluding Observations on Canada, supra note 193, at
25; Concluding Observations on the United Kingdom, supra note 193, at 1 31.
224. See Concluding Observations on Senegal, supra note 193, at 1 24. The provi-
sion states in full that, "States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of
forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters
affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with
the age and maturity of the child." Convention of the Child, supra note 142, art. 12(1),
at 8.
225. Santos Pais, supra note 189.
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authoritative sources, there is at least one other provision of
the Convention which may be interpreted to the same purpose
as a matter of simple logic. Article 24, paragraph 3 of the Con-
vention of the Child provides that "States Parties shall take all
effective and appropriate measures with a view to abolishing
traditional practices prejudicial to the health of children."221
"Health" may be defined as "the condition of being sound in
body, mind, or spirit."227 As Part III of this Article will demon-
strate, there is data indicating that even corporal punishment
of children which does not cause physical injury may still do
harm to the child's mental health,' and that such punishment
can lead to child abuse resulting in physical harm as well.229
This reasoning would support an interpretation of article 24,
paragraph 3 as requiring states parties to take measures
abolishing the traditional practice of spanking or other corpo-
ral punishment of children because these practices are
"prejudicial to the health of children." The drafting history of
the Convention also arguably supports such a reading of the
provision: at the insistence of the Senegalese delegation, the
drafters refused to limit "traditional practices" to female cir-
cumcision and equally severe practices and opted instead for
broader language.o
226. Convention of the Child, supra note 142, art. 24(3), at 13.
227. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 558 (9th ed. 1988).
228. See infra notes 349-50, 355-63 and accompanying text.
229. See infra notes 366-67 and accompanying text.
230. During discussions that led to the formulation of article 24, paragraph 3 of
the Convention of the Child, the United Kingdom's and United States' representatives
took the position that the language proscribing traditional practices should expressly
designate female circumcision as such a practice. The U.S. representative advocated
that such specification would demonstrate that the practices to be abolished were
those of a serious nature. See THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF
THE CHILD: A GUIDE TO THE "TRAVAUXPRItPARATOIRES" 352 (Sharon Detrick ed., 1992)
[hereinafter GUIDE TO THE "TRAVAUX PRIPARATOIRES1. The delegations of Canada,
Japan, Sweden, and Venezuela stated that the term "traditional practices" should be
understood to include all those practices outlined in the 1986 report of the Working
Group on Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of Women and Children. See id.
(citing Report of the Working Group on Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of
Women and Children, U.N. Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human
Rights, 42d Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 19, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1986/42 (1986)). The
report lists practices to be given priority consideration and as topics of discussion and
does not mention corporal punishment. See Working Group on Traditional Practices,
supra, at It 22-24. However, neither the positions of the Canadian et al. delegations
nor the report of the Working Group purport to exclude corporal punishment as a
traditional practice affecting the health of children. In any event, Senegal's represen-
tatives sought more general language that would not specify the precise practices
prohibited thereby. The Finnish delegation also advocated that the word "health" must
be used in its broadest sense. The final language reflects the Senegalese preference.
See GUIDE TO THE "TRAVAUXPRPARATOIRES,' supra, at 352.
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B. Other International Human Rights Instruments
Marta Santos Pais, in her capacity as a member of the
Committee on the Rights of the Child, observed that the Con-
vention of the Child brought together different norms
previously set forth in earlier international instruments and
further improved these norms as a means to effectively ensure
the fundamental rights of the child, "including the one not to
be subject to any form of violence, treatment or punishment
inconsistent with his/her dignity and integrity."231 Even before
the Convention of the Child, then, there were international
instruments arguably protecting children against corporal
punishment.
From an American perspective, it may be of special interest
to explore the ramifications of this observation that the
Convention of the Child incorporates and draws upon the
standards of earlier international instruments. For purposes of
this Article, the interest lies in the fact that if this body of law
applies to children and implicitly prohibits corporal
punishment, then the international consensus against corporal
punishment is even more weighty and influential than might
be supposed from only consulting the Convention of the Child.
Quite apart from the ongoing controversy over whether any of
these instruments are domestically enforceable, their status as
international consensus is a compelling reason to look to them
for guidance as additional credible exemplars of legal regimes
evolving in relation to this issue. In this regard, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration),232 the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(Economic Rights Covenant),233 the International Covenant on
231. See Santos Pais, supra note 189; see also BEVERLY C. EDMONDS & WILLIAM R.
FERNEKES, CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 2-3, 27 n.1 (1996)
(observing that the Convention of the Child was preceded by various international
human rights instruments that provided protections for children); Anders Riinquist,
Counselor, Permanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations, Speech at United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: Prospects for the Year 2000, Loyola
University New Orleans School of Law (Feb. 14, 1997) (making the point that the
Convention of the Child develops principles that were already applicable to children
through earlier international human rights instruments).
232. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, (III), U.N. GAOR,
3rd Sess., pt. 1, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
233. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter
Economic Rights Covenant].
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Civil and Political Rights (Civil and Political Rights
Covenant)," the American Convention on Human Rights
(American Convention),235 the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(European Convention), 36 and the Torture Convention" are
particularly relevant.
A considerable number of commentators are of the view that
these instruments generally apply to children, regardless of
whether or not they also have provisions specifically address-
ing children's rights.238 This analysis is based on the fact that
these documents contain language safeguarding rights for all
human beings as well as provisions that are obviously meant
only for adults.239 The Universal Declaration uses inclusive
234. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1967) (ratified by the
United States on June 8, 1992, see UNITED NATIONS, supra note 179, at 122)
[hereinafter Civil and Political Rights Covenant].
235. American Convention on Human Rights, done on Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S.
123 (entered into force July 18, 1978) [hereinafter American Convention].
236. European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, done on Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention].
237. Torture Convention, supra note 177.
238. See VAN BUEREN, supra note 187, at 17, 19-23 (indicating that the Universal
Declaration, the Economic Rights Covenant, the Civil and Political Rights Covenant,
the European Convention, and the American Convention apply generally to children);
Fernando Volio, Legal Personality, Privacy, and the Family, in THE INTERNATIONAL
BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 185, 186-88, 205-08
(Louis Henkin ed., 1981) (contending that the Civil and Political Rights Covenant
applies generally to children); Walter H. Bennett, Jr., A Critique of the Emerging Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child, 20 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 25-29 (1987) (noting that
the Universal Declaration, the Economic Rights Covenant, the Civil and Political
Rights Covenant, the European Convention, the American Convention, and the Tor-
ture Convention apply generally to children); Calciano, supra note 185, at 518 & n.25
(1992) (arguing that the Universal Declaration, the Economic Rights Covenant, and
the Civil and Political Rights Covenant apply generally to children); Christine A. Cor-
cos, The Child in International Law: A Pathfinder and Selected Bibliography, 23 CASE
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 171, 172 (1991) (suggesting that the Universal Declaration applies
generally to children); Rnquist, supra note 231 (stating generally that many interna-
tional human rights instruments predating the Convention of the Child apply to
children). But see Cynthia Price Cohen, The Human Rights of Children, 12 CAP. U. L.
REV. 369, 376 (1983) (remarking that except for certain articles which expressly refer
to juveniles, nothing in either the Economic Rights Covenant or in the Civil and Po-
litical Rights Covenant clearly states that these instruments apply generally to
children).
239. See Bennett, supra note 238, at 27 (explaining that although the rights con-
tained in the Universal Declaration, the Economic Rights Covenant, and the Civil and
Political Rights Covenant apply generally to children, there are some rights "obviously
intended exclusively for adults, such as the rights to vote and hold public office"); Co-
hen, supra note 238, at 378 (asserting that there are provisions of the Economic
Rights Covenant and the Civil and Political Rights Covenant which obviously do not
apply to children, such as the right to form trade unions and the right to vote).
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language such as article l's statement that "[aill human be-
ings are born free and equal in dignity and rights," ° and
article 2's promise that "[elveryone is entitled to all the rights
and freedoms set forth in this Declaration... ,,241 In a similar
vein, the Torture Convention indicates that it is meant to pro-
tect "all members of the human family."242 Likewise, the
Economic Rights Covenant, the Civil and Political Rights
Covenant, and the European Convention all employ the term
"everyone" in guaranteeing various rights.243 The latter two
covenants also use the phrase "no one" as a term of general
applicability in protecting all persons,2" including children,
against the infringement of certain rights.245 The American
240. Universal Declaration, supra note 232, art. 1; see VAN BUEREN, supra note
187, at 17 (pointing out that the Universal Declaration "proclaims a catalogue of hu-
man rights which apply to 'all human beings' and therefore implicitly to children")
(citation omitted).
241. Universal Declaration, supra note 232, art. 2; cf Bennett, supra note 238, at
27-28 (suggesting that the word "everyone" as used in the Economic Rights Covenant
and in the Civil and Political Rights Covenant should be taken to include children);
Volio, supra note 238, at 186 (stating that the term "everyone" as used in article 16 of
the Civil and Political Rights Covenant encompasses both adults and children).
242. Torture Convention, supra note 177, pmbl., S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20 at 19,
1465 U.N.T.S. at 113; cf Bennett, supra note 238, at 25 (stating that the convention
protects children as members of the human family from torture).
243. For instance, the Economic Rights Covenant requires that States Parties rec-
ognize the rights of "everyone" to an adequate standard of living and to be free from
hunger. See Economic Rights Covenant, supra note 233, art. 11, at 7. That instrument
also recognizes the right of "everyone" to partake "of the highest attainable standard
of physical and mental health." Id. art. 12(1), at 8. The Civil and Political Rights
Covenant provides that "everyone" has the right to "security of person." See Civil and
Political Rights Covenant, supra note 234, art. 9(1), at 175. That covenant further
states that "everyone" shall have a right to "recognition ... as a person before the
law." See id. art. 16, at 177; cf Bennett, supra note 238, at 27-28 (suggesting that the
word "everyone" as used in the Economic Rights Covenant and in the Civil and Politi-
cal Rights Covenant should be understood to include children); Volio, supra note 238,
at 186 (asserting that "everyone" as used in article 16 of the Civil and Political Rights
Covenant encompasses both adults and children). The European Convention uses the
same terminology, such as its guarantee that "[elveryone's" right to life will be pro-
tected. See European Convention, supra note 236, art. 2(1), at 224. Indeed, the case
law which has developed under the European Convention "shows that all rights
phrased in terms of general application apply" to children. See Bennett, supra note
238, at 29.
244. The Civil and Political Rights Covenant declares in article 7 that "[n]o one
shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment." Civil and Political Rights Covenant, supra note 234, art. 7, at 175. Similarly,
the European Convention provides in article 3 that "[no one shall be subjected to
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." European Convention,
supra note 236, art. 3, at 224.
245. Cf Bennett, supra note 238, at 27-28 & n.176 (remarking that in referring to
"no one," article 7 of the Civil and Political Rights Covenant means no children as well
as no adults).
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Convention even specifies in article 1, paragraph 2 that
"person," as used in that treaty, means every human being"'-
demonstrating an unmistakable statement of intent to include
children."7
Having concluded that these international instruments are
generally protective of children's human rights, the next ana-
lytical problem is to identify those provisions that implicitly
prohibit corporal punishment and that have served as the
normative and conceptual basis for the Convention of the
Child.
1. Provisions Protective of Dignity-As noted above in Part
II.A, the Convention of the Child assumes an inherent
irreconcilability between fostering dignity and administering
corporal punishment to children.248 Article 1 of the Universal
Declaration provides that "[aill human beings are born free
and equal in dignity and rights." 9 Article 11, paragraph 1 of
the American Convention announces that "[elveryone has the
right to have.., his dignity respected."50 Insofar as preserving
dignity is inconsistent with undergoing corporal punishment,
these provisions may be interpreted to prohibit corporal
punishment without reference to other sources. However, these
provisions also appear to be precursors of those provisions of
the Convention of the Child protecting children's dignity. 1 As
such, the provisions of the Convention of the Child represent a
retrospective affirmation and further strengthening of the
view that article 1 of the Universal Declaration and article 11
of the American Convention make corporal punishment of
children unacceptable.1
2
2. Provisions Against Torture or Cruel, Inhuman, or De-
grading Treatment or Punishment-The Convention of the
246. See American Convention, supra note 235, art. 1(2), at 145.
247. See Bennett, supra note 238, at 29.
248. See supra notes 208-18 and accompanying text.
249. Universal Declaration, supra note 232, art. 1.
250. American Convention, supra note 235, art. 11(1), at 148.
251. Cf Cohen, Corporal Punishment, supra note 13, at 112-14, 129-30
(discussing the recognition in the Universal Declaration's preamble of "the inherent
dignity... of all members of the human family" and implying that the preservation of
human dignity is incompatible with corporal punishment of children); Santos Pais,
supra note 189 (stating that protection of human dignity in "a variety of international
[human rights] instruments" preceding the Convention of the Child is tantamount to
protection against corporal punishment).
252. Cf Santos Pals, supra note 189 (equating the term "dignity," as it is used in
international human rights instruments predating the Convention of the Child, with
freedom from corporal punishment).
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Child's absolute prohibition of corporal punishment of children
also builds upon and, indeed, represents a further progression
from interpretations of article 7 of the Civil and Political
Rights Covenant, which forbids subjecting anyone to torture or
to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.253 In
a recent reiteration of its 1982 comments, the Human Rights
Committee, charged with monitoring compliance with the Civil
and Political Rights Covenant,254 made the following observa-
tions about article 7 of that covenant:
The aim of the provisions of article 7 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is to protect both
the dignity and the physical and mental integrity of the
individual. It is the duty of the state party to afford eve-
ryone protection through legislative and other measures
as may be necessary against the acts prohibited by article
7, whether inflicted by people acting in their official ca-
pacity, outside their official capacity or in a private
capacity.
The prohibition in article 7 relates not only to acts that
cause physical pain but also to acts that cause mental suf-
fering to the victim. In the Committee's view, moreover,
the prohibition must extend to corporal punishment, in-
cluding excessive chastisement ordered as a punishment
for a crime or as an educative or disciplinary measure. It
is appropriate to emphasize in this regard that article 7
protects, in particular, children, pupils and patients in
teaching and medical institutions.255
253. See Civil and Political Rights Covenant, supra note 234, art. 7, at 175. With
respect to interpretations of article 7 by the Human Rights Committee, see infra notes
254-55 and accompanying text.
254. See Civil and Political Rights Covenant, supra note 234, arts. 28, 40, at 238,
240, 244; Cohen, Corporal Punishment, supra note 13, at 114.
255. Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted
by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment
20, 2, 5, U.N. Doc. HRIGEN/I/Rev.2 (1996) (substantially restating the substance
of General Comment 7, 2, U.N. Doc. HRTIGEN/l/Rev.2 (1996)); see also Tamela R.
Hughlett, Comment, International Law: The Use of International Law as a Guide to
Interpretation of the United States Constitution, 45 OKLA. L. REV. 169, 189 n.144
(1992) (suggesting that article 7 of the Civil and Political Rights Covenant may apply
to corporal punishment); Elizabeth M. Misiaveg, Note, Important Steps and
Instructive Models in the Fight to Eliminate Violence Against Women, 52 WASH. & LEE
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Thus, article 7 of the Civil and Political Rights Covenant may
be understood to prohibit excessive corporal punishment in
familial or other contexts. By inference, the Human Rights
Committee's interpretation of article 7 of the Civil and Politi-
cal Rights Covenant as prohibitive of excessive corporal
punishment may apply to the identical language of article 5 of
the Universal Declaration since the Covenant is an outgrowth
of the Universal Declaration.256
The Torture Convention also contains prohibitions against
torture in article 1257 and against cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment in article 16.255 In light of the
discussion above, this prohibitory language would seem to
warrant the conclusion that the Torture Convention forbids at
least excessive corporal punishment of children. There is, in
addition, some support for the conclusion that the Torture
Convention forbids all corporal punishment. The Committee
Against Torture, the body which monitors compliance with the
L. REV. 1109, 1130-31 (1995) (noting that article 7 may be interpreted to proscribe
gender-based violence perpetrated by private persons).
256. See McDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 173, at 321-22, 327; Michael Scaperlanda,
Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 965, 1012; Louis B. Sohn, The
New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than States, 32
AM. U. L. REV. 1, 19 (1982).
257. The pertinent provision reads in full:
For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means any act by which
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted
on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person informa-
tion or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him
or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when
such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent
or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.
It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental
to lawful sanctions.
Torture Convention, supra note 177, art. 1(1), S. TREATY DoC. NO. 100-20 at 20, 1465
UN.TS. at 113-14.
258. The relevant provision reads in part:
Each State Party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdic-
tion other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which
do not amount to torture as defined in article 1, when such acts are committed
by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official
or other person acting in an official capacity.
Id. art. 16(1), S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-20 at 23, 1465 U.N.T.S. at 116.
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Torture Convention,25 9 has suggested that corporal punishment
in general could be incompatible with the provisions of the
Convention-without specifying that the offending punishment
must be excessive.60 In any event, these interpretations may be
somewhat weaker with respect to parental corporal punish-
ment of children than under other international human rights
instruments. One reason is because both articles 1 and 16
stipulate that the proscribed conduct must be inflicted "by or
at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a
public official or other person acting in an official capacity."261
Some analysts have opined that the Torture Convention thus
only reaches the conduct of government actors and not private
perpetrators.262 Under this view, the Torture Convention may
cover only corporal punishment meted out by or at the behest
of governmental authorities-such as school personnel-but
not that administered by parents.
Nevertheless, some commentators have argued that articles
1 and 16 of the Torture Convention should apply to private
actors.2' For example, one commentator maintains that the
259. See id. arts. 17-24, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20 at 23-28, 1465 UN.T.S. at
116-21 (detailing the composition, procedures, and functions of the Committee
Against Torture).
260. See Report of the Committee Against Torture, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp.
No. 44, It 169, 177, U.N. Doc. A150/44 (1995); see also Torture and Other Cruel, Inhu-
man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Comm. on Human Rts. Res.
1997/38, 9 (1997) (reminding governments that "corporal punishment can amount to
cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment or even to torture"); Report of the Special
Rapporteur, U.N. Comm. on Human Rts., 53d Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 8(a);
3-11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.41997/7 (1997) (stating that corporal punishment is incon-
sistent with the Torture Convention).
261. Torture Convention, supra note 177, arts. 1(1), 16(1), S. TREATY DOC. No.
100-20 at 19, 23, 1465 U.N.T.S. at 113-14, 116.
262. See Katherine M. Culliton, Finding a Mechanism to Enforce Women's Right to
State Protection from Domestic Violence in the Americas, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 507, 554
(1993); David P. Stewart, The Torture Convention and the Reception of International
Criminal Law Within the United States, 15 NoVA L. REV. 449, 455-56 (1991); Kristen
Walker, An Exploration of Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter as an Embodi-
ment of the Public/Private Distinction in International Law, 26 N.YU. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 173, 193-94 (1994); Andrew M. Wolfenson, The US. Courts and the Treatment of
Suspects Abducted Abroad Under International Law, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 705, 717
(1989-90).
263. See Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic
Violence as Torture, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 298-99, 308-53, 355-56 (1994);
Jordan J. Paust, The Other Side of Right: Private Duties Under Human Rights Law, 5
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 51, 60-61 (1992); see also Matthew Lippman, The Development
and Drafting of the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, In-
human or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 27 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 275,
314 (1994) (stating that the Torture Convention may apply even if public officials do
no more than tolerate an ongoing practice of torture).
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Torture Convention's provisions should apply to situations of
domestic violence against women.26 Essentially, she gives two
reasons for this conclusion. First, the Torture Convention may
be read not only to govern official behavior but also to "hold
states responsible for ... failure to take steps to avert private
violence."2" Second, domestic violence has many of the same
characteristics as torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment at the hands of the state. Both
domestic violence and governmental violence may produce
equal degrees of physical and/or mental pain or suffering,2"
represent an intentional infliction against the will of the
victim,267 and are legitimated by the victim's status.261 With
respect to article 16, this argument is equally cogent in
relation to parental corporal punishment of children since the
pain or suffering and intentionality elements are similar
where a child is the victim as where a woman is the victim and
since the punishment is typically legitimated by the victim's
status as a child.269
It may also be objected that corporal punishment of children
typically falls short of the definition of "torture" in article 1 as
"any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental" is caused to the victim. 27° This problem with article l's
applicability is more readily resolved since, as shown in Part
264. See Copelon, supra note 263, at 298-99, 352-53, 355-56.
265. Id. at 299.
266. See id. at 308-25.
267. See id. at 325-29.
268. See id. at 330-31.
269. These aspects of corporal punishment of children are explored more fully in
Part III of this Article.
The argument set forth in the text above is perhaps less persuasive with respect to
article 1 of the Torture Convention insofar as it provides that torture "does not in-
clude pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful
sanctions." Torture Convention, supra note 177, art. 1(1), S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20
at 19, 1465 U.N.T.S. at 113-14. A country's "lawful sanctions" conceivably could en-
compass legal authorizations of parental corporal punishment. But see Report of the
Special Rapporteur, supra note 260, 8 (stating that flogging would not be permissi-
ble under article 1 of the Torture Convention simply because this punishment had
been duly promulgated under the domestic law of a nation). Then again, the United
States has enunciated an understanding to this part of article 1 to the effect that "a
State Party could not through its domestic sanctions defeat the object and purpose of
the Convention to prohibit torture." 136 CONG. REC. S17491 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990)
(statement of understandings to apply to the Senate's advice and consent to the ratifi-
cation of the Torture Convention). Thus, the "lawful sanctions" caveat cannot take
corporal punishment outside of article l's prohibition if it is the object and purpose of
the Torture Convention to outlaw such chastisement.
270. Torture Convention, supra note 177, art. 1(1), S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20 at
19, 1465 U.N.T.S. at 113-14 (emphasis added).
[VOL. 31:2
Corporal Punishment of Children
III, even "reasonable" corporal punishment may cause severe
psychological suffering.. and is felt more acutely as physical
pain by a child than an adult.272 Be this as it may, the difficul-
ties in applying article 1 probably make article 16 of the
Torture Convention the more convincing source of an interna-
tional prohibition against parental corporal punishment of
children.
Article 5, paragraph 2 of the American Convention likewise
contains a provision against torture or cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment. 273 The Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights has urged that in order for
countries to achieve full observance of the American Con-
vention, they should ratify the Convention of the Child and
ensure that children "are not the targets of violence."274 Given
the absolute prohibition against corporal punishment in the
Convention of the Child, this commentary may mean that
article 5 of the American Convention would be best understood
as forbidding all corporal punishment of children and not just
that which is excessive.
Article 3 of the European Convention contains a further
variation on this type of language to the effect that "[n]o one
shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment."275 The European Court of Human
Rights and the European Commission of Human Rights have
developed a distinct body of case law indicating that corporal
punishment of children falls within the purview of article 3 of
the European Convention and may violate that provision
depending upon the particular circumstances.276 For example,
271. See infra notes 355-60 and accompanying text.
272. See infra note 368 and accompanying text.
273. American Convention, supra note 235, art. 5(2), at 146.
274. Areas in Which Steps Need to Be Taken Towards Full Observance of the Hu-
man Rights Set Forth in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
and the American Convention on Human Rights, 1994 INTER-AM. YB. ON H.R. (INTER-
AM. COMMN ON H.R.) 690, 704.
275. European Convention, supra note 236, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. at 224.
276. See, e.g., Y v. United Kingdom, 1992 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 196 (Eur. Ct.
H.R.) (taking note of a settlement reached after the European Commission of Human
Rights found that article 3 of the European Convention had been violated when school
personnel caned a fifteen-year-old pupil four times on his clothed buttocks so as to
cause bruises, bruising, and swelling); Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) at 6-9, 17 (1978) (holding that when authorities inflicted a judicially mandated
birching on a fifteen-year-old, they violated the prohibition in article 3 of the Euro-
pean Convention against degrading treatment); A & B v. United Kingdom, App. No.
25599/94, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 190, 194 (1996) (Commission Report) (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (ruling admissible an application of a
boy claiming that his stepfather violated article 3 of the European Convention by
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in Costello-Roberts v. United Kingdom, the European Court of
Human Rights ruled that when a headmaster hit a seven-year-
old student three times on his clothed buttocks with a rubber-
soled gym shoe, the punishment was not severe enough to
constitute a violation of article 3;277 yet the court at the same
time cautioned that its ruling should not be taken to mean
that corporal punishment must have severe or long-lasting
effects in order to violate article 3.278 The court even issued a
disclaimer that it did not wish to be taken as having in any
way approved of corporal punishment as part of the
disciplinary regime of a school.279 That this cautionary language
was not a momentary slip of the pen is borne out by the
European Commission of Human Rights having previously
held, in Warwick v. United Kingdom, that just one cane stroke
to a female student's hand by a male teacher, in the presence
of another male teacher, violated the prohibition in article 3
against degrading punishments.8 "
Until 1996, the cases arising under article 3 of the European
Convention involved either judicially mandated corporal
hitting the boy with a stick over the course of a week so as to cause bruises on the
boy's legs and buttocks); App. No. 10592/83 v. U.K, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep., 277, 278 (1987)
(Eur. Comm'n on H.R.) (holding admissible a complaint that article 3 of the European
Convention was violated when school personnel struck one student's palms and struck
another student's buttocks twice with a leather strap); Warwick v. United Kingdom,
App. No. 9471/81 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R., July 18, 1986) (unreported) (holding on the
merits that one cane stroke to a female student's hand by a male teacher so as to
break a blood vessel violates the prohibition of Article 3 of the European Convention
against degrading punishment), discussed in VAN BUEREN, supra note 187, at 251,
and cited in Firouzeh Bahrampour, Comment, The Caning of Michael Fay: Can Singa-
pore's Punishment Withstand the Scrutiny of International Law?, 10 AM. U. J. INVL L.
& POLVY 1075, 1093 n.118 (1995); Mrs. X & Ms. X v. United Kingdom, App. No.
9471/81, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 450, 450-51 (1985) (finding admissible a sixteen-year-old
student's claim that article 3 of the European Convention was contravened when the
headmaster caned her); cf Campbell & Cosans v. United Kingdom, 1982 YB. Eur.
Cony. on H.R. 3,4 (Eur. Ct. of H.R.) (holding that there was no violation of article 3 of
the European Convention when school personnel threatened to strike two students'
palms with a leather strap, but also noting that mere threats to administer corporal
punishment could violate article 3 if the actual punishment would violate that arti-
cle). But see Costello-Roberts v. United Kingdom, 1993 YB. Eur. Cony. on H.R. (Eur.
Ct. of H.R.) 172, 172-74 (5-4 decision) (ruling that a headmaster did not violate arti-
cle 3 of the European Convention by hitting a seven-year-old student three times on
his clothed buttocks with a rubber-soled gym shoe, but observing that a punishment
which did not have any severe or long-lasting effects could still fall within the ambit of
article 3).
277. See Costello-Roberts, 1993 YB. Eur. Cony. on H.R. at 172-74.
278. See id. at 174.
279. See id.
280. See VAN BUEREN, supra note 187, at 251 (discussing the Warwick decision);
see also Bahrampour, supra note 276 (citing the holding of Warwick).
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punishment 2 1 or corporal punishment in the school context.212
Notably, in September 1996, the European Commission of
Human Rights took cognizance in A & B v. United Kingdom28 3
of a complaint arising in the familial setting284 under articles 3,
8, 13, and 14 of the European Convention. 285 The Commission
concluded that a boy stated a viable claim pursuant to these
provisions286 against his stepfather based on the complainant's
allegation that the stepfather had administered degrading
punishment by hitting the boy's buttocks and legs with a stick
so as to cause bruises.287 The Commission issued a decision on
the merits two years later finding that the stepfather's actions
violated article 3. 288 However, the Commission also stressed
"that this finding does not mean that Article 3 is to be
interpreted as imposing an obligation on States to protect,
through their criminal law, against any form of physical
rebuke, however mild, by a parent of a child."2 9
In sum, article 3 of the European Convention has given rise
to an adjudicative approach that may reflect normative
tension and transition. The case law reveals that the European
Court of Human Rights and the European Commission of
Human Rights have read article 3 to tolerate some milder or
less degrading corporal punishments. The, cases under the
European Convention also reflect that at least some corporal
punishment of children administered by either the authorities
or parents violates article 3 of that treaty. The European Court
281. See, e.g., Tyrer, 26 Eur Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 6-9.
282. See, e.g., Costello-Roberts, 1993 YB. Eur. Cony. on H.R. at 172-74; Y, 1992
Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. at 196; Campbell & Cosans, 1982 YB. Eur. Cony. on H.R. at 3;
App. No. 10592/83, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 277; Warwick, supra note 276; Mrs. X & Ms. X,
7 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 450.
283. App. No. 25599/94, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 190 (1996) (Commission Report).
284. See id. at 190.
285. See id. at 193. Article 8(1) of the European Convention provides that
"[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence." European Convention, supra note 236, art. 8(1), at 230. Article 13 of
the European Convention states that "[elveryone whose rights and freedoms as set
forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national
authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in
an official capacity." Id. art. 13, at 232. Article 14 of the European Convention declares
that "[tihe enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national
minority, property, birth or other status." Id. art. 14, at 232.
286. SeeA & B, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 195.
287. See id. at 191.
288. See A v. United Kingdom, App. No. 25599/94, Report of the Commission (Sept.
18, 1997), at 15.
289. Id.
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has issued conflicting pronouncements on whether article 3's
application should be keyed to the harshness of the
punishment. It is, therefore, an open question whether the
court will find in a future case that all corporal punishment of
children violates article 3 regardless of the severity of the
punishment.
3. Provisions Protective of Personal Security-There are ar-
ticles guaranteeing "security of person" in the Universal
Declaration,29 the Civil and Political Rights Covenant,291 and
in the European Convention.' Article 5 of the American Con-
vention expresses a similar assurance, providing that "[elvery
person has the right to have his physical, mental, and moral
integrity respected."293 It has been suggested that the security
of one's person is necessarily transgressed by being subjected
to corporal punishment.29
4. Provisions Protective of Privacy-The American Conven-
tion, the Civil and Political Rights Covenant, the European
Convention, and the Universal Declaration, protect against
undue interference with personal privacy. 295 There is some
authority for the proposition that "corporal punishment vio-
lates a child's right to privacy, because the concept of privacy
encompasses the concept of bodily integrity."296 Although the
European Court of Human Rights held in Costello-Roberts that
a headmaster's punishment of a pupil by hitting the latter's
290. Universal Declaration, supra note 232, art. 3, at 72.
291. Civil and Political Rights Covenant, supra note 234, art. 9(1), at 175.
292. European Convention, supra note 236, art. 5(1), at 226.
293. American Convention, supra note 235, art. 5(1), at 146.
294. See Cohen, Corporal Punishment, supra note 13, at 119 (arguing that the
commitment to "security of [every human being's] person" made in the American
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man could be read to bar corporal punish-
ment of children if the Commission found Article I applicable to children); cf Santos
Pais, supra note 189 (offering the idea that the various provisions of the Convention of
the Child implicitly outlawing corporal punishment of children affirm that a range of
more broadly phrased norms in earlier international human rights instruments have
the same effect).
295. See American Convention, supra note 235, art. 11(2)-(3), at 148 (stating that
"[nio one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference with his private life
[or] his family" and that "[elveryone has the right to the protection of the law against
such interference"); Civil and Political Rights Covenant, supra note 234, art. 17(1)-(2),
at 177 (providing that "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interfer-
ence with his privacy [or] family" and that "[e]veryone has the right to the protection
of the law against such interference"); European Convention, supra note 236, art. 8(1),
at 230 (declaring that "[elveryone has the right to respect for his private and family
life"); Universal Declaration, supra note 232, art. 12, at 73 (asserting that "[nlo one
shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy [or] family").
296. VAN BUEREN, supra note 187, at 251.
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clothed buttocks three times with a soft-soled gym shoe did not
violate the European Convention's guarantee in article 8 of
respect for everyone's private life,"' the court observed that
"Itihe possibility that circumstances might exist in which Arti-
cle 8 could be regarded as affording a protection which went
beyond that given by Article 3 was not excluded."298 In fact, in
App. No. 10592/83 v. United Kingdom, the European Commis-
sion of Human Rights concluded that child complainants
stated an actionable claim for violation of their privacy under
article 8 arising out of incidents where school personnel used a
leather strap to strike one student on each palm and another
student twice on the buttocks. 99 As previously mentioned, in
the recent case of A & B v. United Kingdom, the European
Commission also held that a child complainant stated an ac-
tionable article 8 claim based on the allegation that his
stepfather caned his lower body so as to leave visible marks.00
Thus, the European Court of Human Rights and the Euro-
pean Commission of Human Rights have left no doubt that
corporal punishment of children may, in appropriate cases, im-
plicate juveniles' privacy rights.3 1 By analogy and in the
absence of contrary authority, this reasoning seems equally
applicable to the privacy guarantees in article 12 of the Uni-
versal Declaration, article 17 of the Civil and Political Rights
Covenant, and article 11 of the American Convention.0 2 In-
deed, the Human Rights Committee has taken the position
that the nondiscrimination policy of the Civil and Political
Rights Covenant set forth in article 24 must permeate the rest
of that covenant, including article 17, so as to spare children
297. See Costello-Roberts, 1993 YB. Eur. Conv. on H.R. at 174.
298. Id.
299. See App. No. 10592/83, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 278.
300. See supra notes 285-87 and accompanying text. At a subsequent stage of the
same case, the European Commission refused to reach the merits on whether the
child applicant should prevail on his article 8 claim. See supra notes 283-91 and ac-
companying text.
301. The privacy claim under article 8 of the European Convention took an inter-
esting twist in X et al. v. Sweden, 1982 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 36 (Eur. Comm'n on
H.R.). In that case, parents challenged Sweden's statutory prohibition of corporal
punishment in tandem with its criminal law on assaults as violative of article 8 as
well as other articles of the European Convention. See id. at 43, 45-46. The Court
held that in extending criminal liability for assault to ordinary parental physical chas-
tisement of children, Swedish law did not contravene the 'right to respect for private
and family life" within the meaning of article 8. See id. at 49.
302. Cf Sohn, supra note 256, at 20 (stating that "European jurisprudence throws
light not only on the provisions of the European Convention, but also on the similar
provisions in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights").
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"from being subjected to acts of violence."0 3 Furthermore, since
the Convention of the Child is understood to forbid all corporal
punishment of children, its prohibition may be understood to
retrospectively affirm that the privacy guarantees of these
other international human rights instruments have the same
prohibitory meaning as well. °4
5. The Provision Protective of Physical and Mental Health-
No mention has been made thus far of any specific provisions of
the Economic Rights Covenant although that treaty was previ-
ously enumerated as among the international instruments
germane to corporal punishment of children. The truth is that
there is only one relevant provision, but it is nonetheless po-
tentially quite important. Article 12, paragraph 1 of the
Covenant provides for the recognition of the "right of everyone
to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical
and mental health.""3 As detailed in Part III of this Article,
corporal punishment of children is likely to impair either
physical or mental health or both and, therefore, would con-
travene article 12's right to health. This reading becomes even
more plausible inasmuch as article 12 may be informed by ar-
ticle 24, paragraph 3 of the Convention of the Child. It will be
recalled that article 24, paragraph 3 of the Convention of the
Child requires states parties to "abolish[] traditional practices
prejudicial to the health of children, "3°6 one of which may be
corporal punishment.3 7 It is therefore arguable that article 12
of the Economic Rights Covenant necessitates the elimination
of corporal punishment because, as a traditional practice
prejudicial to children's health, such punishment also is an ob-
stacle to children's enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health.3 8
303. General Comments Under Article 40, Paragraph 4, of the Covenant, U.N.
GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 35th Sess., 891st mtg., General Comment 17 (35) 3(art. 24),
3, 5, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/21Add.7 (1989); cf Santos Pais, supra note 189 (remarking
that the antidiscrimination policy of the Convention of the Child militates against
tolerance of corporal punishment of children).
304. See Santos Pais, supra note 189.
305. Economic Rights Covenant, supra note 233, art. 12(1), at 8.
306. See Convention of the Child, note 142, art. 24(3), at 13.
307. See supra notes 226-30 and accompanying text.
308. Cf Santos Pais, supra note 189 (discussing that the Convention of the Child
draws upon the norms of preceding international human rights instruments and fur-
ther clarifies their meaning).
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C. Summation
This survey should leave no doubt that many international
human rights instruments touch upon corporal punishment of
children. But what, after all is said and analyzed, is the prin-
ciple that emerges as a matter of international law? A
synthesis of the aforesaid documents, taken together, ulti-
mately yields the international law principle that all corporal
punishment of children is prohibited-even though a few iso-
lated treaty provisions have been interpreted in a less absolute
manner. To recapitulate, the Convention of the Child une-
quivocally prohibits all corporal punishment of children; °9
arguably the Torture Convention31 and the American Conven-
tion,311 as well as a host of provisions in the Universal
Declaration, 12 the Civil and Political Rights Covenant,... and
the Economic Rights Covenant,"' may be construed to do the
same. In contrast, article 7 of the Civil and Political Rights
Covenant1 5 and article 3 of the European Convention 36 have
been interpreted to prohibit some, but not all, corporal pun-
ishment of children; a semantic analysis would arguably allow
for a similar reading of analogous provisions in the Universal
Declaration.1 7 These interpretations and analyses of articles 7
and 3 do not, however, change the fact that an absolute bar to
all corporal punishment of children may be found and does
exist in international law.
Finally, it would be a distortion of modem human rights law
to suggest that the Universal Declaration, the Civil and
Political Rights Covenant, the Economic Rights Covenant, the
American Convention, the European Convention, and the
Torture Convention are the only international law documents
addressing the legal status of corporal punishment of
children. 3" The reason that this Article focuses on the
309. See supra notes 191, 193-230 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 257-72 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 250-52, 273-74, 293-95, 302 and accompanying text.
312. See supra notes 249, 252, 256, 290, 294, 295 and accompanying text.
313. See supra notes 291, 294-95, 302 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 305-08 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 253-56 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 275-91 and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 290, 294 and accompanying text.
318. See, e.g., Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, Dec. 9,
1985, art. 1, 25 I.L.M. 519, 521 [hereinafter Inter-American Convention] (committing
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aforementioned instruments is twofold. First, the United
States is a party to the Civil and Political Rights Covenant319
and to the Torture Convention,320 a fact which should enhance
their credibility with Americans. Second, an impressive
number of American international law scholars credit these
six instruments with having attained the status of customary
international law.21 Indeed, the Universal Declaration, the
states parties to prevent and punish torture); id. art. 6, at 522 (committing states
parties to take effective measures to prevent and punish cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment); African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 24-
27, 1981, art. 4, 21 I.L.M. 59, 60 (1982) [hereinafter African Charter] (asserting that
"[h]uman beings are inviolable" and that "[e]very human being shall be entitled to
respect for his life and the integrity of his person"); id. art. 5 (enunciating that
"[e]very individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a hu-
man being" and that "[all forms of exploitation and degradation of man particularly
... torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall be prohib-
ited"); id. art. 6 (protecting every individual's right "to the security of his person"); id.
art. 16(1), at 61 (affirming that "[elvery individual shall have the right to enjoy the
best attainable state of physical and mental health"); id. art. 18(1) (stating that "[tihe
family... shall be protected by the State which shall take care of its physical ... and
[moral health]"); id. art. 18(3), at 62 (proclaiming that "[tihe State shall... ensure the
protection of the rights of... the child as stipulated in international declarations and
conventions"); American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, art. I, O.A.S.
Res. XXX, adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogota,
Mar. 30-May 2, 1948, art. I. reprinted in PAN AMERICAN UNION, FINAL ACT OF THE
NINTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN STATES 39 (1948) [hereinafter
American Declaration] (providing that "[e]very human being has the right to ... secu-
rity of his person"); id. art. V, at 40 (stating that "[elvery person has the right to the
protection of the law against abusive attacks upon his ... private ... life"); id. art. VII
(declaring that "all children have the right to special protection, care and aid"); id. art.
XVII, at 42 (positing that "[e]very person has the right to be recognized everywhere as
a person having rights and obligations, and to enjoy the basic civil rights"); id. art.
XXIX, at 44 (stating that every person has the obligation "so to conduct himself in
relation to others that each and every one may fully form and develop his personal-
ity"); id. art. XXX (imposing the duty on every person "to aid, support, educate and
protect his minor children").
319. During the Carter administration, the United States signed the Covenant.
See Scaperlanda, supra note 256, at 1019 n.272. "On June 8, 1992, the United States
deposited its instrument of accession to the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights." William A. Schabas, Invalid Reservations to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights: Is the United States Still a Party?, 21 BROOK. J. INTL L.
277, 277 (1995). Three months later the Covenant went into force for the United
States. See id.
320. See supra note 177.
321. See Florentino P. Feliciano, The Application of Law: Some Recurring Aspects
of the Process of Judicial Review and Decision Making, 37 AM. J. JURIS. 17, 50 (1992)
(maintaining that customary international law is embodied in the Universal Declara-
tion, the Civil and Political Rights Covenant, the Economic Rights Covenant, the
European Convention, and the "Inter-American Conventions"); John P. Humphrey,
The International Bill of Rights: Scope and Implementation, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV.
527, 529 (1976) (asserting that the Universal Declaration has become customary in-
ternational law); Richard B. Lillich, Invoking International Human Rights in Domestic
Courts, 54 U. CIN. L. REv. 367, 396 (1985) (making the point that at least articles 3, 5,
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Civil and Political Rights Covenant, and the Economic Rights
Covenant have been especially esteemed as a veritable
International Bill of Rights. 22
Customary international law is binding as federal common
law in the United States.323 The fact that some of these inter-
national instruments, or pertinent portions of them," constitute
federal common law capable of being interpreted to prohibit
corporal punishment of children may, therefore, be of some
moment for the United States as a country which has not yet
ratified the Convention of the Child. However, the current en-
forceability of these instruments in state and federal courts as
federal common law presents difficult and complex questions
that are beyond the scope of this Article.325
7, 9, 12, and 13 of the Universal Declaration and articles 7, 9, 10, and 12 of the Civil and
Political Rights Covenant reflect customary international law); Scaperlanda, supra note
256, at 1014-15 (stating that "many would argue" that all or portions of the Universal
Declaration and of the Civil and Political Rights Covenant are "embedded in customary
international law"); Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights
of Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 17, 32 (1982) (indicating that the
principles laid down in the Universal Declaration, the Civil and Political Rights Cove-
nant, the European Convention, and "inter-American instruments" have, generally
speaking, become a part of international customary law); Nadine Strossen, Recent US.
and International Judicial Protection of Individual Rights: A Comparative Legal Process
Analysis and Proposed Synthesis, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 817 (1990) (stating that the
human rights values in the Universal Declaration and in the Civil and Political Rights
Covenant are customary international law); Christopher J. Borgen, Note, The Theory and
Practice of Regional Organization Intervention in Civil Wars, 26 N.YU. J. INTL L. & POL.
797, 820 (1994) (contending that the Civil and Political Rights Covenant "is taking on the
mantle of customary international law"); see also MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 173, at
327 (noting that the Universal Declaration has become customary international law and
that the Civil and Political Rights Covenant and the Economic Rights Covenant "create[
the expectations comprising customary international law"). But see Suzanne M. Bernard,
An Eye for an Eye: The Current Status of International Law on the Humane Treatment of
Prisoners, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 759, 768 (1994) (declaring that the Civil and Political Rights
Covenant has not yet become customary international law); Humphrey, supra, at 533
(intimating that the Civil and Political Rights Covenant and the Economic Rights Cove-
nant were not customary international law in the 1970s because "they [applied] only to
those states that ratiflied] them").
322. See McDouGALETAL., supra note 173, at 320-22; Louis Henkin, Preface to THE
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS ix
(Louis Henkin ed., 1981); Sohn, supra note 321, at 19.
323. See supra note 183.
324. For example, the late Professor Richard Lillich was of the opinion that articles
3, 5, 7, 9, 12, and 13 of the Universal Declaration and articles 7, 9, 10, and 12 of the Civil
and Political Rights Covenant constitute customary international law. See Lillich, supra
note 321. As discussed in the text above, articles 3, 5, and 12 of the Universal Declaration
and articles 7 and 9 of the Civil and Political Rights Covenant may be interpreted to
prohibit corporal punishment of children. See supra notes 243-45, 251-56, 290, 294-95.
325. Compare THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS
CUSTOMARY LAW 114-15, 119-32 (1989) (observing that although "it has not been easy
to extend the reach of international human rights in the United States through the
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The enforceability of a prohibition of corporal punishment of
children as it is manifested in articles 7 and 17 of the Civil and
Political Rights Covenant and article 16 of the Torture Con-
vention is equally problematic even though the United States
is a party to these treaties. Putting aside the thorny issue of
whether these treaties should be self-executing,"6 it is the case
application of customary law," this law is self-executing in American courts and should
be further promoted), and Lillich, supra note 321, at 368-69, 393, 412-15 (stating that
while customary international law should be enforceable in domestic courts and that
some courts have responded accordingly, in the near future these courts are more
likely to use customary law to inform the federal Constitution and statutes), with
Gordon A. Christenson, Customary International Human Rights Law in Domestic
Court Decisions, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 225, 225-26 (1995-96) (noting that U.S.
federal courts are reluctant to incorporate customary international law as directly
applicable federal law), and Strossen, supra note 321, at 815-16, 818-23 (remarking
that while customary international law has occasionally been judicially enforced in
the United States and while there is support for the view that such law should be
controlling, relatively few courts have actually implemented this approach), and Mar-
garet Hartka, Note, The Role of International Law in Domestic Courts: Will the Legal
Procrastination End?, 14 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 99, 99, 124-25 (1990) (mentioning
that the judiciary has failed to properly use customary international law).
326. Enforceability may turn on whether the Civil and Political Rights Covenant
and the Torture Convention are self-executing or non-self-executing. If the Covenant
and the Convention were self-executing, they would be enforceable, barring other
legal obstacles; if the Covenant and the Convention were non-self-executing, they
would be unenforceable without federal implementing legislation. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111(3) (1987)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS]; see also Lillich, supra note 321, at
368; John Quigley, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
Supremacy Clause, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1287, 1297-1300 (1993); Strossen, supra note
321, at 812-13.
Interestingly, some commentators opine that the terms of the Civil and Political
Rights Covenant are inconsistent with non-self-executing status and urge that the
judiciary should hold the Covenant to be self-executing. See Jordan J. Paust, Avoiding
"Fraudulent" Executive Policy: Analysis of Non-Self-Execution of the Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1257 passim (1993); Quigley, supra, at 1300-
10; cf Richard B. Lillich, The United States Constitution and International Human
Rights Law, 3 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 53, 68-69 (1990) (claiming that many of the provi-
sions in the Civil and Political Rights Covenant "appear to be self-executing in
character," but expressing concern that a Senate declaration that the treaty is non-
self-executing would be given "great weight"). But see Mathias Reimann, A Human
Rights Exception to Sovereign Immunity: Some Thoughts on Prinz v. Federal Republic
of Germany, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 403, 416 n.70 (1995) (stating that the Covenant is not
self-executing); Jaleen Nelson, Comment, Sledge Hammers and Scalpels: The FBI
Digital Wiretap Bill and Its Effect on Free Flow of Information and Privacy, 41 UCLA
L. REV. 1139, 1150 n.56 (1994) (stating that since the Covenant is not self-executing,
U.S. courts will not enforce it). This is a view that has also been articulated with re-
spect to the Torture Convention. See Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, The
Scope of US. Senate Control over the Conclusion and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 571, 631-32 (1991) (stating that it is likely that the Torture "Convention
will be deemed self-executing"). But see 136 CONG. REC. S17492 (daily ed. Oct. 27,
1990) (statement of declarations to which the Senate's advice and consent is subject,
announcing that articles 1 through 16 of the Torture Convention are not self-
executing); Message of the President Transmitting the Torture Convention, S. TREATY
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that the United States has made a reservation in relation to
the Civil and Political Rights Covenant's article 7 (the clause
forbidding torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
or punishment) and to the Torture Convention's article 16 (the
clause forbidding cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment). Such reservations undoubtedly would impede
article 7's and article 16's respective enforceability in relation
to corporal punishment of children.1 7 The reservation to the
Civil and Political Rights Covenant states that, "[tihe United
States considers itself bound by Article 7 to the extent that
'cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment' means
the cruel and unusual treatment or punishment prohibited by
the Fifth, Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendment to the Consti-
tution of the United States."2 ' The reservation to article 16 of
the Torture Convention is, in substance, of the same import."2
In Ingraham v. Wright330 (which is examined more thoroughly
in Part IV), the U.S. Supreme Court held, among other things,
that corporal punishment of students by school personnel does
not contravene the Eighth Amendment.33' In fact, in giving its
DOC. No. 100-20, at 1, 2 (1988); Stewart, supra note 262, at 467-68 (taking the posi-
tion that articles 1 through 16 of the Torture Convention are not self-executing).
327. "A reservation... modifies the relevant provisions of the agreement as to the
relations between the reserving and accepting state parties but does not modify those
provisions for the other parties to the agreement inter se." RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS, supra note 326, at § 313(3); see also id. at § 314 cmt. a (noting that a res-
ervation modifies the treaty); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Reflections on the Ratification of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by the United States Senate,
42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1169, 1175 (1993) (stating that reservations leave provisions of
treaties "internationally binding yet nationally unenforceable"); Quigley, supra note
326, at 1289-90 (remarking that a reservation exempts the nation making it from a
particular treaty provision "so long as the reservation is not incompatible with the
object and purpose of the treaty").
328. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 102-23, at 22 (1992).
329. The reservation to article 16 of the Torture Convention provides:
The Senate's advice and consent is subject to the following reservations:
(1) That the United States considers itself bound by the obligation under Article
16 to prevent "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment," only in-
sofar as the term "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment"
means the cruel, unusual and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited
by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States.
136 CONG. REC. S17491 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of reservations to which
the Senate's advice and consent is subject).
330. 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (5-4 decision).
331. See id. at 664.
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rationale for the reservation to article 7, the American gov-
ernment specifically indicated that protection against corporal
punishment should be considered excluded by its reservation.332
Some commentators have theorized that the reservation to arti-
cle 7 is not valid.3 ' They are not alone in this opinion: eleven
European countries have objected to the U.S. reservation to
332. The pertinent rationale provided by the Bush Administration for the United
States' reservation to article 7 of the Civil and Political Rights Covenant reads as
follows:
Because the [U.S.] Bill of Rights already contains substantively equivalent pro-
tections, and because the Human Rights Committee ... has adopted the view
that prolonged judicial proceedings in cases involving capital punishment could
in certain circumstances constitute such treatment, U.S. ratification of the
Covenant should be conditioned upon a reservation limiting our undertakings
in this respect to the prohibitions of the Fifth, Eighth and/or Fourteenth
Amendments. This would also have the effect of excluding such other practices
as corporal punishment and solitary confinement, both of which the Committee
has indicated might, depending on the circumstances, be considered contrary to
article 7.
SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 328, at 12 (emphasis added.).
333. Commentators have cited a number of grounds for finding the reservation
invalid. First, some commentators have advanced the notion that the American reser-
vation to article 7 is incompatible with the object and purpose of the Civil and
Political Rights Covenant and therefore is not valid. See, e.g., Michael H. Posner &
Peter J. Spiro, Adding Teeth to United States Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights: The International Human Rights Conformity Act of 1993, 42 DEPAUL
L. REv. 1209, 1216-17, 1226-27 (1993); Schabas, supra note 319, at 291. This theory
relies on the principles of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which pro-
vides that a reservation to a treaty is not valid if the reservation is "incompatible with
the object and purpose of the treaty." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 19(c), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (1969) [hereinafter
Vienna Convention]; see also RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 326,
§ 313(1)(c) (reiterating the Vienna Convention principle). Second, at least one com-
mentator has noted with approval that the Human Rights Committee considers that
article 7, as nonderogable customary international law, may not be the subject of a
valid reservation. See Schabas, supra note 319, at 295, 308 (citations omitted). Finally,
another analyst has contended that, as a general matter, reservations intended to
reject international obligations rising above a nation's existing law are of doubtful
validity and, perhaps, even of questionable constitutionality. See Louis Henkin, Com-
ment, US. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker,
89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341, 343, 348 (1995). This contention is highly relevant since the
United States' reservation to article 7 is designed precisely to limit article 7 to the
parameters of constitutional law under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. See supra note 328; cf Ved P. Nanda, The United States Reservation to the Ban
on the Death Penalty for Juvenile Offenders: An Appraisal Under the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1311, 1331-32 (1993)
(suggesting that because it is incompatible with the object of the Civil and Political
Rights Covenant, the United States' reservation to the Covenant's ban on capital
punishment of juveniles is invalid); Paust, supra note 326, at 1277-78 (theorizing that
the reservation to article 7 of the Civil and Political Rights Covenant should be
treated as meaningless because in interpreting domestic law "our reading of [the Fifth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments] ... can be conditioned by... the Covenant").
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article 7,334 and the Human Rights Committee concluded that
the reservation is invalid as well. 35 As might be expected from
this reaction, the reservation to article 16 of the Torture Con-
vention has also been the object of scholarly criticism."'6
This short digression into the problems of enforceability is
offered to help set the relevant international law in historical
context. But, lest the thread be lost, it bears reiteration that
the point is not whether these international instruments are
or are not enforceable in the United States. Rather and again,
the point is simply that since the principle has been estab-
lished in the international arena and especially under the
Convention of the Child that corporal punishment of children
is prohibited, this principle should at least be taken into ac-
count if the United States is to formulate a position on this
matter that is sophisticated and has legitimacy before the rest
of the world.337 The status of international law on corporal
punishment of children, like the laws in jurisdictions that pro-
hibit such punishment, is offered as information that provides
a more empirically sound context and more realistic parame-
ters within which Americans can reconsider the issue.
334. See Schabas, supra note 319, at 277, 310.
335. See Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Art. 40 of the
Covenant, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Human Rts. Comm.,
53rd Sess., 1413th mtg. 1 14, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 50 (1995) (stating that the
committee believes the U.S. reservation to article 7 is incompatible with the object
and purpose of the Covenant).
336. See Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 326, at 629-30; cf Schabas, supra note
319, at 282-84 (likening the reservation to article 16 of the Torture Convention to the
reservation to article 7 of the Civil and Political Rights Covenant and intimating that
the former is as objectionable as the latter).
337. A nation's fulfillment of international human rights law standards correlates
with its prestige and legitimacy as an enlightened world leader. See LOUIS HENKIN,
THE AGE OF RIGHTS 74 (1990) (offering that the United States' failure to live up to the
standards of international human rights instruments has been "resented as arrogant"
and "derided as hypocritical"); Paust, supra note 326, at 1283 (remarking that the
policy of non-self-execution vis-a-vis the Civil and Political Rights Covenant has seri-
ously dishonored the United States); Scaperlanda, supra note 256, at 1016 (opining
that the United States has expended "a large measure of moral capital in the world
market place" because of its historic reluctance to become a party to the major inter-
national human rights covenants); David P. Stewart, United States Ratification of the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The Significance of the Reservations, Under-
standings, and Declarations, 42 DEPAuL L. REv. 1183, 1183-84 (1993) (stating that
American adherence to the Civil and Political Rights Covenant would enhance the
United States' international role in promoting the rule of law and democratic ideals).
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III. POLICY REASONS WARRANTING A LEGAL PROHIBITION OF
CORPORAL PUNISHMENT OF CHILDREN
The fact that seven other countries and Minnesota prohibit
subabuse corporal punishment of children and that
international law supports such a prohibition should be highly
persuasive in reconsidering policy on the subject. Still,
prohibiting all subabuse corporal punishment of children would
represent a veritable sea change in Americans' traditional
approach to the subject, especially as it relates to punishment
within the family. In order for a proposal of such far-reaching
proportions to be taken seriously, this Part offers psychological
and sociological data and theories as well as philosophical
considerations demonstrating that a ban on all corporal punish-
ment of children would significantly improve individual lives
and the condition of society as a whole. Because there are
ample bases for prohibition, this Part also examines the
question of whether legal reform is advisable or whether
reliance exclusively on other means of changing public
attitudes would be more appropriate.
Incidentally, in laying out the policy rationales for prohibit-
ing corporal punishment of children, the author is not
unmindful that some may object to prohibition on the grounds
that it does not take cultural or racial identities of families
into account as extenuating circumstances.3 3 8 For instance,
many African-Americans contend that "'strong discipline' in
the form of corporal punishment is necessary to keep children
out of trouble in an environment where trouble lurks on every
block. Some also argue that corporal punishment is just a part
of black culture."39 Professor Murray Straus refutes this ar-
gument by making three points. First, he notes that corporal
338. The argument that there should be a culturally and/or racially based exemp-
tion to a ban on corporal punishment of children is undermined by the fact that this
form of discipline is common in different cultures. For example, before the Swedish
prohibition on corporal punishment of children, the Swedes had a tradition of harsh
physical chastisement of their children. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying
text. Likewise, the English still frequently use corporal punishment on children. See
NEWELL, supra note 18, at 53-55, 97-101. Also many immigrant parents in the United
States prefer to use corporal punishment when their children misbehave. See Celia W.
Dugger, A Cultural Reluctance to Spare the Rod, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 1996, at B1.
339. STRAUS, supra note 2, at 117; see also Hyman, Corporal Punishment, supra
note 3, at 119-20 (stating that many African-American parents believe that physically
chastising their young children will spare the latter from getting into trouble later in
life and from experiencing brutalization by the authorities).
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punishment became a part of black culture in response to a
history of slavery and oppression and suggests that "the con-
tinuation of that aspect of black culture interferes with
progress towards equality."34 Second, he argues that corporal
punishment is not an essential element of strong discipline
and does not ultimately help people defend their honor.34'
Third, he suggests that those successful African-American
adults who were corporally punished as children have not
flourished because of corporal punishment, but, rather, in spite
of it and due to other parenting strategies.
34 2
This Article purposefully declines to recommend a relativis-
tic approach. If this decision is misguided, let it be known that
it is born out of concern for the welfare of all children and so-
cial groups rather than out of insensitivity to multiculturalism
issues. The decision is predicated upon the tautology that hu-
man beings share the quality of being human. They have it in
common to flinch from pain; they share psychological reactions
to being rendered simultaneously helpless and maddened by
the use of force against which there is no redress.43 As this
Part will show, these are reactions that may be ruinous for
people across the spectrum of nationalities and races.344 These
are also reactions that mirror a universal human hunger for
right treatment and for a respect that acknowledges each per-
son's humanity.u5 It is not far-fetched, therefore, to suggest
that abolition of corporal punishment of children may actually
serve rather than disserve the cause of diversity by strength-
ening all children's protection from violence and from the
dehumanization of undergoing violence, regardless of any par-
ticular child's background or identity.
346
340. STRAUS, supra note 2, at 117.
341. See id.
342. See id.
343. See infra notes 348-65, 368-84 and accompanying text.
344. See infra notes 368-405 and accompanying text.
345. See infra notes 406-27 and accompanying text; see also THOMAS HOBBES,
LEVIATHAN 106, 149 (Herbert W. Schneider ed. 1958) (describing the respect that peo-
ple naturally seek from each other); IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 54, 56
(W. Hastie trans., Augustus M. Kelley Publishers 1974) (1796-97) (urging that people
should regard themselves as an end rather than a means and that every person ought
to be his or her own master by right).
346. The international human rights instruments discussed in Part II of this Arti-
cle may also be interpreted to contribute toward equalizing the status of all children
to that of adults insofar as protections against violence are concerned. See supra Part
II.
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A. Reasons for Prohibiting Corporal
Punishment of Children
1. Psychological and Sociological Reasons for Prohibiting
Corporal Punishment of Children-Respected theoretical con-
structs and accumulating data indicate that corporal
punishment jeopardizes children while they are children and
that such punishment has lasting deleterious effects upon
reaching adulthood. The harm done represents personal loss
and pain for the individuals who undergo corporal punishment
but it also may exact a considerable toll on a society-wide
scale. While it would be impossible within the confines of this
Article to give a comprehensive description of these phenom-
ena, even a superficial foray into the theories and data
establishes a persuasive policy basis for reform directed to-
ward prohibiting corporal punishment of children. Persuasive
but not perfect. At the outset of this discussion, it should be
candidly acknowledged that there is some controversy among
health and child care professionals over whether light or mod-
erate spanking does any actual harm.3'7 Nevertheless, this
Article will take the position, in company with most experts on
the subject, that, on balance, persuasive policy reasons for a
prohibition exist. The various theories and data, considered in
total, make it apparent that the overwhelming evidence of the
injurious effects of corporal punishment of children is accom-
panied by almost no evidence of lasting benefits. 8 Moreover,
corporal punishment may be challenged on moral grounds.
347. For commentators acknowledging the existence of the controversy, see Ed-
wards, supra note 5, at 990-94; Hyman, Corporal Punishment, supra note 3, at 118-
20; Kenelin F. McCormick, Attitudes of Primary Care Physicians Toward Corporal
Punishment, 267 JAMA 3161, 3163-65 (1992); Murray A. Straus et al., Spanking by
Parents and Subsequent Antisocial Behavior of Children, 151 ARCHIVES OF PEDIATRICS
& ADOLESCENT MED. 761, 762-64 (1997); and Fredric P. Nelson, A Letter Supporting
Physical Discipline, NEWSLETTER OF THE SECTION ON CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT (Am.
Acad. of Pediatrics, Elk Grove Village, Ill.), Sept. 1993, at 1, 1-3. A recent article takes
the position that parents who are authoritative (rather than authoritarian) in their
parenting and who have established a "warm, engaged rational parent-child relation-
ship" may use spanking without any adverse consequences. See Diana Baumrind,
Parenting: The Discipline Controversy Revisited, 45 FAM. REL. 405, 412 (1996). How-
ever, an even more recent article reports on a study showing that parental corporal
punishment causes an increase in children's antisocial behavior regardless of the
warmth and cognitive stimulation parents provide. See Straus et al., supra, at 764-67.
348. Although there is some evidence that corporal punishment may have "an
immediate deterrent effect" on children's misbehavior, see Hyman, Corporal Punish-
ment, supra note 3, at 119, there is also data showing that any deterrent effect is
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Turning first to the damage which physical chastisement
may work during childhood, it appears that there are a num-
ber of potential adverse effects. Corporal punishment may
cause children to exhibit increased physical aggressiveness. 49
Worse still, for both the child-victims and society at large, chil-
dren who are corporally punished also tend to have less
capacity for empathy.35 Coupling aggressiveness with lack of
empathy creates a propensity to hurt others without compunc-
tion. This correlation of corporal punishment with childhood
aggression and lack of empathy is no minor consideration in
an era when the incidence of youth violence has reached unac-
ceptably high levels.351
fleeting, see id.; infra notes 353-54 and accompanying text. See also LEACH, supra
note 11, at 224 (stating that smacking children cannot change their behavior and that
such punishment does not even produce momentary regret in the child because he or
she is "so overwhelmed by [feelings ofl pain and indignity"); SAMALIN, supra note 1, at
73-74 (mentioning that experience shows corporal punishment to be ineffective);
SEARS & SEARS, supra note 1, at 150 (explaining that during and immediately after
the spanking, the child is so preoccupied with the pain and humiliation involved in
the punishment that he or she loses sight of the reason for the punishment). But see
Baumrind, supra note 347, at 412 (theorizing that spanking can be productive in
shaping children's behavior if it is administered by authoritative, warm parents).
349. See LEACH, supra note 11, at 224 (stating that smacking children contributes
to turning them into bullies); JANE NELSEN ET AL., POSITIVE DISCIPLINE A-Z: 1001
SOLUTIONS TO EVERYDAY PARENTING PROBLEMS 164-65 (1993) (pointing out that
spanking children encourages them to hit others); SAMALIN, supra note 1, at 73;
ROBERT R. SEARS ET AL., PATTERNS OF CHILD REARING 266 (1957); SEARS & SEARS,
supra note 1, at 154 (explaining that the more frequently a child is given physical
punishment the more likely it is that she will behave aggressively toward other family
members and peers); SPOCK, supra note 11, at 152; STRAUS, supra note 2, at 22, 100;
FELICITY DE ZULUETA, FROM PAIN TO VIOLENCE: THE TRAUMATIC ROOTS OF DE-
STRUCTIVENESS 218 (1993); J.L. Caldwell, Parental Physical Punishment and the Law,
13 N.Z. UNIV. L. REV. 370, 384 (1989); Leonard D. Eron, Parent-Child Interaction,
Television Violence, and Aggression of Children, 37 AM. PSYCHOL. 197, 203, 208 (1982);
Norma D. Feshbach, The Effects of Violence in Childhood, 2 J. CLINICAL CHILD
PSYCHOL. 28, 29-30 (1973); Herman, supra note 2, at 32-35. But see JAMES DOBSON,
THE STRONG-WILLED CHILD: BIRTH THROUGH ADOLESCENCE 34-35 (1978) (contending
that reasonable corporal punishment administered by a loving parent inhibits chil-
dren's misbehavior); Baumrind, supra note 347, at 410, 412-13 (opining that corporal
punishment does not cause children to become more aggressive or delinquent).
350. See PHILIP GREVEN, SPARE THE CHILD: THE RELIGIOUS ROOTS OF PUNISHMENT
AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF PHYSICAL ABUSE 127-29 (1991) (explaining that
children who are hurt by their parents develop immunities to empathy); Feshbach,
supra note 349, at 30; see also ALICE MILLER, BREAKING DOWN THE WALL OF SILENCE
88 (Simon Worrall trans., Dutton Books 1991) (describing how beatings by his parents
during childhood were a factor causing Hitler's later disregard for human life).
351. See Daniel Goleman, Early Violence Leaves Its Mark on the Brain, N.Y
TIMES, Oct. 3, 1995, at C1 (mentioning that the rate of violence among teenagers has
been rising precipitously); Camille Sweeney, Portrait of the American Child, 1995, N.Y
TIMES, Oct. 8, 1995, § 6 (Magazine), at 53 (reporting that although crimes of violence
decreased nationally between 1985 and 1995, arrest rates for violent crimes commit-
ted by children ages 10 to 17 doubled between 1983 and 1992). Indeed, it appears that
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Ironically, corporal punishment, which often is the result of
parental concern, may actually hamper relations between par-
ents and their children.352 This impairment of the parent-child
bond is not only unfortunate but, it appears, is quite unneces-
sary: there is considerable data indicating that corporal
punishment does not, in any consistent way, deter misbehavior
or encourage good behavior on the part of children.353 Most ex-
perts agree that corporal punishment does nothing to fulfill
the disciplinary goal of developing a child's conscience so as to
enable him or her to behave well without parental prodding.54
Physical attacks on a child intended to inflict pain generally
do just that-they cause the child to feel physical pain and an
accompanying terror of that pain.3 5 As an invasion of their
bodily integrity, children may find the experience "humiliating
and degrading."356 Experts have also found that corporal
corporal punishment is associated with juvenile delinquency. See NEWELL, supra note
18, at 43-46; STRAUS, supra note 2, at 108-09.
352. See GREVEN, supra note 350, at 123-27; SEARS & SEARS, supra note 1, at
148-49 (stating that hitting devalues the parent-child relationship); STRAUS, supra
note 2, at 153-54; Herman, supra note 2, at 18; Jan Hunt, Ten Reasons Not to Hit
Your Kids, in MILLER, supra note 350, app. D at 169; Lawrence S. Wissow, & Debra
Roter, Toward Effective Discussion of Discipline and Corporal Punishment During
Primary Care Visits: Findings from Studies of Doctor-Patient Interaction, 94 PE-
DIATRICS 587, 587 (1994). But see J. RICHARD FUGATE, WHAT THE BIBLE SAYS ABOUT
... CHILD TRAINING 111 (1980) (maintaining that proper use of physical chastisement
is the only way to foster family fellowship); ROY LESSIN, SPANKING: WHY, WHEN, HOW?
22-23 (1982) (asserting that a truly loving relationship between parent and child may
necessitate spanking).
353. See LEACH, supra note 11, at 224; NEWELL, supra note 18, at 16-21; SEARS &
SEARS, supra note 1, at 154 (explaining that spanking doesn't work because it does not
promote good behavior, creates a distance between parent and child, and contributes
to a violent society); STRAUS, supra note 2, at 149-51; Caldwell, supra note 349, at
384-85; Edwards, supra note 5, at 1020; Herman, supra note 2, at 27-32; McCormick,
supra note 347, at 3161-62. But see FUGATE, supra note 352, at 127-130 (arguing that
physical chastisement helps children to be obedient).
354. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 19; SAMALIN, supra note 1, at 74; STRAUS, su-
pra note 2, at 100, 144; Anthony M. Graziano & Karen A. Namaste, Parental Use of
Physical Force in Child Discipline: A Survey of 679 College Students, 5 J. INTER-
PERSONAL VIOLENCE 449, 449, 458 (1990); McCormick, supra note 347, at 1361;
Kathryn D. Perkins, Parents' Dilemma: T Spank or Not, THE SACRAMENTO BEE, June
5, 1994, at Al; Murray A. Straus, Remarks at the International Seminar on Worldwide
Strategies and Progress Towards Ending All Physical Punishment of Children
(Dublin, Ireland, Aug. 22, 1996). But see FUGATE, supra note 352, at 186 (asserting
that corporal punishment of children lays the foundation for the development of self-
control).
355. See DOBSON, supra note 349, at 47; FUGATE, supra note 352, at 136; GREVEN,
supra note 350, at 122-23; NEWELL, supra note 18, at 12; STRAUS, supra note 2, at 5,
7, 9-10; Feshbach, supra note 349, at 29-30; Graziano & Namaste, supra note 354, at
450; Herman, supra note 2, at 21; McCormick, supra note 347, at 3162.
356. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 12; see also JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 73-74 (1979); MILLER, supra note 11, at 17; SEARS
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punishment may produce in children neurotic reactions such
as depression,357 withdrawal,358 anxiety,35 9 tension,360 and, in
older children, substance abuse,361 interference with school
work,362 and precocious sexual behavior.33 Corporal punishment
can cause serious physiological damage as well, 6 including
somatic responses such as headaches and stomachaches.3s
Even more dangerous, corporal punishment of children is often
the prelude to child abuse as more traditionally conceived.366 It
& SEARS, supra note 1, at 152 (explaining that children may feel anger, humiliation,
and a sense of unfairness in response to corporal punishment). But see DOBSON, supra
note 349, at 84 (arguing that corporal punishment can and should be used so as not to
break the child's spirit). Some who favor corporal punishment of children see its value
precisely in that it humbles the child. See, e.g., FUGATE, supra note 352, at 139.
357. See HYMAN, READING, WRITING, AND THE HICKORY STICK, supra note 3, at 94,
99-100; ALICE MILLER, THE DRAMA OF THE GIFTED CHILD 43 (1994); NEWELL, supra
note 18, at 46; Herman, supra note 2, at 18; Wissow & Roter, supra note 352, at 588.
358. See GREVEN, supra note 350, at 129; HYMAN, READING, WRITING AND THE
HICKORY STICK, supra note 3, at 94, 100; SEARS & SEARS, supra note 1, at 148, 152.
359. See HYMAN, READING, WRITING AND THE HICKORY STICK, supra note 3, at 94,
99-100; GREVEN, supra note 350, 122-23.
360. See HYMAN, READING, WRITING AND THE HICKORY STICK, supra note 3, at 95,
100; cf Herman, supra note 2, at 39 (stating that corporal punishment causes children
to obey their parents out of fear).
361. See HYMAN, READING, WRITING AND THE HICKORY STICK, supra note 3, at 96;
NEWELL, supra note 18, at 46; Wissow & Roter, supra note 352, at 587; cf MILLER,
supra note 357, at 97 (explaining that people who as children "repressed their intense
feelings" may try to regain those feelings by means of drugs or alcohol) (citation omit-
ted).
362. See HYMAN, READING, WRITING AND THE HICKORY STICK, supra note 3, at 96,
99; Herman, supra note 2, at 39.
363. See HYMAN, READING, WRITING AND THE HICKORY STICK, supra note 3, at 96.
364. See id. at 1; LEACH, supra note 11, at 225; NEWELL, supra note 18, at 31-33;
JORDAN RIAK, PLAIN TALK ABOUT SPANKING 3 (1994); Hyman, Corporal Punishment,
supra note 3, at 114-16; Corporal Punishment in the Home: Commentary, NEWS-
LETTER OF THE SECTION ON CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT (Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Elk
Grove Village, Ill.), Mar. 1992, at 1, 2; Wissow & Roter, supra note 352, at 587.
365. See HYMAN, READING, WRITING AND THE HICKORY STICK, supra note 3, at 95,
100.
366. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 21-31; SEARS & SEARS, supra note 1, at 149;
STRAUS, supra note 2, at 81-87, 90-97; DAVID A. WOLFE, CHILD ABUSE: IMPLICATIONS
FOR CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 51 (Developmental Clinical Psy-
chology and Psychiatry Series No. 10, 1987) (suggesting that child abuse may be
caused by social structures which neither sanction nor provide alternatives to the use
of corporal punishment); Richard J. Gelles, Violence Toward Children in the United
States, in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CHILD ABUSE 53, 75 (Richard Bourne & Eli H.
Newberger eds., 1979); Gibbons, supra note 32, at 112; Herman, supra note 2, at 40-
41; McCormick, supra note 347, at 3161; see also LEACH, supra note 11, at 224 (noting
that use of corporal punishment on children has a tendency to escalate in intensity);
Caldwell, supra note 349, at 381-82 (observing that corporal punishment can lead to
child abuse); cf Brandt F. Steele, The Psychology of Child Abuse, 17 FAM. ADVOC.,
Winter 1995, at 19, 21 (stating that abusive parents tend to believe "in the educa-
tional value and necessity of using physical punishment as a disciplinary tool"). But
see Demie Kurz, Corporal Punishment and Adult Use of Vi1olence: A Critique of
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is no secret that severe child abuse has become a deplorably
pervasive problem in American society.3 7
The ill effects of corporal punishment on children's lives are
reason enough to consider prohibition. However, as pathetic as
the child's plight may be, some of the most ominous ramifica-
tions of corporal punishment of children are those that are
manifested when children who have felt the rod reach adult-
hood. Analysis by respected psychologists and experts in
related fields reveals that corporal punishment of a child is all
too likely to produce an adult with lasting psychic suffering
and maiming. The root cause of the ensuing adult disorders is
that children are not permitted to vent the rage and humilia-
tion they feel upon being struck."i They may not express these
feelings for a variety of reasons. Looked at from a child's point
of view, it is dangerous to react hostilely toward the very peo-
ple upon whom one is dependent 6 . and with whom one
invariably identifies37-- especially if an outbreak of hostility is
"Discipline and Deviance", 38 SOC. PROBS. 155, 155-57 (1991) (arguing that there is no
convincing evidence for singling out corporal punishment as a major cause of child abuse
without also considering gender, race and class).
367. See Elizabeth Gleick, The Children's Crusade: A '60's-Style Campaign Aims to
Put Kids First in This Year's Budget Battles and the Presidential Race, TIME, June 3,
1996, at 31, 32 (reporting that in 1992 there were 850,000 substantiated cases of child
abuse or neglect in the United States); Bob Herbert, In America: Turning Children's
Rights into Reality, N.Y TIMES, May 27, 1996, at 19 (relating that every seven hours an
American child dies from abuse or neglect); Sweeney, supra note 351, at 53 (advising that
from 1985 to 1994, the number of reported cases of child abuse nationwide increased 64
percent); Who Stands for Children?, N.Y TIMES, June 1, 1996, at 18 (stating that each
day nearly 8,500 children are abused or neglected in the United States).
368. Children are likely to experience anger and a sense of degradation when they
are corporally punished. See GREVEN, supra note 350, at 124-27, 132; LEACH, supra note
11, at 224; MILLER, supra note 350, at 92-94; SEARS & SEARS, supra note 1, at 147, 152;
STRAUS, supra note 2, at 69; Herman, supra note 2, at 18. These reactions are especially
understandable in light of the fact that children, even more so than adults, experience
being physically struck as a profoundly traumatic event. See STRAUS, supra note 2, at 9-
10; Herman, supra note 2, at 21; cf MILLER, supra note 357, at 78-79 (discussing the
intensity of feelings unique to young children).
369. See GREVEN, supra note 350, at 132 (describing how a child cannot afford to re-
act with anger towards a punitive parent "on whom he or she depends for nurturance
and life itself"'); MILLER, supra note 357, at 8; MILLER, supra note 2, at 6; J. KONRAD
STETTRACHER, MAKING SENSE OF SUFFERING: THE HEALING CONFRONTATION WITH YOUR
OWN PAST 27-28 (1991).
370. See GREVEN, supra note 350, at 132 (theorizing that children suppress anger in
response to hurtful discipline administered "by adults whom the child loves"); ALICE
MILLER, BANISHED KNOWLEDGE: FACING CHILDHOOD INJURIES 98-105 (1988) (explaining
that the child identifies so thoroughly with the punishing parent that the child is unable
to comprehend when an injustice is being done to him or her); ALICE MILLER, PICTURES
OF A CHILDHOOD 4-5 (1986) [hereinafter MILLER, PICTURES] (suggesting that because
children love their parents the former tend to absolve the latter from responsibility for
cruelty to the children); STRAUS, supra note 2, at 163 (noting that it is difficult to
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likely to be met with more intimidation and pain. 71 It may also
be inconceivable, especially to younger children, that the par-
ent's punitiveness could be wrong."2 Nor can very young
children and babies even accurately conceptualize what is
happening to them so as to respond consciously to their pre-
dicament. 3
Despite its function as a natural defense mechanism, this
quiescence does nothing to assuage the child's hurt and anger;
to the contrary, such feelings must go somewhere and, ulti-
mately, many children have no alternative but to repress
them.3 7' The psychologist Alice Miller has explained the dy-
namic as follows:
If there is absolutely no possibility of reacting appropri-
ately to hurt, humiliation, and coercion, then these
experiences cannot be integrated into the personality; the
feelings they evoke are repressed, and the need to articu-
late them remains unsatisfied, without any hope of being
fulfilled.
What becomes of this forbidden and therefore
unexpressed anger? Unfortunately, it does not disappear,
but is transformed with time into a more or less conscious
hatred directed against either the self or substitute
persons, a hatred that will seek to discharge itself in
various ways permissible and suitable for an adult. 5
The repressed childhood fury does, then, "go somewhere";
after years of smoldering intrapsychically, the accumulated
ire can emerge in some adults in the guise of personality
acknowledge that corporal punishment is destructive because it means condemning
one's own parents).
371. See GREVEN, supra note 350, at 123; LEACH, supra note 11, at 224; MILLER,
supra note 350, at 55.
372. See MILLER, supra note 11, at 59, 61, 74, 247-48; MILLER, supra note 350, at
19-20, 55.
373. See GREVEN, supra note 350, at 19; STETIRACHER, supra note 369, at 28;
Herman, supra note 2, at 21.
374. See GREVEN, supra note 350, at 126; MILLER, supra note 11, at 7, 61; ALICE
MILLER, THE UNTOUCHED KEY: TRACING CHILDHOOD TRAUMA IN CREATIVITY AND
DESTRUCTIVENESS 159-60, 168 (1990) [hereinafter MILLER, UNTOUCHED KEY];
STRAUS, supra note 2, at 69; Herman, supra note 2, at 19.
375. MILLER, supra note 11, at 7, 61.
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disorders characterized by destructiveness either toward the
self or toward others.376
A correlation has been drawn, for instance, linking repressed
childhood anger with such inward-turning adult disorders as
depression,3 77 obsessive-compulsive behavior,37
8  dissociation,3 79
and paranoia."o Such childhood anger is also thought to con-
tribute to adult aggressiveness, 1 authoritarianism, 8  and lack
376. See GREVEN, supra note 350, at 128-74, 186-212; MILLER, supra note 350, at
82, 94-95; SEARS & SEARS, supra note 1, at 153-54 (listing the negative long term
effects of spanking such as psychological disturbances, aggressive behavior, and in-
creased rate of abusing a child or spouse); STRAUS, supra note 2, at 67-146; Herman,
supra note 2, at 25, 36-39; Wissow & Roter, supra note 352, at 587-88.
377. See GREVEN, supra note 350, at 130-35; STRAUS, supra note 2, at 67-79;
Herman, supra note 2, at 39; Wissow & Roter, supra note 352, at 588. If a child is un-
able to retaliate verbally in response to corporal punishment, an urge to punish in
turn may be directed toward himself or herself upon reaching adulthood. Depression
or even suicide are forms of such self-punishment. See GREVEN, supra note 350, at
131-32; STRAUS, supra note 2, at 77-79.
378. When a child represses the anger he or she feels upon being corporally pun-
ished, this dynamic may cause resort to self-imposed rituals, rules, and controls to
keep the repressed anger within bounds later in life. These rituals, rules, and controls
are symptomatic of obsessive-compulsive behavior. See GREVEN, supra note 350, at
135-41.
379. See GREVEN, supra note 350, at 148-68. Dissociation may be manifested by
hysterical trances, multiple personalities, or more benign dissociative states. See id. at
148. The process of dissociation may occur when the anger and/or pain caused by cor-
poral punishment is so unbearable that the victim creates alternative selves to deal
with such feelings or, in a more mild reaction, induces himself or herself to render the
feelings distant and unconscious. See id. at 148; cf MILLER, supra note 357, at 30-38
(explaining that when a child is forced to adapt to parental dictates that are not
geared to the child's needs, the child will split feelings of need from the rest of his or
her psyche and submerge such feelings).
380. See GREVEN, supra note 350, at 168-74; cf MILLER, supra note 350, at 86-87,
108-09, 111 (indicating that paranoia, such as that exhibited by Adolf Hitler and Ni-
colae Ceausescu, may result from beatings and harsh discipline in childhood). The
etiology of paranoia may be in the child's continuing fear of pain caused by corporal
punishment. The child is imbued with a continuing sense of endangerment and of a
need for vigilance. See STETTBACHER, supra note 369, at 16, 18 (pointing out that
physical attacks on a child can lead to "a constant state of readiness to ward off per-
ceived dangers"). However, because the child's anger at being so punished is
suppressed, the anger persists into adulthood when it is displaced onto others who, as
stand-ins for the punishing parents, also become objects of a now grown-up unreason-
able fear. See GREVEN, supra note 350, at 168-69, 173.
381. The anger repressed in childhood is acted out or repeated in adult life as ag-
gression against others who are perceived as surrogates for the once punitive parents.
See GREVEN, supra note 350, at 126-27; MILLER, supra note 11, at 61, 65-66, 115-17,
172; MILLER, supra note 350, at 91, 108; SEARS & SEARS, supra note 1, at 153-54;
Herman, supra note 2, at 36; see also STRAUS, supra note 2, at 99, 103, 106, 110, 113-
15 (describing the linkages between corporal punishment and criminal behavior).
382. The psychologist Alice Miller has explained that corporal punishment of chil-
dren can lead to their development into authoritarian adults in the following manner:
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of empathy, 3 conditions in which repressed anger is acted out
at the expense of others. Not uncommonly these others are the
adult's own children, thereby perpetuating an intergen-
erational cycle of childhood trauma and adult neurosis or
psychosis. 4
Parental corporal punishment may adversely affect adult
sexuality as well. Because a person whom the child loves is
doing the hitting, the child may confuse love with being hurt.
It appears that this fusion of love and pain can lead to a
predisposition for sadomasochism when the child becomes an
adult.385 This may especially be the case because corporal
punishment is often administered upon a child's buttocks,3 6
The victims of such an upbringing ache to do to others what was once done to
them. If they don't have children, or their children refuse to make themselves
available for their revenge, they line up to support new forms of fascism. Ulti-
mately, fascism always has the same goal: the annihilation of truth and
freedom. People who have been mistreated as children, but totally deny their
suffering, use the mottoes and labels of the day... They are consumed by the
perverse pleasure in the destruction of life that they observed in their parents
when young. They long to at last be on the other side of the fence, to hold power
themselves, passing it off, as Stalin, Hitler, or Ceausescu have done, as
"redemption" for others... . The unconscious compulsion to revenge repressed
injuries is more powerful than all reason. That is the lesson that all tyrants
teach us.
MILLER, supra note 350, at 84-85; see also GREVEN, supra note 350, at 198-204;
MILLER, UNTOUCHED KEY, supra note 374, at 50-52, 60, 62, 68, 149 (tracing the des-
potism of Stalin and other authoritarian personalities to beatings received in
childhood and the lack of adult sympathy for the child's resulting pain); NEWELL, su-
pra note 18, at 46; Herman, supra note 2, at 38-39 (stating that an "authoritarian
personality" can be "correlated with past subjection to corporal punishment").
383. See GREVEN, supra note 350, at 127-29 ("The parent who hurts a child while
imposing discipline is teaching a lesson in indifference to suffering ... ."); MILLER,
supra note 11, at 79-83, 115; cf. MILLER, supra note 357, at 34 (theorizing that when
the child is forced to adapt to parental needs, through corporal punishment or other-
wise, a consequence is the impossibility of experiencing "consciously certain feelings of
his own ... either in childhood or later in adulthood").
384. See MILLER, supra note 2, at 61, 211; MILLER, supra note 11, at 232, 247;
MILLER, PICTURES, supra note 370, at 6-7; Herman, supra note 2, at 34-35; Steve
Offner, New Light on Child Killings--Study Links Tolerance of Physical Punishment
to Deaths, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Sept. 15, 1994, at P3.
385. See GREVEN, supra note 350, at 174-86; NEWELL, supra note 18, at 48-49;
STRAUS, supra note 2, at 130-36; Herman, supra note 2, at 39.
386. One writer recommends that "God has given parents the perfect area on
which to administer a spanking-the child's bottom. It is a safe place because it is well
cushioned, yet it is a highly sensitive area." LESSIN, supra note 352, at 75; see also
DOBSON, supra note 349, at 47 (suggesting that when disciplining a toddler, "[tiwo or
three stinging strokes on the legs or bottom with a switch are usually sufficient');
FUGATE, supra note 352, at 143 (stating that "[t]he rod should be used on the bare
back, preferably on the buttocks"); GREVEN, supra note 350, at 184 (observing that
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which are an erogenous zone.3 87 Thus, the basis is established
for the child to merge love, pain, and sexual feelings into later
masochistic sexual desires or other sexual perversions. 88
Less obviously, there is evidence that corporal punishment
during childhood may even impair adult capacities for
economic achievement and success in employment.38 The
theory is that corporal punishment is liable to engender certain
characteristics, such as passivity, withdrawal, depression,
powerlessness, alienation, and/or decreased initiative and
creativity, which may interfere with the ability to hold
intellectually satisfying, lucrative occupations. 9 °
The toll that childhood corporal punishment may take on
individual lives is, therefore, multifaceted and baneful. The
vitality and equilibrium of an individual's psychic life may be
distorted and violated by corporal punishment in ways that
cause lasting suffering and varying degrees of persistent dys-
function. This internal debilitation, in turn, has ramifications
for a person's relations with others, impairing familial dy-
namics and personal achievement.
That corporal punishment of children is a widespread prac-
tice in the United States39' means personal despair and
suffering for the millions of men and women who have been
subjected to such punishment-regardless of whether they are
aware of the origin of their tribulations. This, of course, is bad
in itself, but the tragedy does not end there. The fact is that
corporal punishment is thought by some to have played a deci-
sive role in promoting man's inhumanity to man on a societal
scale .3 ' Experts have found that criminals are typically people
"[clorporal punishment commonly focuses upon a child's buttocks, the anal area in the
back being the most frequently beaten part of the body").
387. See DAVID BAKAN, SLAUGHTER OF THE INNOCENTS: A STUDY OF THE BATTERED
CHILD PHENOMENON 113 (1971); GREVEN, supra note 350, at 184; TOM JOHNSON, THE
SEXUAL DANGERS OF SPANKING CHILDREN 1 (1996); Hunt, supra note 352, at 170.
388. See BAKAN, supra note 387, at 113; GREVEN, supra note 350, at 183-85;
JOHNSON, supra note 387, at 3; RIAK, supra note 364, at 3; Hunt, supra note 352, at
170.
389. See STRAUS, supra note 2, at 137-46.
390. See id. at 138-39.
391. See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text.
392. See GREVEN, supra note 350, at 199, 201-04, 206-07; MILLER, supra note 11,
at 62, 66-75, 79-84, 86-91, 115, 139-97, 242-43, 264-65; MILLER, PICTURES, supra
note 370, at 18-19; MILLER, UNTOUCHED KEY, supra note 374, at 50-54, 62-68;
MILLER, supra note 350, at 81-113; SPOCK, supra note 11, at 151-52; Herman, supra
note 2, at 36-39.
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who underwent corporal punishment in childhood. 93 Crime, of
course, is a nationwide problem of major concern in the United
States.3" Regrettably, it is not hard to think of instances of
more massive brutality than that perpetrated by the common
criminal; the historical evidence comes all too readily to mind.
Without even considering the wars and inquisitions of earlier
eras, modern history provides a panorama of appalling car-
nage and mayhem: Nazi torture and extermination of Jews,
Gypsies, and others;396 Stalin's persecution of kulaks and other
dissidents in the then Soviet Union;3 6 American "napalming"
of villages in Vietnam;3 97 the Khmer Rouge's butchery of more
than one million Cambodians;398 the bloody strife between Tut-
sis and Hutus in Rwanda; 99 Pinochet's murderous policies
against the left in Chile;"° and the internecine slaughter in
former Yugoslavia. 0 ' As we all know, the list could go on and
on. But even these few selected examples raise perplexing
questions. How do people come to such a pass that they can
commit genocide and other atrocities against each other?
393. See GREVEN, supra note 350, at 194-98; MILLER, supra note 11, at 198-202,
231, 249; NEWELL, supra note 18, at 43-46; STRAUS, supra note 2, at 99, 108-20;
ZULUETA, supra note 349, at 219; Herman, supra note 2, at 39.
394. See Michael Hedges, America's Crime Forecast Grim: Study Warns of Future
Loaded with Hoods, Hurts, CIN. POST, Jan. 6, 1996, at A2 (discussing a study on crime
that concluded only a minority of criminals are jailed and crime is predicted to get
worse); Richard Liefer, Crime Study Paints a Dark Picture, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 6, 1996, at
2 (reporting that violent crime is at an all-time high); Violent Crime Labeled "Ticking
Bomb", L.A. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1996, at A4 (explaining that crime levels remain at a his-
toric high and discussing a report that shows that a significant number of crimes are
unreported).
395. See Leon A. Jick, Holocaust, in 9 WORLD BOOK, supra note 129, at 296, 296;
Mary Nolan, Nazism, in 14 WORLD BOOK, supra note 129, at 92, 92-93; James L.
Stokesbury, World War II, in 21 WORLD BOOK, supra note 129, at 470, 486.
396. See Albert Marrin, Stalin, Joseph, in 18 WORLD BOOK, supra note 129, at 824,
826-27; James R. Millar, US.S.R., in 20 WORLD BOOK, supra note 129, at 28, 37.
397. See JAMES W. GIBSON, THE PERFECT WAR: TECHNOWAR IN VIETNAM 146, 367-
75 (1986).
398. See HERBERT HIRSCH, GENOCIDE AND THE POLITICS OF MEMORY: STUDYING
DEATH TO PRESERVE LIFE 141 (1995).
399. See Raymond Bonner, Rwanda Facing Difficult Struggle for Rebirth, THE
PATRIOT LEDGER, Dec. 30, 1994, at 4; Tom Davidson, 1994: Year in Review Throughout
the World, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Dec. 31, 1994, at 3A; William John-
son, Hope and Despair; From Mandela's Election in South Africa to the Nightmare in
Rwanda, 1994 Was a Year in Which Hope Grew a Little Taller than Despair,
MONTREAL GAZETTE, Dec. 30, 1994, at B3.
400. See JAVIER MARTINEZ & ALVARO DIAZ, CHILE: THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION
12-16 (1996).
401. See Battles Rake Croatia as Envoys Meet, COURIER-J., (Louisville, Ky.), Dec.
31, 1991, at 4A, Slobodan Lekic, Yugoslav Jets Pound Croatia City; Serbs Flee
Mountain Stronghol4 BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 30, 1991, at 2; Strategic City Near Zagreb
Under Heavy Fire, EDMONTON J., Dec. 30, 1991, at A4.
433
434 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Where, one wonders, has their empathy and kindness gone?
Why is there apparently an impulse to aggress in such mon-
strous ways and in such monstrous proportions? And, why is
this aggression such a pervasive feature of the human condi-
tion historically and geographically?
Given the complexity of societal evolution and tensions, it
would be simplistic to suggest that any one factor is totally re-
sponsible for all historical events involving mass cruelty.
Nevertheless, it is interesting indeed that various types of cor-
poral punishment have been part of traditional child rearing
practices in most parts of the globe-a shared experience
across time, cultural barriers, and national borders. °2 Moreo-
ver, corporal punishment of children can give rise to the very
symptomology of aggressiveness, authoritarianism, and lack of
empathy that characterizes societal acts of inhumanity.4 3
Thus, the commonality of childhood corporal punishment and
its adverse effects on adult personality closely parallel the in-
gredients needed for inhumanity on a grand scale. Corporal
punishment of children may be a hidden but potent factor con-
tributing to man's continuing pitilessness and inclination for
barbarism. Childhood suffering due to corporal punishment,
taken in conjunction with other psychological, political, and
economic dynamics, may help to account for the Hitlers, Sta-
lins, and Pol Pots of the world and all those masses of people
who willingly followed them."° In fact, adults who have been
corporally punished in childhood tend to feel most comfortable
in roles that, if they are not authoritarian, are alternatively
blindly obedient. 5
In short, there is accumulating data as well as a sort of
theoretical new thinking among psychologists, pediatricians,
and other experts on human development that establish a
402. See ZULUETA, supra note 349, at 212-18; John E.B. Myers, The Legal Response
to Child Abuse: In the Best Interest of Children?, 24 J. FAM. L. 149, 157 (1985-86); Mason
P Thomas, Jr., Child Abuse and Neglect Part I: Historical Overview, Legal Matrix and
Social Perspectives, 50 N.C. L. REV. 293, 298 (1972). To date, only seven countries have
adopted legal measures (judicially or through legislation) against corporal punishment of
children in the home. See supra notes 19-154 and accompanying text.
403. See supra notes 381-83 and accompanying text.
404. See GREVEN, supra note 350, at 199, 201-04, 206-07; MILLER, supra note 11, at
62, 66-75, 79-84, 86-91, 115, 139-97, 242-43, 264-65; MILLER, supra note 350, at 81-
113; Herman, supra note 2, at 36-39. See generally HIRSCH, supra note 398, at 125-32
(observing that mass murder results from the willingness to obey at all costs).
405. See GREVEN, supra note 350, at 200-04; MILLER, supra note 11, at 70; Her-
man, supra note 2, at 37; cf STRAUS, supra note 2, at 138-39 (observing that childhood
corporal punishment may cause people to become passive and that it "teaches chil-
dren what to think, not how to think").
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scientific basis for concluding that corporal punishment of
children is a source of grievous destruction. This destructiveness
extends not only to the drama of individual lives, but also to
that larger stage where societal dynamics are enacted. The
implications of the data and expert analyses bear on the very
evolution of human nature and on the future prospects for the
human race. However, for those who are not persuaded by
scientifically based reasons for prohibiting corporal punishment
of children, there are philosophical and moral considerations
which should inform further policy decisions on this issue.
2. Philosophical and Moral Reasons for Prohibiting Corpo-
ral Punishment of Children-Regardless of the scientific
studies and postulates, the argument can be made that corpo-
ral punishment of children should be prohibited simply
because it is wrong. Three interrelated ideas demonstrate this.
First, since it is wrong-indeed, even criminal-to hit adults, it
is also wrong to hit less mature human beings who, although
they are children, are nonetheless still human beings. Second,
human dignity is offended when a child is struck; human dig-
nity is protected under international law and has been
recognized as an important factor by the U.S. Supreme Court
in cases decided under the U.S. Constitution. Third, permitting
corporal punishment of children is tantamount to treating
them as chattels, and no one should be another's chattel.
The first point may perhaps best be illustrated by use of a
hypothetical problem. If your adult neighbor engages in offen-
sive or even infuriating behavior, you would probably not swat
him or her. If that neighbor has less than average adult physi-
cal or mental abilities, you would probably be even less likely
to use physical force as a dispute resolution technique. And, if
you love that neighbor as if he or she were a family member,
hitting that neighbor would seem inconceivable. Now imagine
that the offender is your child-typically, a person of less than
average adult abilities and a person you love as a family mem-
ber. Would you hit your child?. 6
It is common knowledge that if you hit your adult neighbor
to get him or her to cease annoying behavior, you could be
prosecuted for assault and/or battery since each state has laws
criminalizing such conduct.0 7 If hitting an adult is assault
406. Cf Bitensky, supra note 112, at 25 (setting forth a similar hypothetical
problem).
407. Every state has statutes criminalizing conduct that would constitute an as-
sault and/or battery. See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-20 to -22 (1994); ALASKA STAT.
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and/or battery, it would seem even more heinous when the
victim is "a person of less than average adult abilities and a
person you love as a family member," i.e., someone more
vulnerable and beloved than the average next door neighbor."°8
§§ 11.41.200-.230 (Michie 1996); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1203 to -1204 (West 1989
& Supp. 1997); ARM CODE ANN. §§ 5-13-201 to -207 (Michie 1997); CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 240-41, 242-43 (West 1988 & Supp. 1998); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-3-202 to
-204 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-59 to -61a (West 1994); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 611-613 (1995); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-504.1 (1996); FLA. STAT.
ANN. ch. 784.011, 784.021, 784.03, 784.045 (Harrison 1991 & Supp. 1996); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 16-5-20 to -24 (1996 & Supp. 1997); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 707-710 to -712
(1993); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-901 to -08 (1996); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-1, 5/12-2, 5/12-3,
5/12-4 to 4.1 (West 1997); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-42-2-1 to -1.5 (West Supp. 1997); IOWA
CODE ANN. §§ 708.1-708.2 (West 1993 & Supp. 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3408, 21-
3410, 21-3412, 21-3414 (1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 508.010-508.020, 508.025,
508.030 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-33 to -38 (West 1997);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, §§ 207-208 (West 1983 & Supp. 1997); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, §§ 12, 12A, 12A-1 (1996 & Supp. 1997); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 265, § 13A
(Law. Co-op. 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.81-750.82a (West 1991 & Supp.
1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.221-.224 (West 1987 & Supp. 1998); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 97-3-7 (1994); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 565.050-.070 (1994); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-5-201
to -202 (1997); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-308 to -310 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 200.400,
200.471, 200.481 (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 631:1, 631:2, 631:2-a (1996); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-1 (West Supp. 1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-3-1 to -5 (Michie 1994);
N.Y PENAL LAW §§ 120.00, 120.05, 120.10 (McKinney 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-33
(1993); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-17-01 to -02 (1985 & Supp. 1997); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 2903.12-14, 5924.128 (Anderson 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 641-642,
644-646 (West 1983 & Supp. 1998); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 163.160, 163.165, 163.175,
163.185 (1995); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2701-02 (West 1983 & Supp. 1997); R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 11-5-2, 11-5-3 (1994 & Supp. 1997); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-610, 16-3-
620 (Law. Co-op. 1985); id. at 22-3-560 (Law. Co-op. 1989 & Supp. 1997); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS §§ 22-18-1 to -1.1 (Michie 1988 & Supp. 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-101 to
-102 (1997); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.01, 22.02 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-102, 76-5-103 (1995 & Supp. 1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1023-
1024 (1974 & Supp. 1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1997);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.36.011, 9A.36.021, 9A.36.031, 9A.36.041 (West 1988 &
Supp. 1998); W, VA. CODE § 61-2-9 (1997); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.19 (West 1996); WYO.
STAT. ANN. §§ 6-2-501 to -502 (Michie 1997). Assault and battery are statutory crimes
in all American jurisdictions. However, the nomenclature affixed to these statutes can
be confusing-
This is not to suggest, however, that every jurisdiction has statutory crimes la-
belled both "assault" and "battery" .... In some jurisdictions, the attempted-
battery type of assault is prosecuted simply as an attempt to commit the crime
of battery, and there is either no crime called assault... or else the crime of as-
sault is limited to the placing of the victim in apprehension of a battery.
In some jurisdictions there is no statutory crime of battery, but.., the crime of
assault is defined to include what is usually classified as battery.
2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAw § 7.14, at
299-300 n.2 (1986) (citations omitted).
408. See Edwards, supra note 5, at 983 (stating that one could consider corporal
punishment as a battery); CINDY S. MOELIS, Banning Corporal Punishment: A Crucial
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Permitting corporal punishment of children when hitting
adults is subject to criminal sanctions seems arbitrary and
unjust.0 9 This is especially true in light of evidence showing
that corporal punishment of children is ineffective as a child
rearing technique,410  that such punishment has negative
effects," and that there are alternative ways of guiding and
instructing children."2
One of the reasons that corporal punishment of children
seems unjust is not only the sense that children are being
treated unequally in comparison to adults, but also because
corporal punishment offends human dignity.413 The preservation
of human dignity is a basic tenet of international human rights
law4" 4 and a federal constitutional value.4" As such, human
Step Thward Preventing Child Abuse, in CHILD ABUSE: A MULTIDIScIPLINARY SURVEY
280, 280 (Byrgren Finkelman ed., 1995) (stating that if an adult hits another person, it is
an illegal act-"unless that person is their child or student"); Gibbons, supra note 32, at
112 (stating what is considered assault and battery on an adult is considered discipline
on a child); see also DAVID ARCHARD, CHILDREN: RIGHTS AND CHILDHOOD 114 (1993)
(arguing that the state sanctions reasonable corporal punishment of children by ex-
empting punishers from assault charges); Thomas, supra note 402, at 339 (noting that
criminal cases reflect parents' exemption from prosecution when it comes to the right to
use reasonable corporal punishment on children).
409. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 12-16; STRAUS, supra note 2, at 10; Feshbach,
supra note 349, at 28; Herman, supra note 2, at 10. But see Robert Blecker, Haven or
Hell? Inside Lorton Central Prison: Experiences of Punishment Justified, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 1149, 1230 & n.134 (1990) (asserting that because children are "intimate depend-
ents," their parents are entitled and obligated to corporally punish them even though in
other contexts such adult conduct would be considered an assault).
410. See supra notes 348, 353, 354 and accompanying text.
411. See supra notes 349-50, 352, 355-66, 368, 376-85, 389-90, 392 and accompa-
nying text.
412. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 15; supra notes 46-50,62 and accompanying text.
413. The psychologist Alice Miller has stated that "[bleatings ... are always de-
grading, because the child not only is unable to defend him- or herself but is also
supposed to show gratitude and respect to the parents in return." MLLER, supra note 11,
at 17; see also Cambria, Cass., sez. VI, 18 marzo 1996, Foro It. II 1996, 407, 410, Transla-
tion, supra note 112, at 3 (reasoning that legal protections of dignity must be extended to
forbid corporal punishment of children); NEWELL, supra note 18, at 15 (commenting that
corporal punishment of children shows a "lack of respect for children as people"); SEARS
& SEARS, supra note 1, at 147-48 (advising that corporal punishment devalues the child
in his or her own eyes).
414. See Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 7-9 (1990); Cohen, Corporal Punish-
ment, supra note 13, at 113-14; Jordan J. Paust, Human Dignity as a Constitutional
Right: A Jurisprudentially Based Inquiry into Criteria and Content, 27 HoW. L.J. 145,
146, 185-87, 192-93, 200 (1984); Oscar Schachter, Editorial Comment, Human Dignity as
a Normative Concept, 77 AM. J. INVL L. 848, 848-49, 853-54 (1983); Ann I. Park, Com-
ment, Human Rights and Basic Needs: Using International Human Rights Norms to
Inform Constitutional Interpretation, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1195, 1228-29, 1249 (1987); see
also supra notes 212-16, 249-50 and accompanying text.
415. See William Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contempo-
rary Ratification, 27 S. TEx. L. REV. 433, 433, 438-40 (1986); Alan B. Handler,
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dignity should be a juridically recognized attribute of juveniles
as well.416 Dignity may be violated by coercive physical attacks
on the body. 417 That the victim is smaller and that the coercion
is inflicted by a caregiver does not change the nature of the
violation and, therefore, its offensiveness to self-respect.418
Perhaps one of the reasons that mankind has been slow to
recognize corporal punishment's infringement on equality and
dignity arises from the fact that children have been regarded
Individual Worth, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 493, 495, 512, 515, 516-19, 521, 532-33 (1989);
Paust, supra note 414, at 148-84; Charles Robert Tremper, Respect for the Human
Dignity of Minors: What the Constitution Requires, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1293, 1297,
1305-11 (1988); Peter S. Adolf, Note, Killing Me Softly: Is the Gas Chamber, or Any
Other Method of Execution, "Cruel and Unusual Punishment"?, 22 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 815, 829, 842-44 (1995); Paul V Regelbrugge, Comment, Barbarism in the Plastic
Bubble: An Application of Existentialist Theory to Capital Punishment in the United
States, 1990 DET. C.L. REV. 1011, 1025, 1040.
416. See Cambria, Foro It. II 1996 at 410-11, Translation at 3.(providing an ex-
ample of such judicial recognition); Cynthia Price Cohen, Developing Jurisprudence of
the Rights of the Child, 6 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1, 19, 59 (1993) [hereinafter Cohen, De-
veloping Jurisprudence]; Henry H. Foster, Jr., & Doris Jonas Freed, A Bill of Rights for
Children, 6 FAM. L.Q. 343, 344-46, 353 (1972); Paust, supra note 414, at 174-75 &
n.140; Tremper, supra note 415, at 1311-17, 1320-23; Santos Pais, supra note 189; cf
Cohen, Corporal Punishment, supra note 13, at 113-15, 130 (asserting that the child's
dignity is protected in certain international human rights instruments); Barbara B.
Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14
CARDOzO L. REV. 1747, 1816-17 (1993) (concluding that legal relationships between
adults and children should be predicated on respect for children as fellow humans).
That the law should recognize the human dignity of minors does not mean that
American law has always embraced this principle in the past. See Tremper, supra note
415, at 1320-44; Woodhouse, supra.
417. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 15; Natalie Abrams, Problems in Defining
Child Abuse and Neglect, in HAVING CHILDREN: PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL RE-
FLECTIONS ON PARENTHOOD 155, 160 (Onora O'Neill & William Ruddick eds., 1979);
Cohen, Corporal Punishment, supra note 13, at 113-15; Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing
the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Violence as Torture 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 291, 298, 309-11, 330, 340-41 (1994); Paust, supra note 414, at 168, 178-79; cf
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4, 10-11 (1992) (holding that excessive use of physi-
cal force against a prisoner may constitute cruel and inhuman punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment even though the prisoner does not suffer serious
injury); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 580 (8th Cir. 1968) (stating that corporal
punishment is "degrading to the punisher and to the punished alike"); Adolf, supra
note 415, at 848 (arguing that infliction of unnecessary pain and physical violence in
the execution process violates prisoners' dignity); Cohen, Developing Jurisprudence,
supra note 416, at 65 (noting that respect for the child's physical integrity is "closely
linked to concepts of human dignity"). But see Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664,
671 (1977) (holding that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to paddling children
as a disciplinary technique in public schools).
418. See MILLER, supra note 2, at 312-13 (remarking that beating children is hu-
miliating treatment); see also MLLER, supra note 11, at 17, 263 (commenting that
corporal punishment of children is "always degrading" and that modern child rearing
practices, including spankings, do not respect the child); GREVEN, supra note 350, at
124-27; NEWELL, supra note 18, at 12-16.
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as their parents' chattels.419 The underlying assumption ap-
pears to have been that if adults conceive children or gain
legal custody of them, then those adults effectively own the
children and may do to their progeny that which cannot be
done to other people who are not "owned"4"°-including physi-
cally attacking children to coerce or enlighten.
The concept goes back to earliest civilizations when it took
on its most awful manifestations. For example, under the Code
of Hammurabi, a father could legally sell, exchange, or even
kill his children.4 21 The ancient Hebrews, Greeks, and Romans
all had the legal "right" to kill their children. 2 Even in the
eighteenth century, infanticide was a common practice
throughout Europe.423 For centuries parents have been per-
mitted to abandon and physically attack or cause pain to their
children with impunity.
42 4
Corporal punishment of children, which dates back to antiq-
uity,42 reflects children's continued classification as parental
property. It is telling that as historically oppressed peoples
have liberated themselves from being legally categorized as
419. See JOHN HOLT, ESCAPE FROM CHILDHOOD 18, 26, 39, 47-48 (1974); Mary
Martin McLaughlin, Survivors and Surrogates: Children and Parents from the Ninth
to the Thirteenth Centuries, in THE HISTORY OF CHILDHOOD 101, 140 (Lloyd deMause
ed., 1974); Michael S. Wald, Children's Rights: A Framework for Analysis, 12 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 255, 256 n.5 (1979); Woodhouse, supra note 416, at 1810-12; Barbara
Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?" Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Prop-
erty, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 997, 1002-03, 1036-38, 1040-51, 1112-14 (1992); ef
Michael A. Slote, Obedience and Illusions, in HAVING CHILDREN, supra note 417, at
319, 321-22 (analogizing parental authority to divine authority). But see Wald, supra,
at 259 (opining that Americans are not inclined to treat children as the property of
adults); cf MARY ANN GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 36-41
(1981) (asserting that parental control over children has diminished in the modern
era); MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 283 (1985) (discussing how developments in domestic
relations law have reduced parental power over children).
420. See Martin Guggenheim, The Best Interests of the Child: Much Ado About
Nothing?, in CHILD, PARENT, & STATE: LAW AND POLICY READER 27, 28 (S. Randall
Humm et al. eds., 1994); Tremper, supra note 415, at 1318-19; Woodhouse, supra note
419, at 1044-45; cf Onora O'Neill, Begetting, Bearing, and Rearing, in HAVING
CHILDREN, supra note 417, at 25, 27 (describing the ways in which biological parents
have disposed of their unwanted children).
421. See Herman, supra note 2, at 5.
422. See id.; see also Lloyd deMause, The Evolution of Childhood, in THE HISTORY
OF CHILDHOOD 1, 25-28 (Lloyd deMause ed., 1974) (detailing the practice of infanti-
cide in early civilizations).
423. See deMause, supra note 422, at 29.
424. See id. at 32-41.
425. See Caldwell, supra note 349, at 371; deMause, supra note 422, at 17, 41-43;
Edwards, supra note 5, at 984, 986-87; Herman, supra note 2, at 5-7; see also STRAUS,
supra note 2, at 170 (stating that "[c]ultural norms that make violence by parents
legitimate have been the predominant pattern of humanity").
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the property of others, such liberation typically has brought in
its wake legal protection from physical chastisement. With the
emancipation of Confederate slaves, Caucasians could no
longer legally beat African-Americans; 48 likewise, American
women ultimately achieved reform such that husbands could
no longer legally beat their wives.427 History and logic would
seem to dictate that if children were no longer regarded as pa-
rental chattels, they too would soon be spared the rod.
As the above exegesis shows, corporal punishment of chil-
dren is harmful to individuals and society and is also morally
objectionable in view of late twentieth century conceptions of
decency and human worth. With such considerations at stake,
Americans and, indeed, people everywhere, are faced with the
responsibility of making a conscious policy choice of whether to
take measures to prevent corporal punishment of children. For
those, like this author, who favor prevention, the difficult ques-
tion remains as to how reform can most successfully be
achieved.
B. Means of Prohibiting Corporal Punishment of Children
An obvious means of preventing corporal punishment of
children is to educate people that such punishment is un-
acceptable. In Ireland, for example, the Irish Society for
Prevention of Cruelty to Children (ISPCC) has been campaign-
ing to teach parents to use other disciplinary tactics in lieu of
corporal punishment.428 This enterprise has been accompanied
426. Indeed, "many abolitionists, loathing all forms of physical bondage and abuse
of the powerless, also fought to end corporal punishment.... [Elducational reformers
viewed the whipping of children in schools and at home as similar to the lashing of
slaves." Stephen Nissenbaum, Lighting the Freedom Tree, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1996, at
A17. For a further description of the lashing of slaves, see JOHN W. BLASSINGAME, THE
SLAVE COMMUNITY: PLANTATION LIFE IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 251 (1979); 4 PAGE
SMITH, THE NATION COMES OF AGE: A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE ANTE-BELLUM YEARS
585, 615-16 (1981); David Brion Davis, Slavery, in 17 WORLD BOOK, supra note 129, at
501, 503.
427. See SUSAN MOLLER ORIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 129 (1989);
STRAUS, supra note 2, at 174; Herman, supra note 2, at 4; Frances E. Olsen, The Myth
of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 835, 839-40, 853-54
(1985).
428. See IRISH SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, ANNUAL
REPORT 1995 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Clan
O'Tighearnaigh, Chief Executive, The Irish Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Children, Address at the International Seminar on Worldwide Strategies and Prog-
ress Towards Ending All Physical Punishment of Children (Aug. 22, 1996).
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by a 12 percent reduction in the number of Irish adults who
think slapping children is advisable.429 The Swedish government
also has waged a strenuous education campaign against
corporal punishment of children with the result that there has
been a substantial reduction in the incidence of use and
approval of parental corporal punishment in that country as
well.""° However, neither the ISPCC nor the Swedish govern-
ment has seen fit to rely exclusively on education programs. It is
noteworthy that the ISPCC is seeking to have the Irish
Parliament enact a prohibition of corporal punishment of
children43 ' and that the Swedish government's education effort
took place in the context of a legislative ban on all corporal
punishment of children.4"2 Apparently, the ISPCC and the
Swedish government concluded that law has a crucial role to
play in ending corporal punishment of children. In this they
are joined by the six other nations, in addition to Sweden, that
have adopted legal measures explicitly aimed at forbidding
such punishment.433 In fact, law can play a pedagogical role
that enhances public awareness in decisive ways.
Generally speaking, there is a pedagogical purpose inherent
in virtually all law. Laws are made to be known;43  otherwise,
they would be ineffective as an instrument of governance or
restraint. The educational impact of law is perhaps most effec-
tually realized by the reciprocal interplay between law and
social values. Law draws its content from the values of the
people it governs. Law assimilates not only a society's values
and priorities as they are, but also those values and priorities
which comprise that society's goals and needs. It is in this lat-
ter initiatory phase that law has its most dramatic educative
effect because it crystallizes and makes visible the norms
which constitute a society's aspirations and ideals.3 5
429. See IRISH SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, supra
note 428; O'Tighearnaigh, supra note 428.
430. See supra notes 23-32, 37-50 and accompanying text.
431. See IRISH SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, supra
note 428; Mary Flaherty (Member of the Irish Parliament), Address at International
Seminar on Worldwide Strategies and Progress Towards Ending All Physical Punish-
ment of Children (Aug. 22, 1996).
432. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
433. See supra notes 19-154 and accompanying text.
434. Robert H. Bork has observed that "[llaw is a public act." ROBERT H. BORIC,
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 144 (1990). See
also GEORGE HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 135 (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford Univ. Press,
1967) (stating the importance of knowledge of the law).
435. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 927,
952 (W.D. Ross trans., Richard McKeon ed., 1941); Plato, Book VII, in THE LAWS OF
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Were Americans to make the policy choice of abolishing cor-
poral punishment of children, a strong argument can be made
that the most efficacious way to achieve abolition would be to
enact a prohibition that, in its pedagogical role, would com-
plement and enrich other educational strategies. Such a law
should make clear, in the most explicit way, that prevention of
corporal punishment of children is government policy. Unlike
the Minnesota statutes on the subject,4 6 this law should be of
sufficient comprehensibility to inform lawyers and laypersons
alike that corporal punishment of children is banned. If the
law also involved legal repercussions for violators, it would
leave no doubt that the policy is of paramount importance. Be-
cause of government's imprimatur and the possibility of
liability, a prohibitory law of this nature may well be one of the
most potent pedagogical tools available in this context.4"7
As mentioned above, hitting or otherwise physically
attacking an adult is generally considered a criminal assault
or battery, the precise terminology varying according to the
PLATO 215-16 (Thomas L. Pangle trans. & ed., Basic Books 1980); David R. Barnhizer,
Prophets, Priests and Power Blockers: Three Fundamental Roles of Judges and Legal
Scholars in America, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 127, 162-63 (1988); Paul Brest, The Thirty-
First Cleveland-Marshall Fund Lecture: Constitutional Citizenship, 34 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 175, 177-179 (1986); Keith Burgess-Jackson, Bad Samaritanism and the Peda-
gogical Function of Law, 8 CIuM. JUST. J. 1, 3-4, 26 (1985); Susan Hedman, Expressive
Functions of Criminal Sanctions in Environmental Law, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 889,
891 (1991); Ralph Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 1967 SUP.
CT. REV. 127, 180; Anne Norton, Transubstantiation: The Dialectic of Constitutional
Authority, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 458, 468-69 (1988); Philip Soper, The Moral Value of
Law, 84 MICH. L. REV. 63, 85 (1985).
The classic case of government taking a pioneering role through the medium of the
law is Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). It will be recalled that in
Brown, the Supreme Court struck down de jure racial segregation in public elemen-
tary and secondary schools as inherently violative of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The civil rights movement which followed on the heels of
this decision is a vivid testament to the leadership of the Brown Court in rejecting
racial segregation as an acceptable part of American life. See MARTIN LUTHER KING,
JR., STRIDE TOWARD FREEDOM 195, 198-99 (1958).
436. See supra notes 155-70 and accompanying text.
437. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 104; Caldwell, supra note 349, at 387; Ed-
wards, supra note 5, at 1022; Herman, supra note 2, at 44-45; Gibbons, supra note 32,
at 144. But see Paul H. Robinson, Are Criminal Codes Irrelevant?, 68 S. CAL. L. REV.
159, 166-67, 200 (1994) (arguing that much of criminal law's effect is thwarted be-
cause the laws are not adequately communicated to the average person). See generally
Francis A. Allen, The Morality of Means: Three Problems in Criminal Sanctions, 42 U.
PITT. L. REV. 737, 739, 742, 748, 750-51 (1981) (examining how criminal law may be
used to affect public attitudes toward criminalized behavior); Natalie Loder Clark,
Crime Begins at Home: Let's Stop Punishing Victims and Perpetuating Vi1olence, 28
WM. & MARY L. REV. 263, 275-79, 281 (1987) (contending that criminal prohibitions
convey a pedagogical message that the proscribed conduct is not socially or morally
acceptable).
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jurisdiction.438 It would therefore be logical to enact a statute
criminalizing corporal punishment of children and making
violators potentially subject to the same criminal penalties as
may be imposed for other assaults and/or batteries.43 9 To carry
out the intended purpose, one possible version of such a
statute might read as follows:
(1) (a) Corporal punishment is defined as the use of
physical force with the intention of causing a
child to experience bodily pain so as to correct,
control, or punish the child's behavior.
(b) Any person who uses corporal punishment on
a child shall be guilty of the crime of battery
provided that such physical force would be a
battery if used on an adult.
(2) The penalties for conviction pursuant to subsec-
tion (1) shall be the same as those for conviction
under any other criminal battery provision(s) or,
in lieu thereof in appropriate cases, shall be a
posttrial or postplea diversion program.
(3) Nothing stated in subsections (1) or (2) herein
shall preclude or limit further prosecution under
any other applicable laws for the use of corporal
punishment described in subsection (1).
(4) The proscription set forth in subsection (1) shall
not apply to the use of such physical force as is
reasonably necessary to prevent death or immi-
nent bodily pain or injury to the child or
others."0
438. See supra note 407 and accompanying text.
439. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 104; Herman, supra note 2, at 44-45; Zimring,
supra note 5, at 523-24, 527; cf Caldwell, supra note 349, at 386-87 (arguing for an
incremental approach beginning with a prohibition of corporal punishment in all
schools followed by removal of parental corporal punishment as a defense to assault
charges). But see Edwards, supra note 5, at 1020-22 (proposing that legislatures enact
a ban on corporal punishment with respect to children under five years of age, but
that violations of the ban should not be punished); Gibbons, supra note 32, at 144
(noting that while a complete ban on corporal punishment would be most desirable, it
may be more realistic first to attempt only a nationwide prohibition of corporal pun-
ishment in the schools).
440. The proposed statute represents an amalgam of my own thinking and that of
other commentators. In particular, see NEWELL, supra note 18, at 144-45; STRAUS, supra
note 2, at 4-5 (providing a definition of corporal punishment); Herman, supra note 2, at
42. The proposed statute has the virtue of assimilating the "crime" of corporally punish-
ing children as part of the criminal law on battery while retaining its specificity as a
particular variant of such general law. See Zimring, supra note 5, at 537.
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There are reasons for preferring a federal to a state statute criminalizing subabuse
corporal punishment of children. Federal regulation provides for a broader base of
expertise upon which to draw. See Tom Stacy, What's Wrong With Lopez, 44 U. KAN. L.
REV. 243, 255 (1996). Moreover, if prohibition of corporal punishment of children is, as
a matter of policy, desirable, then children across the nation should have the benefit of
that policy choice rather than only those children fortunate enough to reside in states
with more enlightened and activist legislatures. Federal regulation would provide
uniform national standards and a policy consistently applicable to all children. See id.
There is extant authority for the proposition that Congress may be empowered to
enact such legislation under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The
Clause provides that Congress shall have the power "io regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld Congress' power under
the Commerce Clause to enact social welfare legislation regulating an intrastate
activity which, taken by itself or as part of a class of like activities, substantially
affects interstate commerce. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.
241, 253-62 (1964) (upholding Congress' enactment under the Commerce Clause of
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 proscribing racial and other invidious
discrimination by certain places of public accommodation in serving potential
patrons). The Court has upheld such legislation even when it contained criminal
penalties that would seem to regulate areas traditionally left to the states. See Perez
v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150-57 (1971) (ruling that Congress had the power
under the Commerce Clause to enact Title II of the Consumer Credit Protection Act
which made intrastate loan sharking a federal crime). Moreover, the Court has
historically refused to find that Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause power even
when the legislation in question regulated arguably non-commercial intrastate
activities-as long as they demonstrated a sufficient impact on interstate commerce.
See Wickard v. Fillburn, 317 U.S. 111, 118-29 (1942) (holding constitutional under the
Commerce Clause that section of the Agricultural Adjustment Act limiting cultivation
of wheat destined for the farmer's own home consumption). This precedent has been
thought to imply that Congress can rely on its commerce power to regulate a range of
local social problems, including domestic relations. See Stacy, supra, at 248; cf.
Kathleen A. Burdette, Comment, Making Parents Pay: Interstate Child Support
Enforcement After United States v. Lopez, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1469, 1518 (1996) (tacitly
acknowledging that Congress' regulatory reach under the Commerce Clause extended
to family law matters before United States u. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), was
handed down).
While Heart of Atlanta Motel, Perez, and Fillburn are still good law, a 1995 decision
by the U.S. Supreme Court has thrown into question congressional latitude to enact
such legislation pursuant to the Commerce Clause. In United States v. Lopez, 115 S.
Ct. 1624 (1995), the Court struck down, as exceeding Congress' Commerce Clause
authority, a criminal statute that proscribed the "non-economic" intrastate activity of
gun possession in and around schools. See id. at 1634. Although it is beyond the scope
of this article to engage in an extended discussion of Lopez's significance, the decision
seems, at the very least, to mean that it is no longer constitutional for Congress to use
the Commerce Clause to regulate non-economic intrastate activities, no matter what
their effect is on interstate commerce. See 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31. If this is not an over-
broad reading of Lopez, then it may signify that the states rather than Congress
should assume the task of banning corporal punishment of children. Cf Stephen R.
McAllister, Is There a Judicially Enforceable Limit to Congressional Power Under the
Commerce Clause?, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 217, 241 (1996) (arguing that Lopez provides
for heightened judicial scrutiny of Commerce Clause legislation that may intrude on
individual liberties associated with raising a family); Stacy, supra, at 243-44, 248, 256
(noting that while the scope of Lopez is uncertain, the decision appears to preclude
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A statute drafted along these lines would not only be likely
to achieve its pedagogical mission, but would also avoid
sweeping within its ambit parent-child interactions that do not
belong there. First, by enacting a provision expressly creating
this new type of criminal battery, the statute would put every-
one on notice that corporal punishment of children is as
unacceptable as hitting an adult. In order to bring the greatest
clarity to this notice function, the proscription in subsection (1)
employs both the shorthand term "corporal punishment" and a
definition of the elements of corporal punishment as "physical
force [used] with the intention of causing a child to experience
bodily pain so as to correct, control, or punish the child's be-
havior." This provision is preferable to merely removing
corporal punishment as a defense to assault and/or battery, as
has occurred in Minnesota, because insofar as it is a plainer
and more emphatic repudiation the provision necessarily has
greater didactic potential."'
Second, even a cursory review of the law on assault and
battery demonstrates that the traditional denomination of
"battery" '2 would be the most appropriate classification for
criminalized subabuse corporal punishment of children.
Although different jurisdictions use different nomenclature,
Commerce Clause regulation of noncommercial intrastate activities in areas of tradi-
tional state law-making such as domestic relations).
On the other hand, some commentators are of the view that Lopez is a narrow deci-
sion and will not "inaugurate a major change in the Court's inclination to uphold
federal legislation." Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce
Power and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554, 554
(1995); see Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 674, 692, 694-95,
727, 729 (1995). If the latter are correct or if Lopez is ultimately overruled, then it
would be entirely appropriate for Congress to enact the ban on corporal punishment of
children. As discussed in Part III of this Article, corporal punishment of children can
cause increased crime and diminished earning capacity in adults as well as creating
the conditions for political tyranny and even genocide. Thus, Congress could find that
corporal punishment of children, when considered as a class of activities, substantially
affects interstate commerce.
441. The experience in Sweden is instructive in this regard. Corporal punishment
of children was first removed as a defense to assault and battery and, subsequently,
Sweden enacted a vaguely worded admonition on child supervision meant to convey
the unacceptability of corporal punishment as a means of such supervision. However,
these reforms did not edify the average Swede and left Swedish legal experts in disa-
greement over the laws' meaning. For this reason, the Swedish Parliament ultimately
opted to enact an express prohibition of corporal punishment of children. See Ei, su-
pra note 23, at 1-6; NEWELL, supra note 18, at 70-73; Olson, supra note 9, at 448-49;
Ziegert, supra note 23, at 919. Austrians experienced similar difficulties with early
vague laws intended to prohibit corporal punishment of children before enacting an
explicit ban. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
442. See LAFAVE & SCOT, supra note 407, § 7.15, at 301.
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i.e., some use "assault," the concept defining the crime remains
the same-that what is proscribed is "unlawful application of
force to the person of another" resulting in "either a bodily
injury" or, in some states, a mere offensive touching."3 Under
the modern approach exemplified by the Model Penal Code, in
order to constitute assault, the attack must cause "bodily
injury,'4" defined as, among other things, "physical pain,
illness or any impairment of physical condition." 5 Even a
"temporarily painful blow" to another will constitute a battery
"though afterward there is no wound or bruise or even pain to
show for it.""6 The perpetrator must also have a particular
mental state, which includes intent to injure or cause bodily
pain. Subabuse corporal punishment, as defined in this
Article, is characterized by precisely these elements of
battery:" 8 to state the obvious, corporal punishment is at least
a temporarily painful blow, intended to modify behavior by
causing bodily pain."9
Third, the draft statute is preferable to creating a cause of
action in tort against the punishing parent or other
caregiver.5 To subject violators merely to civil liability would
443. Id. § 7.15, at 301; see Miguel Angel Mendez, Essay, A Sisyphean Task: The
Common Law Approach to Mens Rea, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 407, 411-12 (1995).
444. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 (1997); LAFAVE & SCo'T, supra note 407, § 7.15,
at 302.
445. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.0 & 211.0.
446. LAFAVE & SCO'T, supra note 407, § 7.15, at 301.
447. See id. § 7.15, at 304.
448. See Herman, supra note 2, at 42-43; Zimring, supra note 5, at 523-24; Gib-
bons, supra note 32, at 112; cf Caldwell, supra note 349, at 387 (aiming to have
parental physical discipline governed by statutory assault provisions). In those juris-
dictions where corporal punishment is not akin to a legislature's definition of assault
and battery, the proposed statute could be crafted to indicate that it covers a unique
crime, and penalties could be assigned that are commensurate with an assault and
battery crime.
449. Battery encompasses and is generally preceded by assault-an attempt to
commit battery or the placing of another person in reasonable apprehension of being
made the target of a battery. See LAFAVE & SCO'r, supra note 407, § 7.16, at 312;
Mendez, supra note 443, at 410. Corporal punishment is, as a matter of course, pre-
ceded by the child's being placed in fear of receiving a blow. See supra note 355 and
accompanying text. Therefore, it is logically possible to classify the threat of corporal
punishment as an assault. Although entirely humane treatment of children (which
would exclude threats of violence) is most desirable, this Article works toward that
ultimate goal by taking a first step in proscribing the most palpable and physically
painful child rearing practice-actual corporal punishment. The limited reform pro-
posed here represents an acknowledgment of American political realities. As such, the
draft statute is conceived as a beginning rather than an end.
450. The Restatement (Second) of Torts repudiates parental immunity from tort
liability with the caveat that repudiation "does not establish liability for an act or
omission that, because of the parent-child relationship, is otherwise privileged or is
Corporal Punishment of Children
be to convey the message that physically attacking children is
not as objectionable as physically attacking adults-the opposite
of the law's intended pedagogical purpose.45' The consequence is
that the possibility of a tort suit would, by itself, perform the
notice or pedagogical function less effectively than the possi-
bility of criminal prosecution. 52 Then, too, civil liability is
problematic in that it places the child in a more directly
initiating and adversarial role with the offending adult, a
posture that may not be emotionally or practically viable for
the child. 53  In a criminal case, the child's burden is
substantially shifted to the state, which would initiate legal
proceedings and take on the necessary adversarial functions.
Fourth, the proposed statute makes intention of causing a
child to experience physical pain an element of the crime for
two reasons. First, the intent requirement is an element of
battery. Second, this requirement distinguishes prosecutable
conduct from acts that may cause pain for other purposes such
as putting antiseptic on a cut or restraining a child from run-
ning into traffic.' As an extra safeguard the proposed statute
only proscribes physical force that would be a battery if used
on an adult to make clear that other parental behaviors in re-
lation to the child, including disciplinary measures not
not tortious." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G (1979). "Several jurisdictions
have either expressly adopted this approach or supported its rationale." Sandra L.
Haley, Comment, The Parental brt Immunity Doctrine: Is It a Defensible Defense?, 30
U. RICH. L. REV. 575, 596 (1996). States differ as to whether they provide full, partial,
or no parental immunity. See Caroline E. Johnson, Comment, A Cry for Help: An Ar-
gument for Abrogation of the Parent-Child Tort Immunity Doctrine in Child Abuse and
Incest Cases, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 617, 628-52 (1993). Outside the context of such
immunity, it is clear that conduct which constitutes criminal assault and battery may
also give rise to civil liability. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874A cmt. f. In
those jurisdictions where there is no parental immunity or where there is a willing-
ness to adopt a new exception to parental immunity, civil liability could theoretically
be provided in lieu of criminal sanctions for subabuse corporal punishment of chil-
dren. See Herman, supra note 2, at 44.
451. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 104; Anne T. Johnson, Criminal Liability for
Parents Who Fail to Protect, 5 LAW & INEQ. J. 359, 384-85 (1987); see also Zimring,
supra note 5, at 537-38 (noting that criminal law can be used as an instrument of
moral education if the law does not extend public tolerance for retributive effects too
far); cf Herman, supra note 2, at 44-45 (suggesting that only criminal sanctions for
corporally punishing a child would sufficiently convey the "moral wrongfulness" of
such a practice).
452. See Henry M. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 401, 403-10 (1958); Herman, supra note 2, at 44; Michael P. Rosenthal, Physi-
cal Abuse of Children by Parents: The Criminalization Decision, 7 AM. J. CRIM. L. 141,
146 (1979); Zimring, supra note 5, at 536; see also Hedman, supra note 435, at 896
(making this point in the context of environmental legislation).
453. See Herman, supra note 2, at 44.
454. See STRAUS, supra note 2, at 5.
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involving painful physical force, do not constitute criminal
conduct even though they may cause some mental pain to the
child.4 5' For example, the disciplinary tactic of "time out" may
cause and may be intended to cause mental pain but would not
come within the meaning of the statute because directing an
adult to sit quietly apart from others would not qualify as a
battery.
Fifth, the proposed statute requires that prosecutable use of
physical force must be for the purpose of "correct[ing], con-
trol[ling], or punish[ing] the child's behavior" in order clearly
to remove correction, control, and punishment as a defense. Of
course, jurisdictions that enact the new statute would need to
repeal any legislation making corporal punishment a defense
as well as any other inconsistent laws.
The above described draft statute is not woven from whole
cloth. In substance it embodies aspects of the approaches
adopted by those countries that have banned corporal
punishment of children. It will be recalled that Sweden,
Finland, Denmark, Norway, Austria, and Cyprus have each
enacted statutes specifically directed at prohibiting corporal
punishment of children;456 Italy has accomplished the same end
by judicial decision.457 Most of the statutes are civil prohibitions
without any mention of liability; but the fact is that in all of
these countries the statutory basis exists for subjecting
offenders to criminal prosecution for conduct that contravenes
these civil prohibitions.458 The draft statute simply integrates
the actual prohibition with the provision for criminal liability,
the same pattern followed by the Cypriot statute.459
It is true that bifurcating the prohibitory language from the
liability language has some advantages. It emphasizes the
pedagogical, exhoratory thrust of the prohibition and down-
plays the politically less palatable repercussive role of the law.
Nevertheless, combining the two may be preferable in the
United States as a format that is as familiar as it is unequivo-
cating, and, therefore, more accessible to the average
American. Ours, after all, is not a legal system that makes
laws merely to announce preferred policies without creating
adjunctive enforceable rights, duties, or liabilities.
455. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 144.
456. See supra notes 19-111 and accompanying text.
457. See supra notes 112-17, 119-38, 140-54 and accompanying text.
458. See supra notes 29, 56-60, 74, 82, 99-101, 111 and accompanying text.
459. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
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That the prohibition of corporal punishment would carry
with it criminal penalties would transmit the message that
such conduct is tantamount to and as intolerable as a battery
against an adult. Naturally, an offender could be prosecuted
under the new statute just as an offender could be prosecuted
under any other criminal statute. The existence of criminal
liability does not mean, though, that the main purpose of the
statute would be to prosecute or to work any immediate deter-
rence through the imposition of penalties. As in Minnesota and
the European countries that have banned corporal punishment
of children, 6 ° prosecutorial restraint probably would be the
most advisable policy. There is precedent in the United States
for such a policy with respect to, for example, minor assaults
and batteries committed on adults.46 1 A conservative prosecu-
torial strategy would take cognizance of the fact that the new
statute would proscribe what sometimes may be impulsive or
habitual behavior that may initially be difficult for adults to
control.
Such a strategy would also further important objectives
apart from effecting a curb on corporal punishment. In most
cases it may be anticipated that children will be key govern-
ment witnesses; yet, giving trial testimony can be traumatic
for children, especially if they are asked to testify against a
parent.162 Nor would it be politically acceptable or a wise use of
judicial resources to have the courts continually clogged with
armies of parents undergoing prosecution for corporally pun-
ishing their children. On balance, then, the primary value of
the proposed statute should be the pedagogic one of having the
460. See supra notes 19-154 and accompanying text.
461. See Richard S. Frase, The Decision to File Federal Criminal Charges: A Quan-
titative Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 246, 257 (1980); Herman,
supra note 2, at 43; James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94
HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1531 (1981).
462. See ATTORNEY GEN. TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, FINAL REPORT 38-39
(1984) [hereinafter ATTORNEY GEN., FINAL REPORT]; Mary Avery, The Child Abuse
Witness: Potential for Secondary Victimization, 7 CRIM. JUST. J. 1, 3-4 (1983); Douglas
J. Besharov, Child Abuse: Arrest and Prosecution Decision-Making, 24 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 315, 353 (1986); Michael H. Graham, Indicia of Reliability and Face to Face Con-
frontation: Emerging Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV.
19, 21, 67 (1985); Lucy McGough & Mark L. Hornsby, Reflections upon Louisiana's
Child Witness Videotaping Statute: Utility and Constitutionality in the Wake of Stin-
cer, 47 LA. L. REV. 1255, 1256-58 (1987). But see Desmond K. Runyan, The Emotional
Impact of Societal Intervention into Child Abuse, in CHILD VICTIMS, CHILD WITNESSES:
UNDERSTANDING AND IMPROVING TESTIMONY 263, 269-71 (Gail S. Goodman & Bette L.
Bottoms eds., 1993) (finding that the testimony of children in juvenile court can have
a salutary effect on the child witness).
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state serve notice, through the potentiality of prosecution, that
all corporal punishment of children must be avoided.
Even in those rare instances where prosecution is instituted
against parents for subabuse corporal punishment of their
children, the consequences of a guilty judgment need not nec-
essarily take the form of fines or incarceration. There may be
dispositions that are more conducive to family integrity and
peace. Indeed, in some jurisdictions, certain criminal offenses
occurring in the family milieu are often handled by means of
diversion, a solution thought to promote such social policy
ends.463 The idea behind diversion programs is to steer appro-
priate criminal defendants into rehabilitative services rather
than subjecting such defendants to the more punitive aspects
of the criminal justice system.4" Diversion would dovetail nicely
with the pedagogical aims of a prohibition on corporal punish-
ment of children by assisting offenders to acquire more
productive and humane parenting skills rather than by exacting
retribution. Criminalization of corporal punishment and diver-
sion may even reduce the number of prosecutions of parents
because, once such parenting skills become a legal necessity, the
incidence of child abuse and neglect may diminish as well.
Diversion of a case away from the regular course of the
criminal justice system may occur either before and in lieu of
trial, or after an adjudication or plea of guilty but before
sentencing. Pretrial diversion channels the accused into a
rehabilitative program after a complaint has been filed, such
that formal proceedings cease and diversion disposes of the
charges unless the accused does not comply with the program
or commits another crime.'6 Posttrial or postplea diversion
463. See ATTORNEY GEN., FINAL REPORT, supra note 462, at 36; Besharov, supra
note 462, at 355; Developments in the Law: Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106
HARV. L. REV. 1498, 1542-43 (1993) [hereinafter Legal Responses to Domestic Vio-
lence]; Johnson, supra note 451, 386-89; Kathleen Waits, The Criminal Justice
System's Response to Battering: Understanding the Problem, Forging the Solutions, 60
WASH. L. REv. 267, 325 (1985); Diane E. Reynolds, Note, The Use of Pretrial Diversion
Programs in Spouse Abuse Cases: A New Solution to an Old Problem, 3 OHIO ST. J. ON
DIsp. RESOL. 415, 426 (1988).
464. See ATTORNEY GEN., FINAL REPORT, supra note 462, at 35; Besharov, supra
note 462, at 354-55; Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, supra note 463, at 1541-
43; Melissa Hooper, When Domestic Violence Diversion Is No Longer an Option: What
to Do with the Female Offender, 11 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 168, 168 (1996); Reynolds,
supra note 463, at 422-24.
465. See ATTORNEY GEN., FINAL REPORT, supra note 462, at 35; RAYMOND T.
NIMMER, DIVERSION: THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF PROSECUTION 4-5
(1974); Besharov, supra note 462, at 355-56; Vorenberg, supra note 461, at 1531-32;
Waits, supra note 463, at 324-26; Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, supra note
463, at 1541-43; Reynolds, supra note 463, at 422-24.
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occurs after the accused has been found guilty and substitutes
a rehabilitative program for a more typical punitive sentence
or imposes a rehabilitative program as a condition of
probation."6 With respect to either type of diversion, failure to
successfully complete treatment should result in a resumption
of traditional criminal justice processes.""
In the context of prosecuting parents or other caregivers for
violating a criminal prohibition of subabusive corporal pun-
ishment of children, posttrial or postplea diversion would
appear to be the most attractive alternative. Pretrial diversion
has the distinct drawback that by effectively absolving the al-
leged perpetrator of any finding that he or she is guilty, the
message may be communicated to the community that corpo-
ral punishment is not as serious an offense as physically
attacking adults.48 While posttrial or postplea diversion could
convey the same message, 69 such diversion has the advantage
of allowing the judicial system to pronounce the defendant
criminally liable before diversion occurs. This pronouncement
packs more punch than pretrial diversion 410 while still taking
into account the interest in sparing families the practical and
emotional hardships that may ensue from fines or incarcera-
tion. However, in cases involving more persistent or egregious
corporal punishment of children even posttrial or postplea di-
version may not be a serious enough response, and more
orthodox, punitive sentences could be substituted.
Thus, there exists both a sound rationale for and an arguably
workable means of prohibiting subabuse corporal punishment of
children. But, answering the why and how questions still
leaves unaddressed the crucial issue of whether criminalizing
466. See ATTORNEY GEN., FINAL REPORT, supra note 462, at 35; Vorenberg, supra
note 461, at 1531; Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, supra note 463, at 1541-42.
467. See ATTORNEY GEN., FINAL REPORT, supra note 462, at 35; Lisa G. Lerman, A
Model State Act: Remedies for Domestic Abuse, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 61, 140-41
(1984); Waits, supra note 463, at 326.
468. See Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, supra note 463, at 1543; Reynolds,
supra note 463, at 427, 434; cf Hooper, supra note 464, at 170-71 (noting that because
pretrial diversion does not require the defendant to admit to any wrongdoing, diver-
sion may be seen merely as a means of expunging the defendant's criminal record).
469. See Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, supra note 463, at 1543.
470. See supra notes 439, 451-52, 468 and accompanying text; see also ATTORNEY
GEN., FINAL REPORT, supra note 462, at 36 (observing that criminal sentencing "can
strongly reenforce [sic] the message that [domestic] violence is a serious criminal
matter"); Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, supra note 463, at 1548 (intimating
that posttrial diversion is preferable to pretrial diversion in domestic violence cases
because under the former system the defendant has to admit guilt or have been found
guilty through adjudication).
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such punishment would harmonize with the American legal
system. This is, of course, a matter with which Europeans
were not confronted when they adopted their respective bans
on corporal punishment of children. It is, however, a decisive
consideration for Americans.
IV. ADDRESSING PROBLEMS RAISED UNDER THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION BY THE PROHIBITION OF
CORPORAL PUNISHMENT OF CHILDREN
That the prohibition of corporal punishment of children is
an expedient or even urgent palliative for many personal and
societal ills does not mean that it would also be legally viable
under more paramount law. The U.S. Constitution is supreme
such that no other laws may contravene its provisions and
survive judicial challenge.'71 It is therefore necessary to
analyze whether prohibition would be tolerable as a
constitutional matter.
The Constitution is silent on corporal punishment of
children. Nor has the U.S. Supreme Court ever characterized
such punishment as a constitutionally protected activity.72 The
Court has addressed the subject of corporal punishment of
children only with respect to its constitutional permissibility
in the schools. In Ingraham v. Wright,7 ' the petitioners
claimed, among other things, 7' that the paddling administered
471. The primacy of the U.S. Constitution derives from the Supremacy Clause,
which provides as follows:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803); 1
RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTrrUIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1.3, 1.4(a), 1.5 (2d ed. 1992).
472. See Sweaney v. Ada, 119 F.3d 1385, 1389-92 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that US.
Supreme Court precedent has not accorded parents a clearly established federal con-
stitutional right to corporally punish their children).
473. 430 US. 651 (1977) (5-4 decision).
474. Petitioners also claimed that the paddling contravened procedural and sub-
stantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment as well as under the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments. See Ingraham, 430 U.S.
at 658, 659 & n.12. The Court only decided the procedural due process and Eighth
Amendment claims. See id. at 659 & n.12, 664, 671, 682-83.
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as discipline by school personnel upon two junior high school
students constituted cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
The Court held that "the Eighth Amendment does not apply to
the paddling of children as a means of maintaining discipline
in public schools."'76 The Court's rationale was that the Eighth
Amendment's reach should be limited to criminal punishments
in keeping with the original intent behind the amendment.
7
The result is that elementary and secondary schools are not
forbidden by the Eighth Amendment from corporally
punishing students. States, however, are still permitted to ban
the practice from educational facilities. In fact, as of this
writing, at least twenty-three states have legislated such
prohibitions. 78
Prohibition of corporal punishment of children by parents or
other adults in the family circle does not lend itself to so tidy
an analysis. To the contrary, enactment of a prohibition of pa-
rental corporal punishment of children along the lines
described in Part III of this Article could raise at least four in-
terrelated problems under the federal Constitution. First, such
a prohibition arguably would violate parents' substantive due
process right to rear their children as the parents see fit. Sec-
ond, the prohibition could be viewed as violating parents' free
speech right to communicate with their children. Third, the
prohibition could be interpreted to constrict parents' right of
free exercise of religion insofar as physical chastisement is re-
ligiously based. Fourth, the prohibition may be regarded as
infringing familial constitutional privacy rights. As will be
475. The Eighth Amendment states that, "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII.
476. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 664.
477. See id. at 664-71. The decision in Ingraham appears somewhat odd when
considered in juxtaposition to Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992). In the latter
case, a prison inmate was beaten by security guards while he was handcuffed and
shackled. See id. at 4. The guards punched him in the mouth, eyes, chest, and stom-
ach, and kicked him from behind. See id. As a result, the victim suffered minor
bruises and swelling, some loosened teeth, and a crack in his partial dental plate. See
id. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit acknowledged the use of force to be
excessive but refused to rule for the prisoner because his injuries were "minor," re-
quiring no medical intervention. See id. at 5. The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the use of excessive force against a prisoner may constitute an Eighth Amend-
ment violation even though the prisoner's injuries (which must be more than de
minimis) are minor. See id. at 9-10. In contrast, a schoolchild who suffered injuries
requiring medical attention after being paddled over 20 times was denied an Eighth
Amendment claim in Ingraham: See 430 US. at 657.
478. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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shown, there is a unitary analytical solution 479 that is respon-
sive to and puts to rest each of these, or any other,
constitutional dilemmas. °
A. Identification of the Constitutional Problems
1. Substantive Due Process Concerns-The principle that,
by virtue of constitutional law, parents have the right to raise
their children in accordance with parental beliefs had its
inception in two cases decided in the 1920s, Meyer v.
Nebraska's and Pierce v. Society of Sisters.4! 2 In Meyer, a
parochial school teacher challenged a Nebraska statute
prohibiting the teaching of subjects in foreign languages or the
foreign languages themselves to private and public school
students who had not yet passed the eighth grade.4' The main
purpose of the statute was to foster civic development,
regardless of parental preferences, by limiting the education of
children in foreign languages before they had learned the
English language and American ideals."8 ' The Supreme Court
ruled that Nebraska's prohibition, as applied to this teacher,
violated the substantive due process doctrine that held sway
479. My colleague, Professor Michael Lawrence, has used the term "unitary
framework" in a manuscript on the negative Commerce Clause; my choice of the phra-
seology, "unitary analytical solution," in the text above may well have been influenced
by reading his work.
480. It may be apropos to point out here that school teachers could conceivably
raise two of the constitutional arguments described above against prohibiting corporal
punishment. That is, school teachers in general might argue that the prohibition im-
plicates their free speech rights while religious school teachers might argue that the
prohibition implicates their free exercise rights as well. Teachers' claims will not be
addressed separately from parents' claims because the logic of the unitary analytical
solution applies to banning corporal punishment in schools as well as in families. See
infra note 494 and accompanying text.
Indeed, Part IV of this Article is not intended as an exhaustive search for all possi-
ble constitutional obstacles to a ban on corporal punishment of children; rather, it is
hoped that by anticipating the more obvious constitutional objections this Part will
inspire or provoke further analysis of the issue. Given the controversial nature of the
proposed ban, the author is confident that other commentators will remedy any over-
sight in identifying additional constitutional barriers.
481. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
482. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
483. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 396-97.
484. See id. at 401.
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at the time.8 5 The Court found that the statute ran afoul of the
doctrine by interfering with the student's freedom to acquire
useful knowledge, the parents' right to direct the upbringing of
their offspring, the teacher's right to teach, and the parents'
and teacher's right to contract with each other for the latter's
instructional services. The Court indicated that such
interference with due process rights could only pass
constitutional muster if the interference was reasonably
related to some legitimate governmental end.487 The Court held
that the statute served no such end because Nebraska could
show no emergency necessitating that its residents have a
ready comprehension of political issues and because the
statute served no other real purpose.4 8
Two years later, in Pierce, the Supreme Court was con-
fronted with claims by two private schools that Oregon had
violated substantive due process in enacting a law that re-
quired most school-age children to attend public rather than
private schools. 4 9 The Court invalidated the law on the theory
that it was an arbitrary and unreasonable interference with
the private schools' clientele and was destructive of the
schools' property.4'90 The Court also offered as a rationale that,
"[u] nder the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska," the Oregon statute
485. See id. at 403. The Due Process Clause provides, in relevant part, "nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
In brief, substantive due process, as it was understood when Meyer was decided, is a
theory fashioned by the U.S. Supreme Court mainly to protect economic liberty rights,
such as the right to contract. Under the theory, states could not curtail protected eco-
nomic rights unless the curtailment represented an exercise of state police power in
the interest of the general welfare. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW §§ 8-2 to -4 (2d ed. 1988). The theory was in vogue during the so-called
Lochner era spanning 1897 to 1937. See id. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), for
which the era was named, typifies the Court's application of substantive due process at
the time. In Lochner, the Court struck down a state statute which prohibited bakers
from working more than 60 hours per week. See id. The Court's rationale was that the
law interfered with the liberty of bakers and their employers to contract under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See id. Both Meyer and Pierce involved
infringements of traditional economic liberty rights as well as a more unusual sub-
stantive due process liberty right to be free of government impediments in the
acquisition of private education according to parental preferences. See Meyer, 262 U.S.
at 399-400; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 533; see also Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Founda-
tions for a Right to Education Under the U.S. Constitution: A Beginning to the End of
the National Education Crisis, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 550, 580-81 (1992).
486. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-403.
487. See id. at 399-400.
488. See id. at 401-03.
489. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 530-31.
490. See id. at 536.
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"unreasonably interferes with the [substantive due process]
liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control."49' The Court expos-
tulated upon the Meyer doctrine: "The child is not the mere
creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his
destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize
and prepare him for additional obligations."492
Parents were not litigants in either Meyer or Pierce. Neither
case involved child rearing beyond parental decisions to obtain
private educational instruction for the children concerned.
These factors, taken in conjunction with the absence of analy-
sis of a parental child rearing right beyond a few conclusory
sentences, leave some question as to whether the parents' .in-
terests in Meyer and Pierce were necessarily integral to the
holdings in those cases. Arguably, any references in Meyer and
Pierce to the parental prerogative of child rearing are, strictly
speaking, dicta.4 93
Nevertheless, it may also be argued that the Court relied in
both cases upon a link between the actual plaintiff educators
and the affected parents such that restriction of the rights of
both were presented as interdependent and inextricable.4"
Indeed, a common view espoused. by the U.S. Supreme Court
and many commentators is that Meyer and Pierce posit in
parents a constitutional child rearing right4 -- even though the
491. Id. at 534-35.
492. Id. at 535.
493. See Andrew Jay Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power Among Infants, Their Par-
ents and the State, 4 FAM. L.Q. 409, 418 (1970); Francis Barry McCarthy, The
Confused Constitutional Status and Meaning of Parental Rights, 22 GA. L. REV. 975,
988-90, 992 (1988); see also Robert B. Keiter, Privacy, Children, and Their Parents:
Reflections on and Beyond the Supreme Court's Approach, 66 MINN. L. REV. 459, 488-
89 (1982) (suggesting that if parents' and children's interests were to collide, it is not
clear that Meyer and Pierce would reinforce parental prerogatives); cf Kearney, supra
note 5, at 12 (hypothesizing that Meyer and Pierce may only posit rights in parents to
make educational and religious choices for their children rather than positing a more
general right to rear children).
494. See McCarthy, supra note 493, at 986 & n.53.
495. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555, 564 (1996); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497
U.S. 417, 445-47 (1990); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505 (1977);
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); TRIBE, supra note 485, § 15-6; James G.
Dwyer, Parents' Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of Parents'
Rights, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1371, 1418 (1994); John H. Garvey, Child, Parent, State, and
the Due Process Clause: An Essay on the Supreme Court's Recent Work, 51 S. CAL. L.
REV. 769, 805-07 (1978); Kearney, supra note 5, at 14; Keiter, supra note 493, at 488-
89; Kay P. Kindred, God Bless the Child: Poor Children, Parens Patriae, and a State
Obligation to Provide Assistance, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 519, 525-26 (1996); Kleinfeld, supra
note 493, at 415-18; McCarthy, supra note 493, at 986, 991; Sharon Elizabeth Rush,
The Warren and Burger Courts on State, Parent, and Child Conflict Resolution: A
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particular brand of economic substantive due process from
which the right is derived has fallen by the wayside.496 This
view of parental rights is a current and prevalent one and,
therefore, is a force with which analysis must contend. It is
also a view likely to be invoked by opponents of a proposed ban
on parental corporal punishment of children. They, no doubt,
will argue that a parent's or guardian's use of corporal
punishment on his or her child is merely a facet of child
rearing; therefore if parents have a constitutional right to be
free of governmental interference in child rearing, then they
must also have a constitutional right to be free of such
interference in choosing the means of disciplining their
children.
2. First Amendment Concerns-Free Speech and Free
Exercise of Religion-Although the Court predicated its
decisions in Meyer and Pierce on the Due Process Clause and
has repeatedly located parental rights in that clause,97 some
writers are of the opinion that the child rearing right actually
may fit more modernly under the Free Speech Clause 9 . and/or
Free Exercise Clause' 9. of the First Amendment.500 The free
speech/free exercise theory is conceived as having two dimen-
sions. One dimension is a purported parental right to live life
through one's own children by using them as conduits for the
Comparative Analysis and Proposed Methodology, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 461, 462-63, 483,
486 (1985); Woodhouse, supra note 419, at 1042, 1090-91; Developments in the Law:
The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1351 (1980); Michael J. Min-
erva, Jr., Note, Grandparent Visitation: The Parental Privacy Right to Raise Their
"Bundle of Joy", 18 FLA. ST. U L. REv. 533, 541, 543-44, 548 (1991); Justin Witkin,
Note, A Time for Change: Reevaluating the Constitutional Status of Minors, 47 FLA. L.
REV. 113, 117-18 (1995). Some commentators have made the point that neither Meyer
nor Pierce involved factual situations in which children's interests were opposed to
those of their parents; thus, the effect of this precedent in relation to such situations
is uncertain. See Keiter, supra note 493, at 492; Kleinfeld, supra note 493, at 418.
496. See TRIBE, supra note 485, §§ 8-5 to -7; Keiter, supra note 493, at 489.
497. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 US. 110, 120-30 (1989); Santosky v. Kramer,
455 US. 745, 753-54 (1982); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-505
(1977); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). But see Woodhouse, supra note 416,
at 1857 (arguing that Michael H. "suggests an attenuation of the adult-centric, indi-
vidualist model" and "respects the child's-eye view").
498. The Free Speech Clause provides that "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
499. The Free Exercise Clause provides that "Congress shall make no law ...
prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]." Id.
500. See 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAx, supra note 471, § 18.26; TRIBE, supra note 485,
§ 15-6, at 1320; Garvey, supra note 495, at 806-07; McCarthy, supra note 493, at 989;
cf Woodhouse, supra note 419, at 1091, 1115 (indicating that the Meyer opinion over-
looked the religious freedom and free speech issues, but also noting that Meyer and
Pierce could lead to "vindication of First Amendment liberties").
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parents' secular and/or religious beliefs." ' The other dimension
involves a parental right to communicate or pass on such
beliefs to one's children for the latter's benefit.502
Opponents of a ban on corporal punishment thus may con-
tend that spanking and the like is expressive or symbolic
conduct protected from governmental intrusion by the First
Amendment.0" With respect to the Free Speech Clause, the
argument might be made that spanking is a way of communi-
cating to children that some of their behavior is un
acceptable," 4 thereby molding the child's conduct to parental
ideals and benefiting the child's maturation process. With re-
spect to the Free Exercise Clause, an argument might be
fashioned that since certain religions are thought by some to
condone parental corporal punishment of children,5 5 such
punishment is a way for parents to live by their religious be-
liefs and to transmit religiously based values to their young.
While there do not appear to be any relevant decisions by
the U.S. Supreme Court that deal with parents' right to engage
in free speech with their children, there are decisions by the
Court treating parents' free exercise rights vis-A-vis their
children.0 6 The Court upheld the parents' claim in only one of
these cases-Wisconsin v. Yoder.5" In Yoder, Old Order Amish
parents were convicted under and subsequently challenged
that portion of a Wisconsin compulsory education statute that
required parents to send their children to a public or private
school for an additional two years after the eighth grade. °s
501. See Garvey, supra note 495, at 806; Woodhouse, supra note 419, at 1114-15.
502. See Garvey, supra note 495, at 806-07.
503. See 4 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 471, § 20.48 (noting that the U.S. Su-
preme Court has long recognized that speech may be nonverbal or symbolic); TRIBE,
supra note 485, § 12-7.
504. See Garvey, supra note 495, at 781-82 (suggesting that spankings are "not for
retribution, but rather for providing information").
505. See DOBSON, supra note 349, at 235; FUGATE, supra note 352, at 79, 83-84,
105-21; GREVEN, supra note 350, at 46-49; LESSIN, supra note 352, at 21-30. But see
STEPHEN J. BAVOLEK, RED, WHITE & BRUISES: SPANKING IN THE US.A. 4-5 (1994)
(contending that the Bible may be interpreted as not supporting physical chastise-
ment of children); SEARS & SEARS, supra note 1, at 150-51 (concluding that "nowhere
in the Bible does it say you must spank your child to be a godly parent"); Adah
Maurer & James Wallerstein, The Bible and the Rod (last modified Nov. 16, 1997)
<http://silcon.com/-ptave/maurer3.htm> (making the case that the Bible may be un-
derstood to disapprove of corporal punishment of children).
506. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 US.
158 (1944); Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hospital, 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D.
Wash. 1967), affd mem., 390 U.S. 598 (1968).
507. 406 US. 205 (1972).
508. See id. at 207-08.
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These Amish parents feared "that by sending their children to
high school, they would not only expose themselves to the
danger of the censure of the church community, but ... also
endanger their own salvation and that of their children.""°9
This fear had its roots in the Older Order Amish's literal
interpretation of biblical commands to live apart from the
world and worldly influences.510
The Court characterized the Amish parents' refusal to allow
their children to partake of state sanctioned secondary
schooling as religiously based parental conduct within the pro-
tection of the Free Exercise Clause. " According to the Court
this is the type of conduct that comes within the "charter of
the rights of parents to direct the religious upbringing of their
children" as announced in Pierce."2 Because Wisconsin could
not show that the Amish parents' religiously based conduct in
relation to their children's education would "jeopardize the.
health or safety of the child, or have a potential for significant
social burdens,"51 the Yoder Court held that the Free Exercise
Clause prevented Wisconsin from forcing the Amish parents to
send their children to a formal high school. "
There are aspects of Yoder that make it a likely source of
precedent for the arguments of litigious parents who would
object to prohibition of corporal punishment of children for
religious reasons. Parents who wish to spank may argue that,
like the Amish, they are engaged in religiously based conduct
with which government is trying to interfere;515 in fact, both
the Amish and many parents who spank for religious reasons
rely upon a literal interpretation of the Bible as authority for
their conduct.51 It should be noted, though, that in spite of the
509. Id. at 209.
510. See id. at 216-17.
511. See id. at 219-20.
512. Id. at 233 (referring to Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)).
513. Id. at 234.
514. See id. In Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 n.1 (1990), the
Court, in dictum, described Yoder as a case that involves both the Free Exercise
Clause and the substantive due process liberty interest of parents to direct the up-
bringing and education of their children. See 4 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 471,
§ 21.6, at 526.
515. See infra note 520 and accompanying text.
516. The Bible contains repeated references to parents' use of the rod on children.
A few examples follow: "A Father who spares the rod hates his son, but one who loves
him keeps him in order." Proverbs 13:24 (The New English Bible, Oxford Univ. Press
& Cambridge Univ. Press 1970). "Do not withhold discipline from a boy; take the stick
to him, and save him from death." Proverbs 23:13 (New English Bible). "Rod and rep-
rimand impart wisdom, but a boy who runs wild brings shame on his mother."
Proverbs 29:15 (New English Bible).
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analogy, Yoder will also prove problematic for those who wish
to marshall it for such purposes. In reaching its holding, the
majority made clear that the Court did not have before it a
situation where parents' and children's interests were at
loggerheads.517 If the decision is properly limited to its facts,58
pro-corporal punishment parents would arguably be able to
profit from Yoder only if they could show that their children
did not oppose receiving corporal punishment.
Another difficulty is that Yoder is legally aberrational. Yoder
represents a break with the Supreme Court's longstanding
observance of what some have seen as a belief/conduct
dichotomy in its Free Exercise Clause cases whereby religious
beliefs are accorded constitutional protections that are usually
denied to religiously motivated conduct burdened by laws of
general applicability.51 9 The fate of litigants favoring parental
corporal punishment would thus depend upon the Court's
517. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 230-32. Justice Douglas dissented in Yoder because,
among other reasons, the majority failed to consider the rights of those respondents'
children whose religious views in relation to high school education had not been can-
vassed. See id. at 241-46 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
518. See 4 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 471, § 21.8, at 548 (stating that in the
absence of "an actual case involving ... a parent-child conflict, the Court refused to
decide if the state's interest in the child would allow the government to require a par-
ent to send a child to school at the child's request over the religious objections of the
parent"); William E. Brigman, Circumcision as Child Abuse: The Legal and Constitu-
tional Issues, 23 J. FAM. L. 337, 354 (1984-85); Matt Steinberg, Note, Free Exercise of
Religion: The Conflict Between a Parent's Rights and a Minor Child's Right in Deter-
mining the Religion of the Child, 34 J. FAM. L. 219, 231 (1995-96); Robert M. O'Boyle,
Comment, Voluntary Minor Mental Patients: A Realistic Balancing of the Competing
Interests of Parent, Child, and State, 37 SW. L.J. 1179, 1190 (1984) (noting that the
Yoder majority opinion cannot be understood to reach the situation where children's
and parents' interests are antagonistic). But see Dwyer, supra note 495, at 1387
(interpreting Yoder as taking the position that parents' free exercise rights trump any
conflicting interests of their children). Yoder may also be "read to limit parental rights
over education largely to the Amish." David M. Smolin, The Jurisprudence of Privacy
in a Splintered Supreme Court, 75 MARQ. L. REv. 975, 1014 (1992).
519. See Joanne C. Brant, Not a Prayer for Curricular Reform After Lee v. Weis-
man, 43 CAsE W. RES. L. REv. 753, 754 & n.4 (1993); Marci A. Hamilton, The
Belief/Conduct Paradigm in the Supreme Court's Free Exercise Jurisprudence: A Theo-
logical Account of the Failure to Protect Religious Conduct, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 713, 722, 731,
750-52, 771 (1993); Ralph D. Mawdsley, Has Wisconsin v. Yoder Been Reversed? Analysis
of Employment Division v. Smith, 63 ED. L. REP. 11, 13 (1990); see also 4 ROTUNDA &
NOWAK, supra note 471, § 21.6, at 526 (summarizing that except for Yoder and cases
dealing with unemployment compensation laws, "the Supreme Court during the 1963-
1990 balancing era ruled in favor of the government in every case in which an individual
sought a free exercise clause exemption from a government regulation of the actions of
persons within its jurisdiction" (emphasis added)). But see TRIBE, supra note 485, § 14-13,
at 1262 (concluding that the belieffconduct dichotomy 'is not generally helpful in illumi-
nating the cases"). Professor Hamilton has stated that "Wisconsin v. Yoder is the single
free exercise case that attempts to break through the belief/conduct paradigm.' Hamil-
ton, supra, at 756.
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willingness to depart again from its dichotomous precedent to
extend the compass of the clause to conduct. 20  As a
consequence, while adherents of corporal punishment in the
home will naturally gravitate to Yoder as constitutional
authority for their position against governmental prohibition,
their reliance, while not exactly misplaced, will be complicated
by Yoder's factual and legal peculiarities.
3. Family Privacy Concerns-Advocates of corporal
punishment of children may also claim that a prohibition of
parental discretion to mete out such punishment will invade
constitutionally protected family privacy rights. They would
presumably argue that parental choice of punishment, within
the bounds of "reasonableness," is a private family matter in
which the state cannot constitutionally interfere without a
compelling reason. Meyer52' and Pierce22 are considered to be
the U.S. Supreme Court's earliest pronouncements of familial
privacy rights5 as well as of the parental child rearing right.
Later, in Griswold v. Connecticut,52  a case involving a
challenge to a statute prohibiting the use or abetment of the
use of contraceptives by married couples, the Court more
explicitly articulated the right to privacy as a function of
"penumbras" and "emanations" of various amendments to the
Constitution.5 2  Because of its factual posture involving
claimed rights of married partners, Griswold is commonly
520. Such litigants might benefit from the atmosphere created by Congress' reau-
thorization and amendment of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act so as to
include a rather obtuse section protecting parents from any federal requirement to pro-
vide their child with medical intervention that would be against the parents' religious
beliefs. See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-235, Title I, § 113(a)(1)(C), 110 Stat. 3064, 3079 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 5106i
(West Supp. 1997)). The statute also provides, among other things, that it may not be
construed to require a state to find or to prohibit a state from finding abuse or neglect
when a parent relies upon "spiritual means rather than medical treatment" in relation to
the health needs of the child. Id.
521. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 US. 390 (1923).
522. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 US. 510 (1925).
523. See 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 471, § 18.26, at 299; Marcia Mobilia Bou-
ril, Dispensing Birth Control in Public Schools: Do Parents Have a Right to Know?, 18
SETON HALL L. REv. 356, 364-65 (1988); Naomi R. Calm, Civil Images of Battered
Women: The Impact of Domestic Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV.
1041, 1083 & n.226 (1991); Garvey, supra note 495, at 805-06; Mark Hardin, Legal Barri-
ers in Child Abuse Investigations: State Powers and Individual Rights, 63 WASH. L. REV.
493, 531 & n.159 (1988); cf TRIBE, supra note 485, § 11-3 (referring to Meyer and Pierce
as within the line of cases setting the stage for later decisions upholding privacy rights).
524. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
525. See id. at 481-86. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Douglas found a right
to marital privacy within the zone of privacy located in penumbras created by emana-
tions from the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments. See id. at 484.
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thought to have tied the privacy right to the family.5 21
According to some commentators, subsequent Supreme Court
cases developing the right to privacy have further manifested
a "constitutional right in family relationships"5 27 as a function
of substantive due process" or equal protection analysis.529
526. See Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family, 67 TUL. L.
REV. 955, 970 (1993); Janet L. Dolgin, The Family in Transition: From Griswold to
Eisenstadt and Beyond, 82 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1558 (1994); Yao Apasu-Gbotsu et al., Proj-
ect, Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context of Homosexual
Activity, 40 U MIAMI L. REV. 521, 569-70 (1986). But see June Aline Eichbaum, To-
wards an Autonomy-Based Theory of Constitutional Privacy: Beyond the Ideology of
Familial Privacy, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 361, 372-73 (1979) (opining that the
Griswold opinion was ambiguous as to whether the privacy right applies to the mari-
tal institution or to the choice of individuals alone); Jane Rutherford, Beyond
Individual Privacy: A New Theory of Family Rights, 39 U. FLA. L. REv. 627, 635 (1987)
(seeing Griswold as "paving the road to individual choice").
527. 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 471, § 18.28, at 313. See Boumil, supra note
523, at 364; Cahn, supra note 523, at 1083 & n.226; Marsha Garrison, Child Welfare
Decisionmaking: In Search of the Least Drastic Alternative, 75 GEO. L.J. 1745, 1771
n.116 (1987); Hardin, supra note 523, at 531; Keiter, supra note 493, at 465, 508; Kin-
dred, supra note 495, at 526; Page McGuire Linden, Drug Addiction During
Pregnancy: A Call for Increased Social Responsibility, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 105,
125-26 (1995); Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 835, 847-48 (1985); Alicia C. Klyman, Comment, Family Law-
Hawk v. Hawk: Grandparent Visitation Rights-Court Protects Parental Privacy
Rights over "Child's Best Interests, 24 MEMPHIS ST. U L. REv. 413, 420 (1994); Ann H.
Zgrodnik, Comment, Smoking Discrimination: Invading an Individual's Right to Pri-
vacy in the Home and Outside the Workplace?, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 1227, 1250-51
(1995).
528. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 US. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion). Jus-
tice Scalia, joined by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist,
found that, in view of the historical sanctity of the unitary family, the unwed biologi-
cal father of a child born in wedlock has no substantive due process liberty interest in
a parental relationship with the child even though he has previously maintained such
a relationship with the child. See id. at 124. Justice Stevens, concurring, assumed for
purposes of deciding the case that the unwed biological father has a due process lib-
erty interest in maintaining a personal relationship with the child. See id. at 133.
Justice Brennan, who was joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, and Justice
White, all dissenting, opined that the unwed biological father has a substantive due
process liberty interest in a parental relationship with the child. See id. at 142-43,
160; see also, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 US. 745, 753, 754 n.7, 758, 766, 768-70
(1982) (holding that a fair preponderance of the evidence standard for governmental
termination of parental rights violates procedural due process because such a low
standard interferes with natural parents' fundamental liberty interest in the care and
custody of their own children); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498-506
(1977) (ruling that an ordinance which limits occupancy of a dwelling unit only to
certain relatives and not to others violates the substantive due process liberty to
make personal choices in matters of family life).
529. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 381-82, 388-89, 394 (1979) (holding
that a state law violates the Equal Protection Clause because it denies to unwed fa-
thers the same opportunity as was given to unwed mothers to block adoption of their
children by withholding consent); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 537-38 (1973) (per
curiam) (ruling that under the Equal Protection Clause a state may not deny illegiti-
mate children a judicially enforceable right to support from their biological fathers
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"The integrity of the family unit has found protection in the
Due Process Clause ... the Equal Protection Clause ... and
the Ninth Amendment."530
Or at least that is one point of view. Other commentators
have taken the position that post-Griswold privacy cases link
the privacy right to the individual more comfortably than to
the family.53" ' In support of this thesis, they commonly refer to
cases such as Eisenstadt v. Baird3 and Roe v. Wade,5 33 among
others.5" In Eisenstadt, the Supreme Court struck down on
equal protection grounds a state statute that prohibited
distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons while
permitting distribution to married persons.535 The Court
thereby imbued individuals, apart from their families, with the
right to privacy, saying that "[ilf the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual ... to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to
bear or beget a child."53 In Roe, the Court held that each
woman, regardless of marital status, has a qualified right to
an abortion as part of her constitutional privacy rights.537 It
may be anticipated that this individualistic orientation will
not deter pro-corporal punishment parents from seeking
support in the privacy right precedents; but an argument
based on family privacy, at the possible expense of an
while granting that right to legitimate children); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658
(1972) (deciding that the state's denial to unwed fathers of the hearing on fitness ac-
corded to all other parents whose custody of their children is challenged constitutes a
violation of equal protection principles).
530. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651 (citation omitted). See S. Randall Humm, Comment,
Criminalizing Poor Parenting Skills as a Means to Contain Violence by and Against
Children, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1123, 1127-28 (1991) ("The due process and equal protec-
tion clauses of the fourteenth amendment, and the ninth amendment each provide the
family unit with protection from unwarranted state intrusion.")
531. See TRIBE, supra note 485, §§ 15-1 to -3, 15-20 to -21, at 1302-12, 1414-35;
Dolgin, supra note 526, at 1543-46, 1554-55, 1558, 1569-70; cf Apasu-Gbotsu et al.,
supra note 526, at 566, 580-89 (analyzing the Supreme Court's privacy cases as capa-
ble of being understood to recognize a right of personal autonomy).
532. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
533. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
534. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Planned Par-
enthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
535. See Eisenstadt, 405 US. at 443, 453-55.
536. Id. at 453.
537. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-55. Complainant Jane Roe was single at the time of
the Roe litigation. See id. at 120.
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individual child's conflicting claim to bodily privacy, may
appear dated and awkward even on its own terms."8
B. The Analytical Solution to the Constitutional Problems
It is not an oversimplification to suggest that there is a sin-
gle analytical solution to each of the identified constitutional
arguments against the criminalization of corporal punishment
of children. A unitary solution should suffice because the four
constitutional arguments described above all suffer from the
same defect. They assume that since corporal punishment is
carried out by parents within the family setting and since such
punishment has not already been made illegal in most states,
then it must have a constitutional dimension. This reasoning
ignores the possibility that corporal punishment of children is
so inimical to humane values that it has no place in a civilized
society's constitution.
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled in Free Speech Clause
cases that physical assaults and violence are not "by any
stretch of the imagination expressive conduct protected by the
First Amendment."539 These cases arose in extrafamilial factual
538. There are readers who would probably respond that an attempt by pro-
corporal punishment parents to rely on family privacy rights would be neither dated
nor awkward in light of Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). In Hardwick, Mi-
chael Hardwick, a homosexual who had been charged under a Georgia statute
criminalizing consensual sodomy, brought suit in federal court claiming that the stat-
ute unconstitutionally infringed his right to privacy. See id. at 187-91. The Court
rejected his claim, holding that the Constitution does not confer a right to privacy that
encompasses homosexual sodomy. See id. at 190-95. The Court refused to extend the
right to privacy cases so far because, among other reasons, "[n]o connection between
family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other
has been demonstrated.. .. "Id. at 191. This characterization of earlier decisions has
led some analysts to conclude that the Hardwick Court was breathing new life into
the family privacy doctrine. See Elvia Rosales Arriola, Sexual Identity and the Consti-
tution: Homosexual Persons as a Discrete and Insular Minority, 14 WOMEN'S RS. L.
REP. 263, 267-68 (1992); Dailey, supra note 526, at 980. But see Dolgin, supra note
526, at 1569-70 (intimating that Hardwick merely revived the rhetoric of family pri-
vacy jurisprudence); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 762
(1989) (suggesting that Hardwick can be understood as championing self-definition by
the legislating community).
539. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993) (unanimous decision). In
Mitchell, an African-American was convicted of aggravated battery against a Cauca-
sian. See id. at 479-80. Defendant's sentence was enhanced under a Wisconsin statute
that provided for enhancement where the defendant chose a victim because of the
latter's race. See id. at 480. Defendant challenged the constitutionality of the statute
under the First Amendment, claiming, among other things, that the statute penalized
him for his bigoted thoughts rather than for his assaultive conduct. See id. at 481-83.
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situations, but the basic principle should not change simply
because the violence occurs at the direction of adults within
the family. If it were otherwise, then the law of domestic rela-
tions could not prohibit husbands from physically chastising
their wives 540 or prohibit parents from committing child
abuse."' Yet no one would think of proposing in this day and
age that husbands and parents should be privileged to engage
in this type of aggression by operation of the Due Process
Clause, the Free Speech Clause, the Free Exercise Clause or,
for that matter, any other provision of the Constitution. Like
wife beating and child abuse, corporal punishment of children
is so egregious in its effects and so ethically unpalatable that
it should be outside the definitional parameters of child rear-
ing, religious or other expression, or family privacy.54 It follows
that if corporal punishment is no part of any constitutional
right, legislatures may prohibit it without showing a compel-
ling interest or any other justification beyond what rational
legislative discretion and wisdom dictates."3
The Supreme Court held that Wisconsin could constitutionally single out for en-
hancement "bias-inspired conduct" because it inflicts greater harm than other
assaultive conduct. See id. at 487-88. Integral to the Court's holding is the idea that
the defendant's belief system motivating the violent act could not transform the vio-
lence into expressive conduct protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment. That is why the Court could conclude that Wisconsin's statute merely
.aimed at conduct unprotected by the First Amendment." Id. at 487; accord NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916-18 (1982); see also Daniel A. Farber, Fore-
word: Hate Speech After R.A.V, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 889, 897 (1992) (opining
that "physical assaults are wholly outside the First Amendment"); cf. Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 792-93 n.2 (1986)
(White, J., dissenting) (stating that parents' substantive due process liberty to raise
their children should not be understood to extend to assaults committed upon children
by their parents).
540. See supra note 427 and accompanying text.
541. See 2 DONALD T. KRAMER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN §§ 16.02-04 (2d ed.
1994); Besharov, supra note 462, at 323-24; Johnson, supra note 451, at 365-68; Gib-
bons, supra note 32, at 119.
542. See Part III of this Article for a full discussion of the deleterious effects of
corporal punishment of children. These effects indicate that corporal punishment's
inclusion as any part of child rearing, free expression, free exercise of religion, or fam-
ily privacy is seriously misplaced. Moreover, in relation to the free exercise of religion,
it should be pointed out that not all commentators think that the Bible mandates
corporal punishment of children. See supra note 352 and accompanying text. See
GREVEN, supra note 350, at 50-54; MAURER & WALLERSTEIN, supra note 505; SEARS &
SEARS, supra note 1, at 150-51; cf PETER J. GOMES, THE GOOD BOOm READING THE
BIBLE WITH MIND AND HEART 33-51 (1996) (observing that the Bible necessarily is
open to interpretation but that there is a danger of "an idolatry of scripture," which
includes worshipping the text over the spirit of the Bible and conforming the Bible's
meaning to prevailing culture).
543. Of course, the conclusion that corporal punishment of children "is no part of
any constitutional right" obviates the need for discussion as to whether a law
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This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the U.S. Su-
preme Court has not held that under the Constitution familial
or parent-child relations must be free of all and any govern-
mental regulation.5" In the Court's view, some governmental
interference with each individual's personal liberty is the only
means of avoiding anarchy. The Court has stated:
But the liberty secured by the Constitution of the United
States to every person within its jurisdiction does not im-
port an absolute right in each person to be, at all times
and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint.
There are manifold restraints to which every person is
necessarily subject for the common good. On any other
basis organized society could not exist with safety to its
members. Society based on the rule that each one is a law
unto himself would soon be confronted with disorder and
anarchy. Real liberty for all could not exist under the op-
eration of a principle which recognizes the right of each
individual person to use his own, whether in respect of his
person or his property, regardless of the injury that may
be done to others.
545
The Court has reiterated this principle in the parent-child con-
text, acknowledging "that the state has a wide range of power
criminalizing such punishment should be held to a compelling interest standard in
order to survive judicial scrutiny. This standard is only applicable when legislation
impacts upon a fundamental constitutional right. See generally 2 ROTUNDA & NOwAK,
supra note 471, § 15.7 (describing the compelling interest standard and the increased
level of scrutiny in fundamental rights cases); 3 id. § 18.3 (describing the standards of
review and illustrating the heightened standard used in fundamental rights cases).
544. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 285-87 (1990)
(upholding a Missouri requirement that family members-in this case, parents-
prove by clear and convincing evidence that an incompetent person would wish
withdrawal of life support); Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27-34
(1981) (holding that the Due Process Clause cannot be understood to require the
appointment of counsel for indigent parents in every parental termination
proceeding); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604 (1979) (stating that parents do not have
absolute and unreviewable discretion to institutionalize a child); Gomez v. Perez, 409
U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (per curiam) (ruling that a state may not deny illegitimate
children the judicially enforceable right to support from their natural fathers when
the state gives that right to legitimate children); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 169-71 (1944) (upholding a Massachusetts statute prohibiting a child from street
preaching in company with her custodial aunt); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S.
11, 30-34 (1905) (commenting upon state statutes that require vaccination of children
as proper exercises of the police power); see also Keiter, supra note 493, at 485
(remarking that the Court does not appear to embrace the idea of absolute parental
authority over the child's life).
545. Jacobson, 197 US. at 26.
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for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting
the child's welfare,"5 6 and that "the family itself is not beyond
regulation in the public interest."u7
In fact, states routinely legislate so as to further child
welfare by directing parents to engage in or to desist from
engaging in various kinds of conduct. For instance, there are
state laws requiring parents to have their children
vaccinated' and to provide their children with state-approved
education,' 9 as well as laws prohibiting parental child abuse.55°
There are also laws governing when children may drive, drink,
vote, contract, or marry.55' The Supreme Court has acknowl-
edged the government's inherent parens patriae power to
intervene in the family and restrict parental conduct so as to
protect children's well-being.552 Indeed, governmental regulation
of the parent-child relationship is accepted practice in the
United States.553 That some child protection laws have on
occasion been the subject of successful constitutional
challenges by parents does not obviate the fact that extensive
regulation of the family continues to coexist with parental or
familial constitutional interests.
Nor have parents always prevailed when they have chosen
to litigate the constitutionality of such regulations. Rather, the
546. Prince, 321 U.S. at 167.
547. Id. at 166.
548. See 2 KRAMER, supra note 541, § 24.08, at 451 (stating that "many states im-
pose the ... requirement that a child be immunized against smallpox, rubeola
(German measles), and other communicable diseases as a precondition to being ad-
mitted to school").
549. See id. § 24.04 (discussing the rights of states to set educational standards);
Bitensky, supra note 485, at 551 & n.6 (stating that every state has laws mandating
school attendance for certain ages).
550. See 2 KRAMER, supra note 541, §§ 16.02 to 16.22.
551. See McCarthy, supra note 493, at 1012 & n.143.
552. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (noting that the state
"may restrict the parent's control by requiring school attendance, regulating or pro-
hibiting the child's labor and in many other ways"); see also John E.B. Myers, The
Child, Parents and the State, in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS IN AMERICA: U.N. CONVENTION ON
THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD COMPARED WITH UNITED STATES LAW 87, 90 (1990) (pointing
to Supreme Court language indicating limitations on parental rights); Johnson, supra
note 463, at 363; Keiter, supra note 493, at 488. See generally Thomas, supra note 408,
at 313-23, 326 (discussing the role of parens patriae).
553. See Woodhouse, supra note 419, at 1038-41, for a concise review of the his-
tory of governmental regulation of the child-parent relationship. See also DAVID
ARCHARD, CHILDREN: RIGHTS AND CHILDHOOD 151 (1993) (observing that in every
society "there is always some limit set to acceptable rearing practices"); Wald, supra
note 419, at 262 (mentioning that every state has adopted minimal standards for par-
enting); Humm, supra note 530, at 1129 (referring to the established governmental
authority to intervene in the family to protect children from abuse).
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Court has opted for a flexible approach that assesses, as a
threshold matter, whether parents or guardians are claiming a
bona fide constitutional right. For example, although in Wis-
consin v. Yoder the Court upheld Amish parents' Free Exercise
Clause challenge, 5 the Court took an entirely different view of
the Free Exercise Clause claim of a child's custodian in Prince
v. Massachusetts.5"5 In Prince, the custodial aunt of a nine-year-
old permitted the child to accompany her on the streets where
they attempted to distribute Jehovah's Witnesses' publica-
tions.55 The aunt was charged with violating a Massachusetts
child labor law that forbade such conduct; she asserted, among
other things, that the state law abridged her and her niece's
right to free exercise of religion.557 She also claimed that the
state law unconstitutionally interfered with the Meyer-Pierce
parental child rearing right under the Due Process Clause.55 8
The Court, however, collapsed the latter claim into the former
for the reason that, in this instance, the due process claim only
extended as far as the free exercise claim. 59
The Court noted that counterpoised against these claims
stood society's interests in protecting the welfare of children." °
The State's interest, said the Court, was "no mere corporate
concern of official authority," but, rather, was "the interest of
youth itself, and of the whole community, that children be both
safeguarded from abuses and given opportunities for growth
into free and independent well-developed men and citizens."56 '
The Court found that the child's street preaching, even under
the supervision of her aunt, was dangerous.562 Not only would
it create the same sorts of difficult situations that adult
propagandizing may produce, but it might cause "emotional
excitement and psychological or physical injury" to the child .5
As such, the child's street preaching was not and could not be a
part of the First Amendment5 "right to practice religion
554. See supra notes 506-14 and accompanying text.
555. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
556. See id. at 161-62.
557. See id. at 160-61, 164. The aunt also claimed that the state law denied her
and her niece equal protection of the laws, an argument not germane to the discussion
in the text of this Article. See id. at 160.
558. See id. at 164.
559. See id. at 164 n.8.
560. See id. at 165.
561. Id.
562. See id. at 169-70.
563. Id.
564. See id. at 170.
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freely."5 5 On this basis the Court held that the state child labor
law, as applied to the aunt and her ward, did not violate the
Free Exercise Clause.56 Although the Court did not explicitly
say so, necessarily this meant that the state law also did not
violate the aunt's substantive due process child rearing right."7
Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hospital5 is similarly
instructive. In this case, the plaintiffs were adult and minor
Jehovah's Witnesses, suing on behalf of themselves and as a
class action on behalf of Jehovah's Witnesses in the state of
Washington.56 9  The plaintiffs alleged that Washington's
Juvenile Court Law was unconstitutional in allowing medical
care providers and judicial personnel to obtain court orders
removing the children of Jehovah's Witnesses from the custody
of their parents when the latter refused, on medical, religious
or other personal grounds, to consent to blood transfusions for
their children who had been placed in the care of a physician.7
Although plaintiffs invoked several constitutional provisions as
the basis for their challenge,571 the three-judge district court
only addressed the plaintiffs' arguments under two provisions:
the Free Exercise Clause and the Due Process Clause insofar as
the latter bears on substantive parental rights.572
The plaintiffs' contention under the Free Exercise Clause
was that as Jehovah's Witnesses they understood literally the
Bible's command that Christians must "'abstain from
blood.'"573 To these Jehovah's Witnesses, the command meant
that they and their offspring must refrain from receiving blood
565. Id. at 166.
566. See id. at 170. The Court also held that the challenged state laws did not
violate equal protection principles. See id. at 170-71.
The Prince Court noted that its holding was limited to the facts of the case. See id.
at 171. This does not mean, however, that Free Exercise Clause claims can only be
overridden when the religious expression or conduct occurs on the streets or in other
places frequented by the general public. Cf Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 US. 872
(1990) (holding that Oregon did not violate the Free Exercise Clause by denying un-
employment compensation benefits to employees fired for ingesting peyote for
sacramental purposes at a ceremony of the Native American Church of which the
employees were members).
567. See supra text accompanying notes 557-59.
568. 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967) (three-judge district court), affid mem.,
390 U.S. 598 (1968).
569. See id. at 499.
570. See id. at 499-500.
571. See id. at 500-01. Plaintiffs invoked their First Amendment rights of associa-
tion and free exercise of religion as well as the First Amendment's Establishment
Clause; they also claimed, among other things, that they had been denied rights of
family privacy and equal protection. See id. at 500-01.
572. See id. at 504-05.
573. Id. at 502 & n.8 (quotingActs of the Apostles 15:20 and Leviticus 17:10).
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transfusions or they would face spiritual harm.574 They also
argued that as parents they had the right to select medical
treatment for their children."5 In plaintiffs' view, the Washing-
ton Juvenile Court Law thwarted Jehovah's Witness parents
from living by these religious beliefs and exercising parental
authority over medical decisions affecting their children.
76
The district court ruled that the Supreme Court's holding in
Prince applied so as to require that the Washington law be up-
held as a "state intervention in the name of health and
welfare."5 7 The court reasoned that the free exercise and pa-
rental child rearing rights do not include the right to expose
children to illness or to make martyrs of them.5"8 The Supreme
Court affirmed the district court's judgment in a memorandum
disposition.579
Thus, Prince and Jehovah's Witnesses exemplify the Court's
willingness to put to one side plaintiffs' characterizations of
the constitutional status of parental directives and to assess
for itself whether those directives are given by constitutional
right. The Court has not shied from repudiating that
constitutional status where parental conduct would be likely
to impair a child's psychological or physical well-being.8 ° Nor
574. See id. at 502.
575. See id. at 501.
576. See id. at 501-02.
577. Id. at 504-05.
578. See id. at 504.
579. See Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 390 US. 598 (1968) (mem.).
580. It should be noted that the Prince Court expressly limited its holding to the
facts of that case. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 US. 158, 171 (1944). Nevertheless,
Prince still stands as a testament to the fact that the Supreme Court may approve of
state interference to protect children even when parents argue the Constitution
against that intervention. Indeed, the district court invoked Prince for precisely this
purpose in Jehovah's Witnesses, 278 F. Supp. at 504-05. See also Parham v. J.R., 442
U.S. 584, 604 (1979) (stating in dicta that constitutional parental child rearing rights
do not give parents an absolute and unreviewable discretion to institutionalize a
child). But see Dwyer, supra note 495, at 1382 (detecting a hint in Prince that "some
lesser harm" may legally befall children when they are included in their parents' free
exercise activities); Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Chil-
dren's Perspectives and the Law, 36 ARiz. L. REv. 11, 37-38 (1994) (placing parental
power to administer corporal punishment within the parents' constitutional child
rearing right).
It is also interesting to note in this connection that in some of the cases involving
the constitutionality of state imposed parental consent as a prerequisite to a minor's
decision to obtain an abortion, the Court has favored the minor's interest over that of
the parents. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 US. 622, 642-51 (1979) (plurality opinion);
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 72-75 (1976). But see Planned Parent-
hood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899-900, 970-71 (1992) (plurality opinion) (upholding a
parental consent provision). However, these cases are inapposite to a discussion of the
constitutionality of governmental prohibition of corporal punishment of children be-
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is there any reason why this approach should be limited to
claims only under the Free Exercise or Due Process Clauses.
As was mentioned previously, the Court has refused to protect
violent behavior under the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment."' If the use of violence against children, even in
the name of discipline, would compromise their well-being,
then Prince, Jehovah's Witnesses, and the free speech cases
teach that parental claims of a right to engage in such conduct
should fail no matter which provision of the Constitution is
invoked to support the claim.
As Part III shows, enactment of a prohibition against sub-
abuse corporal punishment of children would constitute
governmental interference with parental conduct to precisely
this end of protecting the child's well-being. The prohibition
has even more justification than the street peddling statute at
issue in Prince because corporal punishment of children may
have lasting adverse side effects for the persons punished as
well as grave societal ramifications. It will be recalled that
corporal punishment is assessed by many authorities as doing
little to develop a child's conscience or to deter children's
objectionable behavior over the long run.582 In contrast, a host
of personal physical and mental ills, manifested during
childhood and later in adulthood, have been traced to this
practice.583  Corporal punishment may also be a factor
contributing to people's capacity for brutality towards each
other on a societal scale, either in the form of crime or of
genocide and war.5" It would seem that alleviating afflictions
of this ilk by deterring corporal punishment would ultimately
preserve rather than violate the Constitution. Moreover, even
if the studies and theories were to be dismissed as incon-
clusive or invalid, Part III also advances the idea that corporal
punishment of children should be criminalized for the simple
reason that it is morally wrong. It is morally wrong because a
child, like any other person, should be able to live free from
violence or the dread of violence. It is morally wrong because
the child's human dignity and very status as a human being is
cause in the abortion cases the state interference was patently in aid of parental
authority and ran counter to the minor's constitutional right to an abortion. A ban on
corporal punishment would restrict the extent of parents' powers. Moreover, this Arti-
cle takes no position on whether children have a constitutional right to be free of
corporal punishment.
581. See supra note 539 and accompanying text.
582. See supra notes 348, 353-54 and accompanying text.
583. See supra notes 349-50, 357-66, 376-85, 389-90 and accompanying text.
584. See supra notes 393, 404 and accompanying text.
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diminished when the child is struck as a matter of right.'
Indeed, as discussed earlier, corporal punishment of children
by any other name is, in its essential elements, a battery." If
the Constitution does not immunize a stranger who hits
another adult or even another person's child, then there can be
no valid reason, based on the data and principles mentioned
above, for the Constitution to immunize a parent who hits his
or her own child. This should especially be the case in view of
the Supreme Court's traditional sensitivity to the vulnerability
of children and recognition that they may therefore deserve
special solicitude from the law.
587
While a prohibition on all subabuse corporal punishment of
children would unquestionably interfere with parental
authority, this, by itself, is not necessarily un-American or un-
constitutional. American law does not treat the family as a
domain for the unfettered exercise of parental power. On the
contrary, the parent-child relationship is already subject to a
certain amount of regulation as an ordinary, unremarkable
incidence of living in a society that prides itself on respect for
all individuals, adults or children. Some governmental inter-
ference with this relationship is constitutional and some is
not. Even more than the state's interference with a child's
street peddling in Prince, the prohibition of corporal punish-
ment of children will shield children from enduring physical
and psychological damage; perhaps such a prohibition would
also give new impetus to society's humane impulses. Further-
more, by steering parents towards more productive and
healthful disciplinary techniques, the prohibition could also
585. See supra notes 413, 417-18 and accompanying text.
586. See supra notes 408, 439, 442-49 and accompanying text.
587. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-50 (1978) (holding that an
FCC order regulating a radio program which contained pervasively sexual and excre-
tory language did not violate the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause because,
although adults might have a constitutionally protected right to hear such materials,
the broadcast was accessible in private homes and especially to children); Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638-43 (1968) (upholding constitutionality of a New York
statute prohibiting sale of "girlie" magazines to minors based upon the theory that for
children's own good their freedom of expression is not coextensive with that of adults);
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168-70 (1944) (ruling that Massachusetts laws
may constitutionally proscribe children's proselytizing on the streets without violating
their right to free exercise of religion or to equal protection because "the power of the
state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over
adults").
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assist parents in their child rearing responsibilities-a proper
and highly desirable legislative goal.'
CONCLUSION
If all of our assumptions were valid, we would need neither
to think nor to change. We could simply follow the practices of
our forebears. History has shown, however, that assumptions,
no matter how longstanding or prevalent, can be ill-advised
and even immoral. At one time in the United States, slavery of
African-Americans was legal,58 9 and physical chastisement of
wives was assumed to be every husband's prerogative.590
Americans thought through these assumptions and ultimately
repudiated them. The process was hardly a smooth one. The
Civil War was fought, in part, over the legitimacy of slavery,59'
and a controversial women's liberation movement contributed
to the recognition that wife battering is wrong.92 Although
abolitionists and women's rights advocates prevailed, initially,
their pleas must have struck many as bizarre and too extreme.
But, what were radical ideas in one century became the norm
in the next century with the help of legal reform and attitudi-
nal transformations.
Like slavery and wife beating, corporal punishment of chil-
dren is symptomatic of a lack of regard for our fellow human
beings. Like slaves in the antebellum South and wives before
the advent of protective law reform, children in this country
hold an anachronistic subhuman status insofar as they alone
588. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) ("The legislature could
properly conclude that parents and others, teachers for example, who have this pri-
mary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to the support of laws
designed to aid discharge of that responsibility."); accord Bellotti v. Baird, 443 US.
622, 639 (1979) (plurality opinion); see also James Lindfield, Stopping Spanking. The
Parental Cessation of Corporal Punishment 21-34 (Jan. 1997) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (describing a
study showing that cessation of parental corporal punishment improves the parent-
child relationship and parents' control over their children's behavior).
589. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856); PETER KOLCHIN,
AMERICAN SLAVERY: 1619-1877 3 (1993).
590. See LORRAINE DUSKY, STILL UNEQUAL: THE SHAMEFUL TRUTH ABOUT WOMEN
AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA 262-63 (1996); OKIN, supra note 427, at 129.
591. See KOLCHIN, supra note 589, at 201; SMITH, supra note 426, at 1175-89; Ga-
bor S. Boritt, Civil War, in 4 THE WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA 614, 614 (1993).
592. See LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES: THE POLITICS AND
HISTORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE: BOSTON 1880-1960, at 251 (1988); OKIN, supra note
427, at 129.
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may legally be made the object of violence in the absence of
war or other armed conflict. We do not know what the world
would be like if a generation of children grew up, with the
benefit of adult guidance and discipline, but protected from
this legalized everyday violence. Certainly the experience of
childhood would be less painful and fearful. Perhaps the real-
ity of childhood would actually live up to its romantic billing as
a time of playfulness and trusting innocence. More intriguing
still, perhaps a generation raised without violence would have
a greater capacity for compassion and rational reflection and
less of an appetite for brutality and impulsive acts of anger.
Dare we forgo the possibility, novel and strange as it may seem
now, that a legal prohibition of corporal punishment of chil-
dren would someday help lead to a less brutish existence? It is
not an awful chance to take, for other countries and even one
of our own states have adopted such a prohibition and "society
has not collapsed." 93 If we dare to spare the rod, not only will
civilization continue, but human mercy may more readily
"droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven,"9 befittingly digni-
fying child and adult alike.
593. Flaherty, supra note 431. Irish Parliamentarian Mary Flaherty described the
mission of a recent delegation of Irish legislators to Sweden as being to "see if
[Swedish] society had collapsed" due to that country's prohibition of parental and
other corporal punishment of children. Id. She noted that the delegation was able to
bring home so favorable a report that two barristers were appointed to draft a new
law prohibiting all corporal punishment of children in Ireland. Id.
594. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 4, sc. 1, 1.185 (George
Lyman Kittredge ed., Ginn and Company 1945).
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